The recognition of the ethical in the context of professional life by Baron, Robert
THE RECOGNITION 
OF THE ETHICAL IN 










/'1, P'1 +! i ýf'1 ý! 
ý"r 






C, oUA: CTM 00 
1'74 
& A-PL 
THE RECOGNITION OF THE ETHICAL IN TIIE CONTEXT OF 
PROFESSIONAL LIFE 





Part I: Rationale for the Research, v 
(A) Origins, v 
(B) Progress and Development, vii 
Part II: Methodology, xii 
(A) Philosophical Analysis, xii 
(a) Meta-Ethical Theory, xiii 
(b) Moral Theory, xiv 
(c) Practical Ethics, xiv 
(B) The Empirical Survey of The Recognition of the Ethical in the Nursing 
Profession, xvii 
(i) Phase One, xviii 
(ii) Phase Two, xiv 
(iii) Phase Three, xx 
(iv) Phase Four, xxi 
(v) Phase Five, xxii 
Part III: Overview of the Arguments, xxiii 
(i) Chapter 1: Professional Ethics, xxiii 
(ii) Chapter 2: Ethical Theory: Moral Theory and Contextualism, xxv 
(iii) Chapter 3: Universalizability: Principles, Rules, and Codes of Conduct, xxvii 
(iv) Chapter 4: Impartiality: The Self, and Professional Roles, xxix 
(v) Conclusion, xxxi 
Notes, xxxii 
Chapter 1: Professional Ethics 
Introduction, 1 
Part I: The Concept of a Profession, 3 
(i) Non-Academic Definitions, 5 
(i. a) The Act of Professing, 6 
(i. b) Profession as Occupation, 7 
(ii) Academic Definitions, 9 
(ii. a) The Traits Approach, 10 
Figure 1: Definition of a Profession, 13 
(ii. b) Professionalisation, 18 
Figure 2: Professionalisation, 19 
(iii) Nursing, 21 
(iii. a) Cognitive Professionalisation, 21 
(iii. b) Normative Professionalisation, 23 
(iii. c) Evaluative Professionalisation, 26 
Part II: Ethics and the Profession, 29 
(i) The Shape of the Debate, 29 
(ii) The Deductive Paradigm, 32 
(iii) The Contextualist Conception, 35 
Notes, 41 
Chapter 2: Ethical Theory: Moral Theory and Contextualism 
Introduction, 45 
Part I: Ethical Theory, 46 
(i) Meta-ethics, 46 
(ii) Two Styles of Ethical Theory, 50 
Figure 3: Two Styles of Ethical Theory, 52 
(ii. a) The Moral Theory Approach, 52 
(ii. b) Contextualism, 57 
(iii) The Moral Point-Of-View and the Basic Question for Applied Ethical Theory, 60 
Part II: The Rejection of The Moral Theory Approach, 64 
Introduction, 64 
(i) The Distinction Between Ethical Theory and Moral Theory, 65 
(ii) The Principles and Presuppositions of The Moral Theory Approach, 66 
(ii. a) The Principle of Universalizability, 67 
(ii. b) The Principle of Impartiality, 67 
(ii. c) Commitment o a Rationalistic Procedure in Moral Argument, 68 
(ii. d) Prioritisation of Conceptions of what it is Right to do over Conceptions of what 
it is Good to be, 73 
Notes, 75 
Chapter 3: Universalizability: Principles, Rules and Codes of Conduct 
Introduction, 78 
Part I: Universalizability and The Moral Theory Approach, 80 
(i) The Principle of Universalizability, 80 
(i. a) Immanuel Kant, 81 
(i. b) Richard Hare, 87 
(i. c) Discourse Ethics, 88 
Part II: Universalizability and Codes of Conduct, 90 
(i) Codes of Conduct: The Problems of Codifiability and Justification, 90 
(i. a) The Problem of Justification, 94 
(i. b) The Problem of Codifiability, 97 
(i. c) Wittgenstein on Rule Following, 100 
(i. d) Contextualist Moral Reasoning, 105 
(i. e) Rules as Partial Specifications of Goods, 108 
(i. f) The Role of a Code of Conduct in Moral Reasoning, 109 
(i. g) Codes of Conduct as Narrative Frameworks, 116 
(i. h) Codes of Conduct and Professional Dialogical Structures, 117 
Notes, 123 
Chapter 4: Impartiality: The Self, and Professional Roles 
Introduction, 127 
(i) The Impartial Agent and the Narrative Self, 129 
Figure 4: Moral Agency and the Narrative Self, 130 
(ii) Acting in a Professional Role, 133 
(ii. a) Instrumental and Identity-Conferring Roles, 135 
(iii) Caring in a Nursing Role, 140 
(iii. a) Task Oriented Caring and Patient Oriented Caring, 141 
(iii. b) Caring as a Nurse is Neither Personal nor Impersonal, 151 
(iv) Moral Reasoning in an Identity-Conferring Role, 155 
(iv. a) Objections, 155 
(iv. b) People do not always Identify with a Role, 156 
(iv. c) Caring is not a Moral Concept, 156 
(iv. d) The Principle of Impartiality is Necessary for Moral Criticism, 157 
(v) Abandoning the Principle of Impartiality, 158 
(v. a) The Relevance of the Concept of Impartiality, 159 
(vi) The Non-Vocational Nurse, 163 
Notes, 164 
Conclusion 
(i) A Summary of the Arguments, 168 
(ii) A Final Reflection, 180 
Bibliography, 183 
Appendices, 217 
THE RECOGNITION OF THE ETHICAL IN THE CONTEXT OF 
PROFESSIONAL LIFE 
ROBERT BARON BA(hons) 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Wolverhampton for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
December 1999 
This work or any part of it thereof has not previously been presented in any form to 
the University or to any other body whether for the purposes of assessment, 
publication or for any other purpose (unless previously indicated). Save for any 
express acknowledgements, references and/or bibliographies cited in the work, I 
confirm that the intellectual content of the work is the result of my own efforts and of 
no other person. 
The right of Robert Baron to be identified as the author of this work is asserted in 
accordance with ss. 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. At this 
date copyright is owned by the author. 
Signature 
Date 20-. t2 - cýcl 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the ways in which ethical considerations are recognised in 
the context of professional life. It combines an empirical survey of the ethical 
opinions and practices of nursing professionals with philosophical analysis. Its 
central aim is to investigate the perceived discontinuity between the sort of 
theories traditionally offered by philosophers to provide guidance for ethical 
decision making and the actual decision making procedures typically engaged in 
by professionals in their daily working practices. Eventually the thesis seeks to 
identify an approach to professional ethics that is both theoretically plausible and 
practically useful. 
It is contended that a key way into the debate is to identify the two broad types of 
philosophical approach to the distinctive nature of professional ethics. These are 
labelled "The Moral Theory Approach" and "Contextualism". The Moral Theory 
Approach includes any specific theory which adopts the two fundamental 
principles of universalizability and impartiality, and the presuppositions that moral 
argument should be rationalistic in procedure and prioritise conceptions of what it 
is right to do over what it is good to be. The various forms of contextualism, by 
contrast, reject all of the aforementioned principles and presuppositions. At this 
point it is noted that while The Moral Theory Approach represents the "dominant" 
philosophical conception of the relationship between theory and practice, the 
evidence gathered in the empirical survey clearly favours a contextualist 
interpretation. From here onwards the contextualist position is supported by 
drawing upon theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to expose deep and 
irresolvable flaws in the principles and presuppositions of The Moral Theory 
Approach. These flaws are shown to account for the perceived discontinuity 
between ethical theory and professional practice, thus once they are diagnosed a 
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This introduction divides into three sections. In section I, I discuss the rationale for 
the research. First, I provide a short account of origins of the research and outline the 
main philosophical reason for studying "The Recognition of the Ethical in the Context 
of Professional Life". Second, I provide a brief account of how the research 
progressed and developed. In section II, I describe the methodologies used in the 
research. I identify philosophical analysis as the primary form of methodology, but 
also pay particular attention to the nature of the empirical research conducted among 
nurses (which provides a constant "practical" reference point for the philosophical 
claims I make throughout the thesis). In section III, I provide an overview of the 
arguments that I develop through the course of the thesis. 
................................................................... 
I 
Rationale for the Research 
(A) Origins 
Applied ethics (and hence professional ethics) is a relatively new area of academic 
study that began to constitute a significantly distinctive philosophical enterprise 
around the end of thel960s'. One of the key factors in its development was 
undoubtedly the heightened public prominence given to an increasing number and 
range of moral dilemmas occurring in professional life. In particular technological 
advances in the field of medicine created (and continue to create) a plethora of moral 
problems that practitioners seemed ill equipped to resolve2. Philosophers with an 
expertise in ethical theory seemed to present an obvious "solution" to this "deficit" in 
moral knowledge, and with problems concerning the application of ethical principles. 
The assumptions lying behind this view were that philosophers can: first, provide a 
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justification for adopting some particular moral theory's set of principles and rules; 
and, second, show how those principles and rules can be applied to specific areas of 
practice3. Applied ethics, then, quite aptly became the name for an activity in which 
an independently established moral theory is applied "top-down" to particular ethical 
problems. This "top-down" approach has been described as representing the 
"dominant conception" in applied ethics as it has formed the most common 
philosophical method adopted by theorists°. The prevalence of this approach should 
really come as no surprise as it flows quite naturally from the dominant traditional 
philosophical approach to ethical decision making adopted by theorists as different as 
Kantians and utilitarians. Despite the substantive differences in Kantian and 
utilitarian theories both approaches presuppose that the justification of any particular 
moral action depends upon it being sanctioned by (or derivable from) universal and 
impartial principles of moral theory. 
However, the original proposal of this research to investigate "The Recognition of the 
Ethical in the Context of Professional Life" had its source in evidence that 
philosophers working in the field of applied (professional) ethics were failing to show 
that ethical theory (principles and rules) could usefully be applied to resolve practical 
moral problems. Scepticism about the ability of philosophers to carry out this task 
has developed both from within the professions and within the philosophical 
community itself. Professionals frequently express bewilderment and doubt about the 
practical usefulness of ethical theories, finding that knowledge of utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, contractualism etc. still leaves them perplexed about what they are 
morally obliged to do in any particular cases. Philosophers, in support of this view, 
have independently argued that the very idea of applied ethics is theoretically flawed'. 
However, these two different sources of criticism, while related, have largely 
developed in isolation from each other. Thus, the possibility of combining the 
perspectives of professionals and philosophers together in one piece of work 
presented itself as an obvious way in which to make a constructive addition to the 
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discussion of professional ethics. Accordingly the aim of this thesis is to examine 
both lines of criticism together by embedding the results of an extensive survey of 
opinion among professionals (nurses) within a critical examination of the theoretical 
arguments of the philosophers. The fundamental point of this is to establish whether 
the views and working practices ofprofessionals (nurses) provide evidence for the 
theoretical claims of philosophers sceptical of the dominant conception of applied 
ethics, or whether the dominant conception can be upheld. 
(B) Progress and Development 
It is, perhaps, both an inevitable and constructive feature of any piece of social 
research that it begins with an initial conception of how it should progress but 
develops in ways, which can be quite unexpected. This is even more obviously the 
case with this piece of research, which has sought to combine traditional methods of 
philosophical analysis with empirical methods of surveying professional opinion. 
This, of course, is not typical for a piece of philosophical research and as a 
consequence considerable effort was expended in a period of trial and error in order to 
establish which empirical methods were most appropriate in feeding information into 
philosophical analysis. The result has often been that certain lines of empirical 
enquiry either had to be abandoned or radically reformulated. Indeed, it is fair to say 
that it was the empirical aspect of the research that raised the most difficult questions 
and problems, I wish to mention three of the most influential issues here. First, there 
was the question of whom to survey to get a genuinely representative understanding of 
the ways in which professionals "recognise the ethical" in their working lives. 
Secondly, there was the question of how to survey the opinion of professionals in a 
way that genuinely reflects their ethical views and practices. Thirdly, there was the 
question of how to embed the empirical research within a broader philosophical 
analysis of the recognition of the ethical in the context of professional life. I shall 
comment upon the first of these issues here and discuss the latter two issues in the 
next section on methodology. 
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At the outset of the research it was decided that while the reading for it could range 
widely over a variety of different professional contexts the empirical survey among 
professionals should focus upon two professions. There were two main reasons for 
this. The first consideration concerned the issue of time resources: as this thesis is 
fundamentally a piece of philosophy the bulk of the time expended on it needed to be 
spent in philosophical analysis and not in empirically investigating large numbers of 
professional practices. The second consideration concerned the wish to examine 
professional ethics in both public sector and private sector contexts in order to see 
whether any relevant differences emerge. Accordingly, nursing, midwifery and health 
visiting, and business management were selected as appropriate areas for the 
empirical survey. 
Business management was, of course, a controversial area to select for a study of 
professional ethics; however, there were good reasons to choose it in the context of 
this piece of research. First, there is clear evidence that business management as an 
occupation is perceived as comparable to other forms of professional life (for 
example, managers are seen as belonging to the same sort of class and status as 
professionals). Second, there are clear examples of business management which 
structurally resemble key features of paradigm professions (for example, bank 
managers and lawyers both provide crucial services, and both are held accountable for 
protecting the best interests of their clients). Third, the widespread introduction of the 
postgraduate award Master of Business Administration (MBA) can be seen as 
paralleling the sort of university qualifications achieved by standard professionals. 
Fourth, a number of academic authors see business ethics as being best developed 
along the same lines as professional ethics'. Finally, business management provided 
the best opportunity for comparing ethical opinions surveyed from the private sector 
with those surveyed from a largely public sector context. 
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The choice of nursing, midwifery and health visiting (hereafter abbreviated to 
nursing) was relatively uncontroversial. While it does not share the same public 
status as the paradigm professions of medicine and law the evidence that it has 
professionalised is indisputable. Since the implementation of the Nurses, Midwives 
and Health Visitors Act 1979 which brought into being its own independent 
regulatory body (the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and 
Health Visiting, UKCC), nursing has undergone a very explicit self-conscious process 
of professionalisation. I discuss this process at length in chapter 1, so will comment 
no further here. 
There was an immediate and good response from the nursing profession to a variety 
of different survey techniques and a substantial amount of empirical evidence was 
accumulated for initial analysis. However, response from business management was 
poor. Initially I attempted to survey the opinions of bank managers as the sort of 
service they provide and the accountability they have to serve the best interests of 
their clients bears a striking resemblance to that of other professionals (mentioned 
above). I contacted the head offices of all the major banks and building societies 
requesting the opportunity to interview branch managers and/or individuals 
responsible for ethical issues within their companies. However, none of them were 
willing to cooperate with the research (although a few kindly sent me their annual 
reports). As a consequence I cast my net wider seeking interviews with any business 
managers by sending letters to chambers of commerce in the West Midlands area 
asking them to put me in contact with any interested companies or individuals, and 
also by using informal contacts. This time I had a more positive response although it 
still represented nothing like as good as the response gained from the nursing 
profession. By the time I produced the transfer document from MPhil to PhD the 
state of the empirical research stood as follows: 
ix 
Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting 
(a) Questionnaires - 163 
(b) Focused interviews - 31 
(c) Written reports from professionals - 13 
(d) Observations - 11 (9 ethics training sessions, 2 hospital ethics committees) 
Business Management 
(a) Questionnaires - 13 
(b) Focused interviews - 11 
(c) Written reports from managers -1 
(d) Observations -1 (conference) 
As I stated in the transfer document the difference between the figures for nursing and 
the figures for business management represented a serious threat to the idea that the 
two sets of data could be genuinely or usefully compared. Accordingly, at that stage I 
proposed to continue with a strenuous effort to gain more co-operation from the 
business community in the hope of generating enough empirical data for comparison. 
However, I also identified two alternative strategies to pursue with the research and 
maintain the integrity of its original aims if this data was not eventually forthcoming. 
The first option involved concentrating solely on the nursing profession as the source 
of empirical data for the research. Although this loses an in-depth comparison with 
the commercial sector there remained the opportunity for a comparison within the 
nursing profession of the opinions of nurses working in public sector and private 
sector contexts. The second option involved limiting the comparison of nursing and 
business management to the extant literature. The empirical data thus gathered from 
among business managers would then be compared only with the literature on 
business management ethics (to see, for example, whether the literature accurately 
reflects the opinions of managers) and this in turn compared with the literature on 
nursing ethics. 
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In the months that followed the passing of the transfer document some significant 
progress was made with generating more empirical data from among business 
managers. However, in my judgement the data produced was insufficient for 
comparison with the data collected from nursing, for two main reasons. First, the 
difference in the quantity of empirical data collected from the two sources continued 
to increase, so much so that comparison became implausible. Second, and more 
importantly, the quality of the data collected significantly differed. In order to 
generate more data from business management, managers from quite different sorts of 
companies were surveyed (from large corporations down to very small family firms) 
with the result that it became clear that they represented a rather disparate collection 
of individuals with no clear identity. It was, in effect, impossible to determine a 
coherent and consistent view that could be said to represent the ethical opinions of 
business managers. That meant in turn that there was no clear set of opinions of 
business managers that could be compared with the opinions of nurses. This in itself 
is an interesting finding and deserves further research elsewhere; however, given the 
nature of the research proposal for this thesis it represented a clear obstacle to 
fulfilling its objectives. It also became clear that the second alternative strategy 
proposed in the transfer document (described above, page x) would also prove 
fruitless in pursuing the research objectives. Thus, it became obvious that the most 
coherent way to proceed with the empirical research was to concentrate solely on the 
nursing profession. Naturally it was frustrating to find that a very considerable 
amount of research (reading and surveying) would find no place in the final thesis; 
however, I hope that the lessons learnt travelling up this particular cul-de-sac have led 





Use of a variety of methodologies was needed in gathering and analysing the data for 
the research. Their choice was guided by three important considerations. First (and 
foremost), the research has been produced as a work of philosophy, thus the primary 
methodology used throughout the thesis is philosophical analysis. The second 
consideration concerned the means by which the empirical data should be gathered 
from the nursing profession. The key issues here were that the data collected should 
be comprehensive and impartial. Accordingly, this involved the application of some 
well-established social research methods. The third consideration concerned the 
question of how best to incorporate the data gathered from the nursing profession into 
the philosophical analysis which forms the body of the research. 
(A) Philosophical Analysis 
What constitutes philosophical analysis is exceptionally difficult to describe in 
general terms. To say that it involves critical reflection upon concepts and theories 
requiring the identification and assessment of the presuppositions lying behind their 
meaning and use is of course true but not very helpful. Luckily, however, 
philosophical analysis is easy to spot when it presents itself, especially in written 
form, and I feel confident that the reader will see that this thesis clearly belongs to the 
philosophical tradition. In particular, chapter 2 will lay out very explicitly what 
constitutes philosophical analysis in the specific field of applied ethics. 
I have utilised two main sources for philosophical analysis: texts and the data 
gathered from the empirical survey of the nursing profession. 
xi i 
(i) Texts 
The most extensive source utilised for philosophical analysis in this research is a 
variety of academic and professional texts. These discuss issues of moral theory and 
practical (professional) ethics. The majority of these were books and journals 
produced by academics working in philosophy departments. This was supported by a 
survey of books and journals written by nursing professionals. (Additionally, for 
chapter 1 only, sociological texts where surveyed in order to discuss the concept of a 
profession. ) These texts can be grouped into three general semi-distinct and 
overlapping categories which I shall label "Meta-Ethical Theory", "Moral Theory" 
and "Practical Ethics". Some texts fall solely into one or other of these categories, 
some cut across two of them, and many cut across all three (depending upon the 
particular presuppositions and objectives of the authors concerned). 
(a) Meta-Ethical Theory 
"Meta-ethics" is a term that I use with a health warning as it has a controversial 
history (which I discuss at length in chapter 2). It had its origins in the use by certain 
positivistic philosophers to describe a logico-linguistic analysis of moral language 
which, it was claimed, is entirely free of any normative implications'. This 
understandably resulted in many critics rejecting the term as it became clear that what 
one says about the logic, meaning, and use of moral language will inevitably affect 
one's substantive ethical views9. However, while I agree with the critics that 
philosophical analysis of moral language will always have substantive implications, I 
believe it is worth preserving the (reconstructed) term to identify those philosophical 
works that are concerned primarily with the question of how we think (or should 
think) ethically rather than with the question of what we think (or should think) 
ethically. For example, some of the most influential recent works in philosophical 
ethics such as Alasdair Maclntyre's "After Virtue", Charles Taylor's "Sources of the 
Self', Bernard Williams's "Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy" are clearly books 
concerned with the question of how we think (or should think) when we engage in 
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ethical reasoning10. While their arguments have important implications for 
determining what to think ethically, none of these authors are really concerned to 
identify any specific principles or rules. Given the objectives of their books they 
understandably see that this activity belongs to a different type of work ("moral 
theory" and/or "practical ethics"). It is worth noting here that meta-ethics redefined in 
terms of the question concerning how to think ethically provides a perfect label for 
this thesis. My concern in this research is certainly not to make any direct suggestions 
about what specific principles, rules and values nurses should incorporate into 
working practice. Rather, I am concerned to analyse how nurses think and could 
improve their thinking about ethical issues, from which I draw general conclusions 
about the nature of moral reasoning in professional life (in chapter 2I describe this as 
providing a "meta-ethical foundation for professional ethics"). 
(b) Moral Theory 
Texts in this category tend to overlap to some extent with meta-ethical theory and 
practical ethics. However, what singles them out as a reasonably distinct class is that 
they seek to defend some particular systematic theory with direct conclusions about 
what fundamental principles and rules should guide moral decision making. Thus the 
works of Kant, Mill, Sidgwick, Habermas etc. fall into this category". To varying 
degrees these authors engage in meta-ethical analysis, however, their major 
preoccupation is to establish some set of universal and impartial principles for direct 
application to practical contexts (see chapter 2). 
(c) Practical Ethics 
Texts in this category include a greater variety of authors and styles. Whereas meta- 
ethics and moral theory are pretty much the exclusive province of philosophers, 
contributors to practical ethics also include professionals (nurses, doctors, lawyers 
etc. ) and lay persons (for example, lobbyists such as environmentalists, anti- 
vivisectionists, etc. ). The concern of texts in practical ethics is to identify or raise 
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specific ethical questions and problems and provide support for adopting some 
particular answer(s). Thus, Peter Singer's well known book "Practical Ethics"' seeks 
to answer specific questions about abortion, and animal rights (etc). Ruth Chadwick 
and Winn Tadd in their book "Ethics and Nursing Practice", seek to answer specific 
questions such as "Must nurses always obey doctors? "". Some texts in practical 
ethics clearly overlap with moral theory: for example, Singer makes explicit appeal to 
utilitarianism in determining answers to the specific problems of abortion and animal 
rights. Other texts touch remotely if at all upon moral theory, for example, Chadwick 
and Tadd appeal directly to case study analysis in providing answers rather than moral 
theory. 
(ii) Nursing Opinion and Practice 
The data gathered from the empirical survey of nursing opinion and working practice 
presented the second major source of material for philosophical analysis. The two 
key methodological questions here (as I noted above, p. xii) were, first, how to 
conduct the survey, and, second, how to embed the data gathered therefrom within the 
main body of the research. I shall deal with the first of these questions in a separate 
more extensive section below, so here I shall comment briefly upon the second issue. 
In section I (B) "Progress and Development", I noted that it was unusual for a piece of 
philosophical research to involve an extensive survey of professional opinion and 
working practice. This, I suggested, offers a good opportunity to add something 
constructive to the debate on professional ethics. However, it also raises the difficult 
question of how to incorporate such data into a specifically philosophical ethical 
analysis. Central to the difficulty is the fact that philosophers are not in the game of 
merely reflecting common opinion about what individuals actually think and do, but 
are concerned to investigate what individuals ought ethically to think and do. In some 
cases this level of abstraction from actual belief and practice has led to an 
unacceptable attitude of contempt for common opinion (perhaps government house 
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utilitarianism provides a good example), and no doubt it has also led to some 
philosophers defending implausible moral positions as a result of privileging 
philosophical dogma over the voice of common-sense. However, it is certainly an 
important truth that if philosophy is to contribute anything worthwhile to professional 
ethics (and ethics generally) it must provide some form of critical activity through 
which commonly accepted moral principles, values, and actions can be challenged 
and assessed. My guiding concern, then, has been to avoid being ensnared by either 
of two polarised positions: that of merely reflecting professional opinion at the 
expense of critical philosophical analysis, or, consistently privileging the theoretical 
"wisdom" of philosophers over the practical experience of practitioners. This has 
certainly proved to be no easy task, and may ultimately be impossible due to the very 
nature of the on-going dynamic of critical moral reflection. However, throughout the 
production of this thesis I have tested a variety of approaches and settled for one 
which I believe represents a genuine attempt to synthesise professional and 
philosophical perspectives, and which has enabled the arguments of the thesis to be 
developed in the most fluent manner. 
Initially I proposed to write a separate chapter (or chapters) on nursing ethics; 
comprehensively laying out the results of the empirical survey from which I intended 
to identify and discuss the substantive issues raised in the nursing profession. I then 
intended to analyse these in the light of competing ethical theories in later chapters. 
However, the results of attempting this proved to be unsatisfactory in two particular 
ways. First, it took up an inordinate amount of space. In writing up a chapter which 
was both genuinely comprehensive and coherent I had to discuss issues that would not 
have any real relevance for the fundamental theoretical concerns of the later chapters. 
It became clear, then, that I needed to be more selective in the material I chose from 
the survey. Second, and connectedly, writing up the chapter in this way had the effect 
of making the thesis resemble a typical applied ethics textbook with quite distinct 
sections on ethical theory and practical ethics. While this might be acceptable for a 
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textbook, it created a feeling of discontinuity between the theoretical and the practical 
which is precisely what I wished to avoid in this research. Thus, it became clear that I 
needed to incorporate the empirical research much more intimately into the 
philosophical analysis. 
The obvious solution to both of these problems was to scrap the idea of writing a 
separate chapter on nursing ethics and begin immediately with laying out the 
important theoretical issues that had arisen from the empirical survey and the 
philosophical analysis of the literature. Then, wherever relevant, aspects of the 
empirical research (extracts from interviews, etc) could be incorporated into the text 
to illustrate the philosophical points being made. One result of this, however, is that 
the opinions of professionals play a less explicit or overt role in the text of the thesis. 
Nonetheless, I hope it will be apparent throughout, that at all times the arguments 
raised and addressed in the research have been significantly (if implicitly) influenced 
and informed by the survey of professional opinion and working practice. The overall 
effect, in my view, has been far more satisfactory; enabling a fluent integration of the 
practical and theoretical issues that are of most relevance to the objectives of the 
thesis. 
Accordingly, in the next section I shall concentrate on describing the social research 
methods used in gathering the empirical data from the nursing profession and give a 
brief account of its progress and development. The substantive issues raised therein 
will be dealt with in the philosophical analysis of the subsequent chapters. 
(B) The Empirical Survey of the Recognition of the Ethical in the Nursing 
Profession" 
The empirical survey progressed in five distinct phases, which, in some cases, were 
not so much planned as forced upon me by a combination of inexperience and the 
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natural pattern that developed in the on-going process of research. Phase one 
consisted of an orienting period where I sought to establish the nature of the ethical 
structures I needed to investigate and the choice of social research methods most 
appropriate to them. Phase two consisted of the initial process of surveying the 
nursing profession (and business management). Phase three consisted of the collation 
and analysis of the data gathered from nursing. It was decided at this stage that the 
research would benefit from a second empirical survey (for reasons I discuss below). 
Phase four consisted of the second survey of the nursing profession. Phase five 
consisted of the collation and analysis of the data gathered in the second survey, and 
its subsequent incorporation into the text of the thesis. 
(i) Phase one 
Before any formal surveying of professional opinion and practices could be usefully 
conducted it was important to identify what sort of structures for the recognition of 
the ethical existed within the nursing profession. In an initial orienting period I 
gained an overview of the most important issues raised in the literature (books and 
journals), and contacted a variety of institutions and organisations which impact upon 
the profession of nursing in order to seek their opinions on what they considered to be 
the most important issues in nursing ethics (for example: local hospitals, local health 
authorities, the Royal College of Nursing, the Queen's Nursing Institute, Good 
Practices in Mental Health, the Registered Nursing Homes Association, the General 
Medical Council, the Patient's Association, etc. ) Accordingly three general areas 
were singled out as requiring intensive research: (a) the extant literature on nursing 
ethics - this included books, journals and articles written by academics and working 
professionals. (b) The formal provision for ethics that is made within the 
professional organisational structure: this included three main areas; education and 
training, codes of conduct (their provision and implementation), and ethics 
committees (within hospitals and the profession). (c) The opinions and working 
practices of individual professionals: this included both the explicit expression of 
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ethical views and values, and the implicitly embodied views and values displayed in 
behaviour. 
Once these categories were identified it was possible to consider which social 
research methods would be most appropriate. As regards the literature on nursing 
ethics the most obvious method of research was the same philosophical analysis 
running through the text of the thesis (although informal discussions with some 
authors have also been useful here). However, the other two areas of research 
required more specific methods of enquiry which included the following: (a) 
questionnaires (see appendix I(a) and I(b)), (b) focused interviews, (c) written reports 
(see appendix I(c)), (d) observation. Questionnaires were selected as offering the best 
opportunity to gain a wide sample of opinion from among nurses, Focused 
interviews were selected in order to gain a more in-depth opinion from a smaller 
sample of nurses. This, of course, would also give me an opportunity to explore the 
reasons and motives lying behind an individual's opinions, and develop lines of 
enquiry that were unanticipated". Written reports were selected in order to offer the 
opportunity for nurses nationally to contribute evidence of particular (ethical) 
experiences. All the major nursing journals were contacted (for example: Nursing 
Times, British Journal of Nursing, Nursing Standard, Professional Nurse etc. ) and 
asked to publish an invitation to their readers to write to me and describe any moral 
dilemmas they have personally encountered. Observation techniques were selected 
in order to witness for myself the ways in which the ethical is incorporated into actual 
day-to-day professional practice. 
(ii) Phase two 
The prospect of gathering of a significant amount of data from the nursing profession 
was helped enormously by the fact that the University of Wolverhampton runs a 
popular degree course in health care (nursing). The course is attended by a variety of 
nurses, midwives, and health visitors, ranging significantly in age and cultural 
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background. Typically the nurses were in full-time employment and completed the 
course on a day-release basis. It was not difficult gaining co-operation from this 
group of individuals who were clearly interested in reflecting upon and developing 
their professional career. Accordingly, they formed the bulk of the individuals 
surveyed. 
The initial survey period took me up to and just beyond the production of the transfer 
document from Mphil to PhD. At the end of the period of the survey I had gathered 
the following data: 
(a) Questionnaires - 232 (28 from the private sector) 
(b) Focused interviews - 39 (6 from the private sector) 
(c) Written reports - 13 
(d) Observations - 15 (11 formal ethics training sessions, 2 hospital ethics 
committees, 2 shadowing a nurse on-the-ward) 
(iii) Phase three 
Phase three involved the collation and analysis of the data gathered in phase two, and 
an assessment of how and where to develop the research from there. I shall leave the 
results of the philosophical analysis of the data to manifest itself in the main text of 
the thesis. Accordingly, I shall restrict myself here to commenting upon the important 
methodological issues that arose. On the whole I was happy with the initial empirical 
survey; however, there were three particular areas that I felt needed to be addressed, 
requiring a further period of surveying. 
The most important issue related to the decision to scrap the survey among business 
management (explained above). This meant that I needed to increase the amount of 
data collected from nurses working in the private sector in order to see whether the 
recognition of the ethical differed between public sector and private sector contexts. 
First, I decided to conduct more interviews with private sector nurses; second, I 
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decided to distribute an amended questionnaire which included one extra question 
relating to the private sector context (see appendix I(b)). 
The second issue which needed to be addressed concerned the lack of questions in the 
questionnaire about the extent to which a nurse personally identified with her role as a 
nurse, and the extent to which this influences her ethical decision making. It became 
clear in the interviews that many nurses did indeed significantly identify with their 
professional role and that this was a very important factor in the way they recognised 
the ethical in their professional life (chapter 4 discusses the importance of this issue at 
length). Accordingly one extra question on this issue was included in the amended 
questionnaire (see appendix I(b)). 
The third issue which arose from the initial survey concerned my own ability to 
conduct the interviews in an unbiased fashion. In analysing the tape-recordings it 
became clear that in 14 of the interviews I had allowed my own ethical opinions to 
influence the answers of the interviewee. It became important to ensure that future 
interviews were conducted in a non-leading manner (as I hope will be apparent in the 
excerpts taken from the interviews dispersed through the main text). 
(iv) Phase four 
The following data were gathered from the second phase of empirical surveying: 
(a) Questionnaires - 137 (46 from the private sector) 
(b) Focused interviews - 29 (19 from the private sector) 
(c) Written reports -I 
(d) Observations -3 (3 shadowing a nurse on-the- ward, including 1 from the private 
sector) 
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I was happy that the second empirical survey was successful in addressing all three 
problems identified with the first survey. 
(v) Phase five 
Phase five concluded the surveying by collating and analysing the data gathered in 
both phases of empirical research. Combined together the data of both constituted a 
substantial empirical basis for the research. The final figures were: 
(a) Questionnaires- 369 (74 from the private sector); 
(b) Interviews - 54 (24 from the private sector) 16; 
(c) Written reports - 14; 
(d) Observations - 18 (11 formal ethics training sessions, 2 hospital ethics 
committees, 5 shadowing a nurse on-the-ward, including 1 from the private sector). 
I have already discussed in section II(a) (above) the ways in which the empirical data 
have come to be incorporated into the main body of the thesis. Accordingly, I shall 
conclude this section on methodology with a few remarks about the usefulness of 
each method. The least useful method turned out to be the written reports. There 
were two reasons for this: first, they were few in number, second, they varied in 
quality of detail and expression. Having said that, some were very informative and I 
include two examples in appendix I(c). The questionnaires proved useful in a number 
of ways. In particular, they enabled me to get a good general picture of nursing 
attitudes to key ethical questions which I was able to pursue in far more detail in the 
interviews (I frequently used an individual's answers to the questionnaire to structure 
the focused interview with her). The interviews proved to be the most useful 
methodology. First, they enabled me to gain a very in-depth understanding of the 
reasons and motives why nurses hold particular ethical opinions. Second, and most 
importantly of all, they provided me with the opportunity to understand how nurses 
typically get a grasp on ethical issues, and the ways in which they engage in ethical 
reasoning. Taking extracts from the interviews also proved to be the most fluent and 
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constructive means to incorporate empirical evidence into the text of the thesis. 
Similarly, observations also proved to be a very useful methodology (although there 
were fewer of these). The most informative observations involved shadowing a nurse 
on-the-ward as she conducted her daily tasks. This enabled me to assess the extent to 
which actual behaviour embodied explicit and implicit ethical values. The overall 
combination of questionnaires, interviews, and observations ensured a very thorough 
empirical of the picture of the recognition of the ethical in the nursing profession. 
Without a doubt the most important effect the empirical research had on this thesis 
was to direct its theoretical concerns in quite specific ways. First, it confirmed the 
general point, which is perhaps obvious to professionals but not always so obvious to 
philosophers: that ethics must first and foremost concentrate on the question of how 
ethical considerations feed into practical decision making. This, in effect, constitutes 
the general question I seek to answer in this thesis. Second, it narrowed the focus of 
this general question, when taken in the context of professional decision making, 
upon two key issues: namely, (1) the nature and function of ethical principles and 
rules, and (2) the ethical implications that follow from filling a professional role. 
............................................................. 
III 
Overview of the Arguments 
(i) Chapter 1: Professional Ethics 
This chapter divides into two sections. Section I is quite different from any other part 
of the thesis in that it deals with concerns that are sociological rather than 
philosophical. There is a very good reason for this: the findings of the empirical 
survey and theoretical analysis of this thesis argue fundamentally that acting in a 
professional role has crucial consequences for the nature of ethical reasoning; 
however, the vast majority of recent sociology is very sceptical of the very idea of a 
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profession. Many sociologists argue that there are no genuine grounds which support 
a distinction between occupations in terms of the concept of a profession (other than 
that certain occupations have somehow come to monopolise and control certain areas 
of working life). More: they then go on to argue that the avowed concern with ethics 
which "professions" claim is nothing other than an attempt to serve their own self- 
interests by deluding the general public that their aims are altruistic and guided by 
high moral values. Now, my argument is not that professionals always pursue 
altruistic ends but rather that there is something structurally significant about 
professional contexts that has distinctive implications for the nature of ethical 
reasoning. Thus I considered it quite important at this initial stage in the thesis to at 
least blunt the arguments of sceptical sociologists. Accordingly, I do not intend the 
arguments of the first section as a knock-down refutation of these sociological claims, 
rather I intend them to hold these sociologists at bay in order to pursue my arguments 
to the contrary throughout the rest of the thesis. I should perhaps note here (in a spirit 
of honesty becoming of a thesis in ethics) that even I myself find the arguments of this 
first section somewhat turgid: this is probably the result of my interests lying with 
philosophy and not sociology, with the result that I have undoubtedly made the 
sociological arguments appear a lot less interesting than they really are. I hope this is 
at least understandable if not entirely forgivable. 
Section II begins the philosophical enterprise. Here I outline two general accounts of 
what makes professional ethics a distinctive area of ethics meriting consideration in 
its own right. As Bernard Williams has argued, what gives the idea of professional 
ethics any content is the idea that it diverges from ordinary morality (see pp. 30-32), 
often requiring professionals to do things that would otherwise be unacceptable or 
develop certain dispositions of character otherwise undesirable. The two general 
accounts of what makes professional ethics distinctive are really accounts of what 
explains and justifies this divergence. On one account, which I label the "Deductive 
Paradigm", professional ethics is regarded as a specific adaptation of 
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general/ordinary morality. This claims that professionals are bound by exactly the 
same universal principles, rules, and values as ordinary citizens; it just happens to be 
a contingent feature of professional contexts that when those principles, rules, and 
values are applied therein they often legitimate actions that would be unacceptable in 
non-professional contexts. The other account, which I label the "Contextualist 
Conception" denies that the divergence of professional ethics can be accounted for as 
a specific adaptation of general/ordinary morality. It accepts that professional ethics 
can be justified within ordinary morality but rejects the idea that this involves appeal 
to universal principles, rules, and values. On this account professional ethics forms 
an independent part of morality fundamentally non-deducible from the general 
principles of ordinary morality. This latter account, then, represents a more radical 
account of the divergence of professional ethics from general/ordinary morality. 
(ii) Chapter 2: Ethical Theory: Moral Theory and Contextualism 
This chapter divides into two sections. In section I the aim is to provide an in-depth 
account of the nature of ethical theory and its relation to applied ethics. I begin by 
providing a very general description of the meta-ethical and normative elements that 
any ethical theory must contain. Then I distinguish between two styles of ethical 
theory: one I label "The Moral Theory Approach" and the other "Contextualism". 
These, I claim, lead to radically different conceptions of the nature of applied ethics 
(and hence professional ethics). The Moral Theory Approach contains four elements: 
(moral) intuitions, meta-ethics, moral theory, and, practical ethics. The process of 
theorising moves from the meta-ethical analysis of "common-sense" intuitions, to the 
production of moral theory, and then the application of moral theory to practical 
ethical problems. Contextualism by contrast moves from the meta-ethical analysis of 
"common-sense" intuitions, to an account of the good, which gets expressed in 
practical ethics. The absolutely crucial difference between the two approaches 
centres, then, upon what meta-ethical analysis of intuitions implies about how we 
should go on to resolve practical ethical problems. The Moral Theory Approach 
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claims that it requires the development of a moral theory, Contextualism rejects moral 
theory in favour of an account of the good. I make it clear at this stage that the 
expression "Moral Theory" is being used in a very specific way to denote a 
constituent part of ethical theory -a sub-theory which consists of a set of universal 
principles and general axioms which justify or entail a systematic set of rules or 
duties from which particular moral judgements are deduced. (From here onwards I 
use the capitalised term "Moral Theory" to prevent confusion with the use of "moral 
theory" as a synonym for ethical theory). Contextualists deny that any such set of 
universal principles and rules can be abstracted from the meta-ethical analysis of 
moral intuitions. Instead, they argue that some account of what constitutes a good life 
to lead is explicitly or implicitly embodied within practice. For the contextualist, 
then, there is no role for a deductive application of any sort of theory in resolving 
moral problems. Having described these two styles of ethical theory I discuss a 
representative example of each approach (Henry Sidgwick for The Moral Theory 
Approach, and Aristotle for Contextualism). I note that in dividing theorists at the 
level of ethical theory I am grouping together individuals who are regarded as 
opponents at the level of Moral Theory (for example: Kantians and utilitarians both 
fall under The Moral Theory Approach). A crucial conclusion from this is that what 
divides Moral Theorists is less important for applied ethics than what unites them in 
regard to the fundamental presuppositions of The Moral Theory Approach. 
From this point I seek to establish the ground upon which I intend to compare the two 
approaches. In this light I identify one fundamental issue for which any ethical theory 
must provide a plausible account: namely, what is involved in reasoning from the 
moral-point-of-view. I note that this must incorporate first person and third person 
perspectives. The first-person perspective recognises that any particular piece of 
moral reasoning is always the reasoning of some particular individual, which must 
motivate her as such, The third-person perspective recognises that any particular 
piece of moral reasoning must also reflect considerations that transcend the merely 
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personal concerns of the individual concerned. Accordingly, I identify what I 
describe as the "Basic Question" for Applied Ethical Theory: How can a stretch of 
practical reasoning incorporate the fact that it needs to reflect reasoning that is 
specifically mine (and motivate me as such) yet at the same time reflect standards that 
transcend my own specific concerns? 
In section III become partisan and lay out the basis for a rejection of The Moral 
Theory Approach. Accordingly, I lay out two core principles and two presuppositions 
of the Moral Theory Approach which I intend to attack at length in the two chapters 
that follow. The two core principles are: (a) the principle of universalizability, and, 
(b) the principle of impartiality. The two core presuppositions are: (c) commitment to 
a rationalistic procedure in moral argument, and, (b) prioritisation of conceptions of 
what it is right to do over conceptions of what it is good to be. 
(iii) Chapter 3: Universalizability: Principles, Rules, and Codes of Conduct 
This chapter divides into two sections. In section I, I begin by defining the principle 
of universalizability as the requirement that any particular principle or rule that one 
adopts could or should be a principle or rule that anyone in relevantly similar 
circumstances could or should adopt. I then describe the principle as it is utilised in 
three different Moral Theories (Kant, Hare, and discourse ethics) in order to show that 
it forms a fundamental principle of any Moral Theory. During this discussion I seek 
to show two other important things, First, that the principle serves as the primary 
principle of justification for more particular principles, rules, and values which are 
supposed to be tested against it. Second, that this leads to a rationalistic approach to 
moral argument. 
Section II focuses the issues raised in the first section (and the previous chapter) 
concerning the form of moral justification and the rationalistic procedure in 
argumentation that result from adoption of the principle of universalizability upon the 
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more specific issues concerning the nature and function of codes of professional 
ethics/conduct. I seek to show that The Moral Theory Approach to codes of 
professional ethics/conduct demands two things: first, that the principles, rules, and 
values embodied in the code can be justified in the light of some form of 
universalistic Moral Theory (I label this "the problem of justification"). Second, that 
the principles, rules, and values embodied in a code can be explicitly stated so as to 
provide clear guidance to anyone who is covered by it (I label this "the problem of 
codifiability"). Making use of the data gathered from the empirical survey of nursing, 
and theoretical arguments produced by philosophers (in particular: Wittgenstein and 
Maclntyre) I seek to show that the demands upon codes made by Moral Theorists are 
neither justified nor possible to fulfil. As regards justification: I argue that the idea 
that codes need to be justified by appeal to universal principles is founded upon a 
mistaken Moral Theory dogma that unless codes can be justified in this way they must 
represent nothing more than the parochial prejudices of professional organisations, In 
contrast I outline the narrative structure of a contextualist justification of 
professional codes which situates the process firmly within the dialogical practices of 
a profession, and of society generally. As regards the problem of codifiability: I argue 
that it is impossible to understand a principle or rule separately from practice. 
Drawing on the seminal work of Wittgenstein, as well as examples from the empirical 
survey of nursing, I demonstrate that moral rules cannot be specified in advance of 
their application in a way that can guide what should be done in some specific case. 
Rules gain their application within practice in the light of judgements made by 
individuals concerning the goods at stake in following the rule one way or another in 
some particular case. Accordingly, I conclude that codes of professional 
ethics/conduct cannot be understood in the terms of Moral Theory. Instead, I argue 
that codes should be understood narratively, that the principles and rules they contain 
should be seen as (partial) specifications of the central goods pursued within a 
profession, in terms of which any particular action can be justified. This, of course, 
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demands a non-rationalistic reading of codes and a concentration upon questions 
concerning the good rather than the right. 
(iv) Chapter 4: Impartiality: The Self, and Professional Roles 
In this chapter I argue that Moral Theorists are committed to a sharp distinction 
between personal and impersonal reasons for action, in the process aligning morality 
with those reasons that are purely impersonal. Accordingly I focus on two questions: 
first, whether it is actually possible for an agent to reason morally from a purely 
impartial perspective (as the principle of impartiality demands). Second, and more 
importantly, I consider whether it is actually necessary to do so. In regards to the first 
question I raise serious doubts that adopting a purely impartial position is possible. I 
argue that it creates an implausible split in an individual's practical reasoning between 
what I describe as her "moral agency" and the agency of her "narrative self'. The 
narrative self has a life history characterised by attachments to a whole variety of 
particular individuals and personal projects that, indeed, give a particular life its 
meaning and purpose; however, if moral agency is aligned with impartiality then any 
particular agent must abstract from the concerns of her narrative self when she 
engages in moral reasoning. This seems to make an answer to the Basic Question 
(see above) unachievable as it locates morality solely in the realm of third personal 
considerations in abstraction from any grounds in first personal motivation. 
However, I recognise that, although this appears to me to count overwhelmingly 
against adoption of the principle of impartiality, it is unlikely to be seen as a knock- 
down argument against the die-hard Moral Theorist. Accordingly I move quickly 
onto the second line of attack and challenge whether moral reasons have to be 
impartial in the first place. Here, my strategy is to show that there is a type of reason 
which clearly should count as moral but is also clearly not derived from an 
impartial/impersonal perspective. The type of reason I identify is one which relates to 
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the reasoning of an agent in the capacity of occupying a professional role. I argue that 
when an individual initially takes on a (professional) role she agrees to take on a set 
of obligations to act in ways that have been impersonally established. So far she may 
not regard those obligations in any other way than as objectives or considerations that 
are instrumental to her getting paid for her job. However, a very important 
phenomenon that was widely apparent from the empirical survey of nursing was that 
the typical nurse develops a relation to her professional role that becomes what I call 
"identity-conferring" or "vocational". The nurse who relates to her role vocationally 
sees herself not merely as an instrument in realising the goals of certain pre-specified 
tasks but in an important sense also realises herself in and through performing the 
tasks she carries out. That is: she moves beyond a merely instrumental attitude to her 
role and absorbs the role into the motivational set of her narrative self She identifies 
with her professional role to a significant extent such that the reasons she has for 
acting in certain ways are not merely the reasons any nurse has for acting similarly but 
are now perceived as fundamentally her own reasons for acting because of the nurse 
that she is. Reasons understood in this way are neither purely impersonal nor purely 
personal. They are not purely personal because being attached to a socially defined 
role means they are not subject to mere personal preference (nor are they seen by 
nurses as a matter of expressing purely personal preferences). However, they are not 
purely impersonal either because the nurse identifies them as her reason to act. I 
claim that this type of reason represents the predominant sort of moral reason used by 
nurses in their ethical thinking. I demonstrate this by focusing on the fundamental 
issue of care (caring) in a nursing context. 
I distinguish between two general models of caring; task oriented caring and patient 
oriented caring. Task oriented caring reduces caring to a set of discrete formally 
specified tasks (changing bandages, drips etc. ). These can be described impersonally 
and represent the duties that any nurse is obligated to carry out. Patient oriented 
caring involves a holistic notion of care. It identifies the person as a whole as the 
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object (subject) of care and elevates the particular care relationship between the 
individual nurse and the individual patient to a primary (moral) position. I provide 
several examples taken from the empirical survey of nurses to demonstrate that 
patient oriented caring is the dominant form of caring in nursing practice. I then 
argue that patient oriented caring is an example of caring that is neither purely 
personal nor purely impersonal. It is not purely personal because the nurse recognises 
that she cares as a nurse (and not say as a friend). However, it is not purely 
impersonal because she cares as the nurse that she is. I note that this can only be 
explained in terms of the notion of role absorption (discussed above). I argue further 
that the discussion of caring confirms how the type of reasons I have identified as 
stemming from identity-conferring roles resolve the Basic Question. They satisfy the 
first-personal condition that a reason must motivate an individual to act, and the third- 
personal condition that moral reasons must reflect standards that transcend merely 
personal opinion. Finally, I defend the notion of identity-conferring roles against 
possible objections, and conclude that the principle of impartiality can be rejected 
without collapsing morality into merely personal opinion. 
(v) Conclusion 
I conclude very briefly that I have provided substantial reasons why The Moral 
Theory Approach to professional ethics should be rejected in favour of a contextualist 
alternative. I note that this should re-focus professional morality away from the 
preoccupation with specifying base-line duties to a concern with promoting 
professional ethical excellence. This I claim can only be secured if the professions 
themselves promote a healthy on-going dialogue within their practices by providing 
the necessary structures and impetus to support genuine critical reflection. 
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"We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer and 
attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their 
reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in society which so important a trust requires. " 
(Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations) 
"All Professions are conspiracies against the laity" 
(George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor's Dilemma) 
Question: Should athletics come clean and be openly professional? 
Answer: No, I don't believe the sport would benefit from being professional, 
there are too many crooks in it already. 
(Interview with Colin Jackson (Olympic medalist), Observer Magazine) 
Introduction 
One of the most striking features about the recent literature analysing the concept of a 
profession is the large extent to which it is sceptical and suspicious of that very notion. 
From scepticism about the prospect of providing a clear definition of the concept, theorists 
have typically moved to suspicion about the social, political and economic motives that 
drive occupations to achieve and preserve professional status in the first place Groups as 
diverse as Marxists, feminists, and the new right (among others), accuse occupations of 
adopting the ideology of "professionalism" in order to disguise pursuit of their own self- 
interest as altruistic service for the public good'. The professions, they argue, seek to 
monopolise services in crucial areas of human life, and their claims that they possess a 
specialised expertise guided by a commitment to ethical principles and values serve to 
placate the qualms of clients (and society generally) that the power the professions gain may 
be abused. As a consequence many theorists see the heightened concern with ethics, 
considered to be a hallmark of a profession, as largely a strategic device to gain and 
maintain a position of high social status and power: 
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"Making claims over the right to control occupational entry through qualifications, the use of ethical codes in 
regulating conduct in practice, the definition of practice standards, and so on, are thus seen as specific tactics 
within broader strategies for gaining and maintaining autonomy... " 
(R Hugman "Social Work and De-professionalization" in P Abbott and L Meerabeau (eds) 1998 (second 
edition), The Sociology of the Caring Professions, London, UCL Press, pp 181-2: (my italics)) 
Were this sort of "sociology of suspicion" directed at the very idea of a profession sound 
"professional ethics" might be dismissed as little more than a manipulative enterprise 
intended to dupe the general public into allowing certain occupational groups unwarranted 
power. First, it might be argued, the term "profession" does not denote any naturally 
occurring category of occupations that distinguishes it from "non-professional" occupations. 
It would follow, secondly, that there is no special category of "professional ethics" (because 
there is no special category of "profession"). Thus, not only does "professional ethics" fail 
to refer to anything real, but it can only be an artifice designed to serve the manipulative and 
acquisitive interests of certain powerful groups of people out to protect their own interests. 
However, in what follows in this chapter (and indeed throughout the thesis) I shall attempt 
to rebut such claims. In doing so I shall not make the naive claim that there is no room for 
healthy scepticism and suspicion about professional ethics (healthy scepticism and healthy 
suspicion are, I would argue, preconditions of any genuinely critical ethical activity), rather I 
shall claim that a large-scale cynical scepticism and suspicion of professional ethics is 
theoretically and practically unjustified. 
Accordingly my immediate concern in this chapter will be to identify what it is that the term 
"professional ethics" denotes. In the course of doing that I hope to explain why professional 
ethics is a special area of ethics that merits systematic consideration in its own right. The 
task has two parts. First, I will attempt to develop a working definition of the concept of a 
profession wherein my major concern will be to answer those sceptics who claim there is no 
genuine substantive distinction to be made between occupations by reference to this 
category. Secondly, I shall attempt to show that the distinctiveness of professional practice 
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explains why there is a distinctive focus upon ethical values and responsibilities in 
professional life, supporting Kenneth Prandy's claim that ethics is "the very essence of 
professionalismi2. In the process I hope to allay those critics who are suspicious of the very 
idea of professional ethics and of the motives lying behind the claim that professionals are 
guided by a heightened concern with moral values. In fulfilling both of these tasks I will 
hope to show why professional ethics involves types of ethical considerations that do not 
apply to other occupational forms, or to life generally. 
............................................................................. 
I 
The Concept of a Profession 
There are in essence two main sources for the definition of a profession, non-academic (lay 
persons and the professions themselves) and academic. Naturally it is largely with the work 
of academics that I shall be concerned here although I shall discuss very briefly some of the 
lay persons' usage as it naturally resonates in the definitions of the theorists. Academic 
discussion of the concept of a profession has almost exclusively been the domain of 
sociologists and a vast literature on the topic has accumulated. Perhaps the most notable 
thing about that literature, however, is the extent to which it has seemingly proved 
impossible to arrive at a definition upon which there is universal agreement. In essence 
there appear to be three interrelated reasons why this is so. First, there seems to be a 
considerable amount of disagreement over just what sort of concept the concept of a 
profession is supposed to be and hence what it is supposed to be used for. As a result there 
is a tendency in the literature to become entangled in the ambiguities that result in 
developing and using the concept in quite different ways (for example, as an "ideal-type" 
and as a "descriptive-type", see below, pp. 13-14). Secondly, there is disagreement about 
just what sort of methodology is appropriate in defining the concept. For example, some 
have approached the problem from a functionalist perspective, describing a list of traits or 
elements (such as knowledge, skill, ethical values, social importance, et cetera) which an 
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occupation must possess in order to be considered a profession3, while others have 
eschewed this approach and suggest instead that one should focus on the ideological 
motives and political institutional processes by which an occupation achieves for itself 
professional (autonomous) status4. Thirdly, there is disagreement about which particular 
occupations should be included under the concept of a professions. This largely reflects 
how disagreement over definition and methodology results in disagreement over what is to 
be included under the category of a profession. 
What all these points demonstrate is that there is a great deal of ambiguity in the use of the 
term "profession" (and the related terms, "professional", "professionalism" et cetera) which 
raises the question whether commentators are actually talking about the same thing when 
they haggle over the definition of the term, or, indeed, whether there is anything there in the 
first place to which the term genuinely refers. 
Unsurprisingly this has led some to embrace a sceptical attitude to the very idea of defining 
the concept. However, such scepticism is unjustified for a number of reasons, both general 
and specific. The most important general reason is that such scepticism rests on a 
presupposition - which happens to be false - according to which to know anything about x 
(whatever x is) one must be able to provide a precise and indisputable definition of x. The 
best candidates for such definitions would be so-called analytic truths such as "all bachelors 
are unmarried men" (i. e. truths which are true by definition'). However, genuinely 
informative definitions not made true merely by fiat are always open to revision and dispute 
and it cannot be demanded of them that they fix beyond doubt precisely what it is to which 
they refer (to make such a demand is to fall prey to the Socratic fallacy). Indeed, any useful 
concept utilised in the human sciences is fundamentally indefinable in the sense that it 
cannot be formulated in a way which fixes beyond dispute a precise meaning and 
application. For it is clear that theoretical analysis can and does proceed under conditions 
which involve an inevitable element of indeterminacy in definition of concepts. Any 
plausible picture of the process of theorising recognises that the development of a definition 
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of the concept concerned and an understanding of its theoretical and practical implications 
proceeds in symbiotic fashion, or in the manner of a hermeneutical circle. One should only 
resort to scepticism if it can be demonstrated that this process results either in the eventual 
undermining of the concept (in a sort of reductio ad absurdum), or that the resulting 
literature contains nothing of any real merit in furthering an understanding of the concept, or 
that it turns out to have no real reference to anything theoretical or practical. Now, while it 
is clear that there is important disagreement about the concept of a profession among 
theorists, what is also clear, I would argue, is that the discussion that has taken place in the 
literature largely does not fall prey to any of the three criticisms identified in the previous 
sentence. In what follows in this section I shall attempt to show more specific reasons why 
the disagreements among sociologists should not lead to a sceptical viewpoint by showing: 
first, that we can and do identify a stratum of the labour force which we recognise as being 
engaged in occupations which are in significant respects different from other occupations 
(and for which we reserve the label "profession"), and secondly, that the disagreements 
among sociologists can be articulated in a way that brings to light the ambiguities in 
meaning and usage of the terminology which, while not providing a solution to those 
disagreements, is nonetheless an activity which furthers our understanding of the concept 
and its use in specific contexts. I shall attempt, then, to identify the different usages of the 
concept "profession" (and "professional", et cetera) and identify the central criteria upon 
which such usages are predicated. 
(i) Non-academic Definitions 
Undoubtedly the best source of non-academic usages and definitions of the concept of a 
profession is the Oxford English Dictionary (O, E. D). The briefest of surveys of the O. E. D 
instantly reveals that the word "profession" (and the words that stem from it like, 
"professional" and "professionalism" et cetera) includes a very wide range of references and 
uses which overlap and diverge in an irreducibly complex fashion. I do not intend to 
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discuss all those definitions and uses but rather wish to select those that are significant for 
academic definitions of the term. 
Roughly speaking the uses of the term can be split into two groups: those which refer to an 
act of professing, and those which refer in some way to an occupational context. 
(La) The act of professing 
The use of the term "profession" to refer to an act of professing has a much older history 
than its use to describe certain occupations. The very first recorded use of the term in this 
sense cited in the Oxford English Dictionary (O. E. D) can be traced to the twelfth century: 
"The declaration, promise, or vow made by one entering a religious order; hence, the action of entering such an 
order; the fact of being professed in a religious order. " 
In its origin, then, the term "profession" was identified specifically with a religious act of 
professing which involved dedicating oneself to the ends of some particular order of 
divinity. Given the largely unquestioned acceptance of the works of the church as moral 
this usage of "profession" contains an unambiguously positive assessment of the act of 
professing. By 1362 the identification of the term with a specifically religious act of avowal 
had been altered to include, "Any solemn declaration, promise or vow. " (O. E. D). And by 1526: 
"The action of declaring, acknowledging, or avowing an opinion, belief, intention, practice etc.; declaration, 
avowal. In later use often with implied contrast to practice or fact. " (O. E. D). 
By the sixteenth century, then, the meaning of the word had become secularised and 
included a hint of ambiguity with the possibility that an act of profession can be an act of 
deception. 
Use of the word "profession" to describe an act of professing, however, has received 
minimal attention from modern day academics who have focused almost exclusively on the 
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use of the word to describe certain sorts of occupation. However, as shall become clear later 
in this thesis, focusing on the act of profession is crucial in understanding how the ethical 
can be fully recognised and incorporated into professional life. In short, the act of 
professing has a clear link with the notion that individuals ethically commit themselves to 
the aims and standards of the profession they belong to by a pledge, oath or vow to pursue 
those objectives and principles'. 
(i. b) Profession as occupation 
During the sixteenth century the word "profession" first comes to be used to denote 
particular occupations, or vocations: 
"A vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its 
application to the affairs of others or in the practice of an art founded upon it. Applied specifically to the three 
learned professions of divinity, law and medicine; also to the military profession. " 
The O. E. D cites the following example: "1541. R. Copland, Gaylen's Terap. The parties of 
the art of medycyne... cannot be separated one from the other without the damage and great 
detryment of all the medycynall profession. ". It was also in the sixteenth century that the 
term "profession" came to be used in a much wider sense to refer to: "Any calling or 
occupation by which a person habitually earns his living. " 
To deal with the latter usage first it should be clear that this is pretty much identical to the 
modern use of the term to describe any occupation that an individual is engaged in, in order 
to earn a living. It rests upon the general distinction between professional and amateur, 
between work which one does for financial reward in order to earn one's living and the 
work or activities one engages in where this is not a concern . This usage creates synonymy 
between the terms "profession" and "occupation", and reflects the sense in which we 
commonly use the term "profession" outside of academic discourse to identify whatever 
occupation it is that someone is employed (or self-employed) to do. This usage specifically 
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does not distinguish between occupations. The important thing to note about this usage, 
then, is quite simply that it identifies professionals as a part of the workforce or labour 
market, and indeed, a number of academics explicitly cite this as a requirement for 
professional status8. 
Much more significant for academic debate is the first use of "profession" quoted above 
(p. 6) which identifies a particular group of occupations (the learned professions of divinity, 
law and medicine) as professions in distinction from other occupations. With its reference 
to knowledge and learning as a basis for this distinction this definition appears to be very 
similar to the sort of definitions common in modern academic literature which distinguish 
professions from non-professions on similar cognitive grounds. However, there is a crucial 
difference to be aware of between pre-industrial (pre-nineteenth century), and nineteenth 
and twentieth century uses of cognitive criteria to distinguish professions from other 
occupations. In the later (academic) use cognitive criteria, where they are cited as a reason 
for conferring professional status, are inextricably tied to the notion of "objectively 
legitimised competencet9. In their pre-industrial use as a criterion for conferring 
professional status knowledge and learning did not ensure professional competence but 
rather indicated that the individual concerned had received a "gentlemanly education". This 
distinction is easy to see in the differences in the nature and functioning of the university 
education that is considered to be a hallmark of professional training. In the pre-industrial 
period the university education of the professional consisted largely in training in the 
classics and it was this that distinguished him from the mere craftsman or tradesman plying 
a similar trade, i. e. he was not necessarily more competent than the tradesman but he was 
what the tradesman was not, truly a gentleman, and this was the basis for his high 
(professional) social status10. With the advancement of the industrial revolution the 
university education of the professional centred upon learning and developing knowledge 
that specifically related to the practice concerned and involved training to ensure that the 
professional had the competence to practically apply that knowledge (this was guaranteed by 
the requirement of examination and certification). Thus, although the connection between 
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professional status and knowledge and a university education had been made in the 
sixteenth century it should be clear that the nature and understanding of this connection was 
radically transformed with the onset of the industrial revolution". 
It is not a coincidence that academic interest in the concept of a profession arose along with 
the introduction and progress of industrial capitalism and its concordant reinterpretation of 
the nature of a profession. Now, it would be out of place here to discuss at length the 
connection between the rise of industrial capitalism and the rise of the modem profession, 
however, two relevant points can be made very briefly which highlight the source of that 
connection. The economic, social, technological, and ideological advances of industrial 
capitalism created a structural space and opportunity for particular occupations to play a 
specially important role in the organisation and functioning of society. The enormity and 
complexity of those advances in effect necessitated the rise of organisations (like the 
professions) in which extensive and specialised knowledge was concentrated and organised 
by competent individuals able to apply that knowledge effectively in a modern capitalist 
setting. This coupled with the ideological dominance of the protestant work ethic which 
enabled the ordinary individual to gain social status through the work they participated in 
provides the distinctive character of the nature and rise of the modern profession. And 
given the significantly increased importance of the professions in the functioning and life of 
society it is easy to see why the professions became a natural focus of attention for 
sociologists and social theorists. 
(ii) Academic Definitions 
Academic research into the professions took off in the latter half of the 20th century and can 
be categorised into three broad trends: the "traits approach", the "power approach", and the 
"professional project" or "professionalisation" approach12. The traits approach was 
developed first and foremost by functionalists (for example, Durkheim and Parsons") and 
flourished in the '50s and '60s. It consisted mainly in listing the attributes of an" ideal -type" 
profession. The traits approach was strongly criticised by theorists in the '70s and '80s as 
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being vague and insufficiently critical of the ideological motives that drove the professions 
to pursue autonomy. Thus the "power" approach (for example, Freidson and Johnson14) and 
the "professional project" or "professionalisation" approach (for example, Larson and 
Jackson15) have tended to dominate the literature ever since. However, I would argue that a 
traits approach need not be understood in solely functionalist terms, and, indeed is actually 
implicitly or explicitly an acknowledged precondition of developing the deeper critical 
analysis of the other sociological methods. Accordingly I will seek to develop a trait 
definition of the concept of a profession and in the process address the most important 
objections of the critics. 
(ii. a) The Traits Approach 
Th traits approach involves listing a set of traits or attributes, such as knowledge, training, 
autonomy et cetera, which distinguish occupations that are professions from those that are 
not. However, a number of theorists have questioned the use of this approach as it has 
failed to yield up a set of attributes upon which all agree. For example, G. Millerson in an 
often cited work surveyed the lists of twenty one writers and found twenty three different 
attributes listed with only fourteen of the attributes mentioned by more than one writer16 
This has led some, for example, Klegon, to reject the very idea of trying to define 
professions in terms of characteristics that are putatively "... inherently distinct from other 
occupations"". He is joined by R Hugman who argues that the traits sociologists cite are 
not "natural" elements that belong to certain types of occupation but traits strategically 
selected to pursue "self-government" (autonomy)18. Klegon and Hugman (et al) suggest that 
we should instead focus upon the processes by which an occupation achieves professional 
status. However, as Freidson rightly points out, this does not get around the problem of 
definition but rather reintroduces it in the area of professional status i. e. what are the 
defining characteristics of professional status? ". Even those like Freidson who believe that 
the real focus of the concept of a profession should be upon political and economic 
influences accept that there needs to be some attempt to define the attributes of a profession 
however inconclusive the results might be. 
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Actually I do not think that the differences in the lists of attributes compiled by different 
writers is anywhere near as problematic as might first be thought. Although there are indeed 
differences in most cases it is possible to group the various attributes listed under more 
general and relatively uncontroversial classes of attributes which are clear enough to 
delineate the basic structure of the professions. Magali Larson identifies three general 
classes of attributes: cognitive, normative, and evaluative20. The cognitive attributes of a 
profession concern the knowledge upon which a profession is founded and the training 
required to facilitate the acquisition and competent application of that knowledge in 
professional practice. The normative attributes of a profession concern the ethical principles 
and values which direct and regulate the professional's working life. These commit the 
professional both to fulfil the objectives and standards of excellence that are determined 
internally within the profession, and to orient herself to serve the external interests of her 
clients and society while acting in a professional capacity. In short they act to guarantee the 
integrity and accountability of the profession (and professional) which in turn legitimates 
the conferment of autonomy upon the profession to regulate its own affairs. The evaluative 
aspects of a profession concern the ways in which professions in comparison with other 
occupations are accorded a distinctively high social status and prestige, based upon the 
perception that they provide (and are motivated to provide) some important service for the 
public good. 
Thus, even though theorists may disagree over the precise nature and identification of the 
attributes which constitute a profession, and often disagree in the way in which these 
attributes are articulated, it is typically possible to discern an implicit general agreement that 
some such attributes must be fulfilled within the three classes of cognitive, normative and 
evaluative criteria. A brief perusal of the following three definitions should confirm this 
point: 
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A) "A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of 
some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This 
understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the 
profession are modified by knowledge of a generalised nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience 
of mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital needs of man, 
considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client. " 
(ML Cogan "Towards the Definition of a Profession" in HM Vollmer and DL Mills (eds), 1966, 
Professionalization, New York, Prentice-Hall) 
B) "... a profession may be defined as an occupation possessing a skilled intellectual technique, a voluntary 
association and a code of conduct. It is this last factor, the guarantee of integrity, that is the main 
distinguishing mark of the professions. " 
(B. Kaye, The Development of the Architectural Profession in Britain, quoted in: K Prandy, 1965, 
Professional Employees, London, Faber and Faber) 
C) "Succinctly put, all professions seem to possess: (1) systematic theory, (2) authority, (3) community 
sanction, (4) ethical codes, and (5) a culture. " 
(E Greenwood "Attributes of a Profession", 1957, Social Work, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp44-55) 
It should be fairly clear how the attributes cited in these definitions fall under the general 
cognitive, normative and evaluative classes of attributes. And, indeed, I would argue that 
these examples reflect the same implicit cognitive, normative and evaluative structure which 
any plausible definitions of this sort share. It is only where definitions actually contradict 
each other over the requirement of fundamental features that a real threat is posed to the 
very idea of definition. However, most disputes are not actually like this but rather tend to 
concern disagreement about how a particular attribute is to be understood and articulated 
and this should be viewed as an inevitable consequence of the diversity of occupations 
which provide the empirical data that inform the development of the concept of a 
profession. This sort of disagreement should not, then, be viewed automatically as a sign of 
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irredeemable confusion concerning the concept of a profession, but rather should be seen as 
a recognition that the concept needs to be broad and fluid in its definition in order that its 
application to particular empirical professional situations can reflect the specificity of the 
context in which the various attributes are fulfilled. 
Accordingly I intend to work with the following general definition of a profession which 
identifies six criteria that accord with the cognitive, normative and evaluative classes that 
define the basic structure of a profession, and which I have found to occur consistently in 
theorists' definitions of the professions: 
(figure 1) 
DEFINITION OF A PROFESSION 
1. KNOWLEDGE: A profession is concerned with, and founded upon, a substantial body of complex 
specialised knowledge which is constantly reviewed and updated. 
2. TRAINING: A profession puts its professionals through a substantial period of training and education 
(usually at a college or university) in order both to impart its specialised knowledge and ensure the competent 
practical application of that knowledge in professional practice. The successful completion of training will 
normally result in the awarding of a recognised qualification which (frequently) acts as a licence to practise. 
3. SOCIAL IMPORTANCE: The work of the profession is widely perceived to be of special relevance to 
society. The profession's work is seen as an important structural element in the identity and functioning of 
society and necessary for the effective functioning of the individual within society. 
4. ETHICS: A profession is guided and regulated in accordance with a set of ethical values which is 
embodied within an explicit code of conduct and tacitly within the acknowledged aims and standards of normal 
working practice. A profession also recognises a responsibility to serve the public good. 
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5. ORGANISATION: A profession exhibits a high degree of organisation which creates a sense of 
community and unity among its members. This organisation is typically formalised in the form of an 
independent professional association and/or body which represent and govern the profession. 
6 AUTONOMY: A profession is accorded the privilege of self-regulation which allows it to determine for 
itself the standards of service and conduct that are appropriate for professional practice. 
Attributes 1 and 2 fall into the cognitive class of criteria, 4 falls into the normative class, 
and 3,5 and 6 fall into the evaluative class2`. 
Now, even if I am right to suggest that criticisms about the variety of attributes listed by 
different writers fail to undermine the attempt at definition (because there is a general 
underlying agreement about the basic cognitive, normative and evaluative structure of any 
such definition) a further objection to any definition of this type is frequently advanced. 
This objection is that such a definition fails to specify the extent to which the attributes or 
criteria specified need to be fulfilled in order for an occupation to count as a profession. 
And it is indeed true that the definition does not specify, for example, just how much and 
how specialised and complex professional knowledge needs to be, or for how long the 
training should continue. Nor, for that matter, does it specify just how socially important 
the work needs to be, nor how organised the profession needs to be, nor the extent to which 
it needs to be self-regulating. Proponents of this objection then typically move on to argue 
that this shows that any occupation either could count as a profession or could imitate the 
characteristics of "real" professions". I shall argue that such criticisms are largely 
unfounded for two important and closely connected reasons. 
First, as I mentioned above (p. 3), these criticisms have their source in a confusion about just 
what sort of concept the concept of a profession is supposed to be and how it is to be used. 
My point here can be illuminated by making reference to a distinction between two different 
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sorts of concepts identified by Max Weber" (although I do not claim to be using that 
distinction in what follows in the same way that Weber does or would necessarily approve). 
Weber recognised that in contrast to natural science the phenomena (and problems) that 
form the subject matter of the social sciences are necessarily "value related" (because of 
their cultural significance). Accordingly the type of concepts required to interpret and 
explain these phenomena (and problems) must fit the task of addressing the value interests 
that underlie them (among other considerations). Weber thus identified and distinguished 
between two sorts of concepts that were appropriate for this activity: "ideal-type" concepts 
and "descriptive" concepts. In brief, an "ideal-type" concept is 
'... constructed by the abstraction and combination of an indefinite number of elements which, although found in 
reality, are rarely or never discovered in this specific form. ' 
(A. Giddens, 1971, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press p. 141) 
An ideal-type, then, is not something intended (with empirical accuracy) to represent 
anything found in reality: it is rather a construct formulated in order to interpret and explain 
what is found there. As an idealisation it serves to bring to light certain crucial features 
found in the empirical phenomenon. In contrast descriptive concepts are concepts intended 
to describe the empirical form ("these simply summarise the common features of groupings 
of empirical phenomena" - A. Giddens, ibid, p. 142). Further, Weber recognised that any 
descriptive concept can be transformed into an ideal-type concept. To quote Giddens again: 
The transition from descriptive to ideal-types takes place when we move from the descriptive classification of 
phenomena towards the explanatory or theoretical analysis of those phenomena. " 
(A. Giddens, ibid, p. 143) 
The point I wish to make can now be stated and is simply this: that in the literature the 
discussion of the concept of a profession is frequently confused by the fact that the concept 
is used ambiguously either as an ideal-type or as a descriptive type and sometimes both. 
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Now it may well be the case that this ambiguity of usage is inevitable (indeed I think it is in 
a sense that I describe below) given the variety of usages that the concept is called upon to 
serve, but it is absolutely crucial that the form or nature of its usage is always accurately 
recognised in order to avoid confusion. And the particular confusion I have in mind is 
based on the requirement that some make of a definition like the one I have outlined above 
that it both identify particular occupations which are professions and simultaneously explain 
why they are distinguished from non-professions. Now, as an ideal-type it is designed to 
draw attention to the central structural features of a profession that explain its distinction 
from other occupational forms. It does not seek to describe the reality of any particular 
empirically existing profession. Thus it can hardly be a criticism of it that as it stands it 
cannot identify particular occupations as professions, it is simply not designed to do that. 
What it can usefully do regarding that task is guide the enquiries of theorists developing a 
descriptive concept by identifying the basic structural features of a profession which can 
then be given substantive empirical content in the context of the specific 
occupation/profession concerned. The fact, then, that the definition of the concept of a 
profession outlined above does not sped the precise nature or extent to which the 
attributes it identifies need to be fulfilled in specific cases is a function of its role as an 
ideal-type and as such does not in any way represent a failing. Indeed quite to the contrary, 
it would fail as an ideal-type if it did try to specify these requirements in anything other than 
the broadest of terms, particularly given the variety of phenomena it seeks to explain24. 
Now, while I think it should be clear, for the reasons just stated, that criticisms of the 
definition fail when they ignore or confuse the fact that it is primarily an ideal-type concept, 
it is perhaps still possible to criticise its use to guide the development of descriptive 
concepts which identify particular professions. The thought might be that it fails to guide 
such enquiries appropriately because it still fails to give any indication of what might count 
in specific contexts as an appropriate fulfilment of the conditions of professionalism. And 
here we come to my second reason for dismissing the claims of the critics of the type of 
definition I have proposed. It is simply the point alluded to in the previous paragraph, that 
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the variety of ways in which the attributes identified in the definition are embodied in 
specific occupations which have a genuine claim for professional status is such as to make 
such precision impossible. For example, suppose one takes the legal profession as a 
paradigm case of a profession and proceeds to specify in detail its cognitive attributes in the 
belief that this will specify accurately what is required of any other occupation seeking 
professional status: in what ways would we expect such a specification to match the 
cognitive attributes of, say, the other paradigm cases of professions, medicine and divinity? 
Obviously we would find great differences, but this would be no reason to assume that 
either just one or indeed none of them are in fact professions. Specification can only be as 
precise as the phenomena dictate according to their own logic and empirical reality, and just 
as we can identify things like chairs and tables without possessing a precise definition so too 
we can identify professions without possessing a precise definition. 
The most important objection to the traits definition I have provided is the one I alluded to 
above: that it fails to provide a critical account of the ideological motives that power the 
drive to achieve professional status (and thereby monopoly and autonomy). However, not 
only is the trait definition entirely compatible with analysing and explaining the ideological 
objectives served by achieving professional status, it is in fact a prerequisite for this sort of 
critical analysis. In order to understand how an occupation achieves and maintains 
professional status reference has to be made to the way such traits are incorporated into an 
occupation's practice. This point holds for the sceptic and non-sceptic alike irrespective of 
whether one considers those traits as naturally occurring elements or manipulative devices. 
An unbiased assessment of an occupation's claim to professional status is only possible if 
one is able to consider critically whether it does genuinely possess specialised knowledge, 
work for the public good, act in accordance with high ethical values etc. For example, this 
thesis is in many important respects an attempt to cash out just what it would mean for an 
occupation to incorporate ethics into working practice such that it could satisfy the claim to 
support a genuinely professional ethics. Sceptics of the traits approach only really have a 
case if a traits definition is alone taken as a sufficient means to determine professional 
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status. However, if a traits definition is incorporated into a critical analysis taking into 
account ideological motives and the dynamic processes of the professional project 
(professionalisation) the sceptic has little to offer against the use of such a definition. 
Accordingly I shall embed the trait definition I have outlined within the concept of 
professionalisation. 
(ii. b) Profesionalisation 
The central thought and motivation lying behind the idea of the concept of 
professionalisation is that because it is impossible to identify precisely what a profession is 
(i. e. precisely the qualitative and quantitative measures of professional status) we should 
instead examine occupations to assess the extent to which they have been professionalised. 
J. A. Jackson describes the change in approach as follows: 
"The most important element in the rephrasing of this question is of course the definition of the problem in 
dynamic terms which recognise that in relation to the range of criteria by which a profession may be denoted, 
there may be considerable variation at different times and under different circumstances. " 
(J. A. Jackson (ed), 1970, Professions and Professionalization, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 5) 
In this respect it is most helpful to see the criteria listed in the definition outlined above 
(p. 13) as axes along which occupations can travel in a process of professionalisation, 
moving from a position on a particular axis where the criterion is fulfilled to a very limited 
degree to a position further along the axis indicating a much more substantial (transformed) 
fulfilment of the criterion. Taking each of the axes in turn it is possible to see how each 






1. KNOWLEDGE simple technical skill ----) complex theoretical knowledge 
2. TRAINING brief, on the job ----- prolonged university education 
3. SOCIAL IMP. non-essential to society -----> central to functioning of society 
4. ETHICS no specific ethical concerns ---> specific ethical values & codes 
5. ORGANISATION none or little strong community, professional assoc. 
6. AUTONOMY external regulation internal (self) regulation 
Clearly, much more could be added to figure 2 to show in greater detail the continuity of the 
process of professionalisation; however, it should be apparent from its form what the 
general nature of the dynamic involved concerns23. There will, of course, be no precise 
point that can be identified along any of the axes at which occupations establish professional 
status, but as I have previously mentioned, such a requirement places an unreasonable 
demand upon a definition that it neither could nor should attempt to fulfil, What one 
certainly can say, however, is that occupations which have travelled minimally along the 
axes will not count as a profession (for example, street cleaning and packing), and 
occupations which have travelled considerably along the axes will (for example, medicine 
and law)26. 
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A second advantage of adopting the concept of professionalisation is that it facilitates an 
understanding of the ideological concerns and motives driving the pursuit of professional 
status by identifying the processes through which an occupation can move to such a 
position. As shall become clear below, when I consider the example of nursing, a strategy 
for professionalisation rests crucially on showing that an occupation has advanced to a 
significant extent along each of the axes represented in figure 2 above. Examining the way 
in which an occupation moves along these axes is the clearest way in which to judge the 
ideological motives driving the claims to professional status. 
There is also a further gain, connected to the previous point, that under the model of 
professionalisation a logical and empirical space for the notion of a semi profession is 
created. Amitai Etzioni describes the semi-professions as: 
"... a group of new professions whose claim to the status of doctors and lawyers is neither fully established nor 
fully desired 
... Their training is shorter, their status is less legitimated, their right to privileged communication 
less established, there is less of a specialised body of knowledge, and they have less autonomy from 
supervision or societal control than "the" professions. " 
(A Etzioni (ed), 1969, The Semi-Professions and Their Organisation, New York, The Free Press) 
Typically, the status of a semi-profession is attached to occupations such as teaching, 
nursing, and social work. A particularly significant thing to note about the semi-professions 
is that they represent occupations that have undergone, and continue to undergo, a process 
of transformation that has taken them from a non-professional to a (semi) professional 
status. And this process of transformation is neatly encapsulated and explained by the idea 
of professionalisation that has been outlined briefly above. 
To summarise the conclusions of the previous sections: my claim is that scepticism about 
the prospect of providing a suitable definition of a profession is misplaced, that the (ideal- 
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type) trait definition presented in figure 1 combined with the concept of professionalisation 
presented in figure 2 provides a sufficiently detailed concept of a profession to enable us to 
explain why some occupations are distinguished from others in its terms. Further, this task 
is identified as a prerequisite for providing the sort of critical analysis of the professions 
supported by power theorists. I shall now attempt to apply this concept of a profession to 
nursing which, as I identified in the introduction, is the focus of the empirical data gathered 
for this thesis. 
(iii) Nursin 
Nursing provides an excellent example of an occupation which has undergone, and 
continues to undergo, a substantial process of professionalisation. A typical conception of 
the nurse's role at the beginning of the twentieth century which depicts it very clearly as a 
non-professional occupation is provided by Dock in 1917: 
"In my estimation obedience is the first and the very cornerstone of good nursing, and here is the stumbling 
block for the beginner. No matter how gifted she may be, she will never become a reliable nurse until she can 
obey without question. The first most helpful criticism I ever received from a doctor was when he told me that 
I was supposed to be simply an intelligent machine for the purpose of carrying out his orders. " 
(Dock 1917, cited in 0 Rumbold, 1986, Ethics In Nursing Practice, London, Bailliere Tindall) 
A nurse who is nothing more than "an intelligent machine" carrying out the doctor's orders 
is certainly not a professional agent. Now, while it is undoubtedly true that certain dated 
stereotypes continue to persist in the minds of certain members of the general public and, 
perhaps, in the minds of a few unreconstructed members of the health care professions, ' 
what is also true is that the substantive role of the nurse has changed radically from this 
early depiction. Further, as I shall seek to demonstrate, these changes are only fully 
illuminated when they are understood as belonging to a process of professionalisation. In 
each of the cognitive, normative and evaluative classes of criteria identified above (p 12) the 
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institutions representing the occupation of nursing have explicitly sought to advance, and in 
many respects has succeeded in advancing, the claims of nursing to professional status, a 
point recognised in a number of works". 
(iii. a) Cognitive professionalisation 
In regards to the cognitive criteria for professionalism - training and knowledge - there have 
been some very significant recent changes. Perhaps one of the most notable of these is the 
advent of Project 200029 which represents an explicit attempt to consolidate and further the 
progress of nursing towards professional status. Project 2000 can in many ways be seen as a 
natural and logical product of the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act 1979 which 
brought into being the statutory regulatory body the United Kingdom Central Council for 
Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC) and which placed a mandatory duty upon 
that body to establish, maintain and improve standards of professional conduct and training. 
The UKCC is required by the 1979 Act to state the requirements that must be satisfied, the 
nature and levels of competencies that need to be achieved, for a nurse to be admitted to the 
national register30. Project 2000 represents a clear attempt by the UKCC to fulfil those 
fundamental duties. The series of reforms that Project 2000 has introduced have included 
the abolition of the minimally trained enrolled nurse and the establishment of a lengthened, 
in-depth, specialised and universal standard of education and training that has, to quote Laft 
and Smith: 
"... raised the quality of nurse education by not only setting the standard at a higher level, that of a diploma 
instead of a certificate, but also changing the status of nurses in training to that of true students. " 
(Laß S& Smith M, 1994, Nursing In General Practice, London, Chapman Hall) 
The three year period of training instituted by Project 2000 has radically changed the focus 
of nurse education from an "on-the-ward" task learning process to an approach which is 
largely classroom based and founded upon nursing theory. The foundation of professional 
practice upon a body of theoretical knowledge and training is, of course, recognised as one 
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of the most important hallmarks of a profession (as noted earlier). Along with the 
introduction of Project 2000 the strengthening of the theoretical knowledge base and 
training of the nursing profession has been further enhanced by the rapid expansion of 
undergraduate and postgraduate degree programmes in nursing and health studies offered by 
universities. This not only achieves for nursing the recognition that its knowledge base is of 
a genuinely theoretical and professionally "respectable" kind, but also has led to nurses 
themselves engaging in the sort of research into an understanding of the basis of 
professional practice that is essential in developing a cohesive community of professionals 
that represent the type of reflective practitioners synonymous with the picture of 
professional agents with which we are most familiar". For example, the University of 
Wolverhampton delivers a nursing degree programme that places great emphasis upon 
training in methods of research and requires each nurse to propose and conduct an 
individual research project. Additionally, nurses on the degree programme undertake 
modules that investigate the link between professional practice and fundamental issues in 
psychology, law, social policy, politics, ethics and philosophy. The rationale for these 
demands, as explained by the course director, is to provide a firm academic and theoretical 
footing to the education and training the nurses receive'. Further evidence of the expansion 
of the knowledge base of nursing is provided by the proliferation of books and nursing 
journals which contain material researched and written by nurses themselves. 
The rapid growth and specialisation of the knowledge base of nursing and the changes in the 
structure and content of the training that have accompanied this growth represent, then, a 
clear case of professionalisation in respect of the cognitive criteria that need to be fulfilled 
for the ascription of professional status". 
(iii. b) Normative Professional isati on 
A continuing process of professionalisation of nursing can also be discerned regarding the 
normative criteria required for professional status. Ethical considerations have received an 
enormous amount of attention from the UKCC, and also from researchers working in the 
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specific field of nursing ethics (including traditional academics and nurses), and also from 
practising nurses generally34. One very important manifestation of a heightened concern 
with ethics was the production of a code of conduct by the UKCC in July 1983 entitled 
"Code of Professional Conduct for Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors". I have already 
noted above that the production of a code of ethics (or conduct) is considered to be an 
essential hallmark of a profession. However, as I also mentioned , it is clearly not sufficient 
for the ascription of professional status merely to develop a code; the extent to which the 
adoption of a code of ethics or conduct represents a genuinely substantive 
professionalisation of an occupation depends very much upon the nature and extent to which 
the code is incorporated into everyday practice. In this respect there seems to be clear 
evidence that the UKCC places the Code of Professional Conduct at the core of nursing 
practice. 
The production of the Code of Professional Conduct was a direct response by the UKCC to 
its legal requirement to establish and improve standards of professional conduct. However, 
Reginald Pyne, the UKCCs Assistant Registrar for Standards and Ethics who was deeply 
involved in developing the Code, claims that the Code was also produced to serve three 
other more specific needs: 
"(1) To establish more clearly than ever before the extent of the accountability of registered practitioners. 
(2) To assist practitioners in the exercise of their professional accountability so as to achieve high standards of 
professional practice. 
(3) To encourage practitioners to assert themselves so that the primacy of the interest of their patients and 
clients is respected. " 
(RH Pyne, 1992, Professional Discipline in Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting, Oxford, Blackwell, 
p. 28) 
From its outset, then, the Code of Professional Conduct was considered to have an 
important role in providing a principled core to professional practice. In furthering these 
24 
aims the UKCC has also produced a number of advisory documents that expand at length 
upon certain of the clauses and principles contained in the Code of Professional Conduct. 
For example, in 1987 the Council produced an advisory document on confidentiality which 
it called "Confidentiality", and in 1989 it produced the document "Exercising 
Accountability". In the latter document the Council clearly states the central importance of 
the Code to the profession by identifying three essential functions that it serves. First, it is 
"a statement to the profession of the primacy of the interests of the patient or client", 
secondly, "a statement of the profession's values", thirdly, "a portrait of the practitioner 
which the Council believes to be needed and which the Council wishes to see within the 
profession. ". Every registered nurse receives a copy of the Code which states in 
unequivocal terms that each nurse must at all times act in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of good nursing practice that the UKCC identifies in the clauses of the Code. The 
centrality of the Code as a guide to nursing practice is, perhaps, asserted most strongly in the 
introduction to the UKCC advisory document "Exercising Accountability" (UKCC 1989) 
where the Council states explicitly that the Code of Professional Conduct, 
"... is the Council's definitive advice on professional conduct to its practitioners. In this extremely important 
document practitioners on the UKCC's register find a clear and unequivocal statement as to what their 
regulatory body expects of them. " 
(UKCC, 1989, Excercising Accountability, London, UKCC) 
The commitment that the UKCC has to making the Code of Professional Conduct central to 
nursing practice is further demonstrated by the Council's declared intention to use the Code 
as a key document in judging cases of professional misconduct. This intention is stated 
explicitly in section 63 of the document "With a View to Removal from the Register...? " 
(UKCC, 1990) in which a nurse charged with professional misconduct is advised that, 
"It is wise to refer to the two items the Professional Conduct Committee members will have in mind. The first 
of these is the definition of misconduct in the statutory rules which states that "Misconduct is conduct 
unworthy of a nurse, midwife or health visitor. " The second is the Code of Professional Conduct for the 
Nurse, Midwife and Health Visitor... " 
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(UKCC, 1990, With a View to Removal from the Register...!, London, UKCC) 
Use of the Code has proven in practice to be an integral part of the conduct of professional 
misconduct hearings of the Professional Conduct Committee" 
It is also clear that the UKCC has attempted to raise awareness of the importance of the 
Code by encouraging nurses to participate in an active dialogue with the Council in 
developing and interpreting its substantive principles and their functioning in professional 
practice. For example, in response to the first edition of the Code, and at the explicit 
invitation of the UKCC, over 4000 nurses wrote to the Council with criticisms and 
suggestions about its structure and content36. As a result a second edition was produced by 
the UKCC in November 1984 entitled "Code of Professional Conduct for the Nurse, 
Midwife and Health Visitor" which took account of these comments. A third edition was 
published in 1992, and the Council is committed to an ongoing process of review and 
updating. 
Although the Code of Professional Conduct has been the main focus of attention of the 
UKCC there is a number of other forms and structures within the profession in which 
ethical issues have received increasing attention. For example, modules and courses in 
ethics are now a standard part of a nurse's education (both as a part of Project 2000 and 
degree programmes), national conferences in nursing ethics have occurred, and there has 
been a phenomenal increase in the literature written on nursing ethics (books, journals et 
cetera). Nurses also participate in increasing numbers on various types of ethics committees 
in hospitals and in professional organisations (for example, the Royal College of Nursing 
(RCN)). 
The evidence appears to be very strong indeed that the adoption of the Code of Professional 
Conduct and its substantive incorporation into everyday nursing practice, coupled with the 
recognition of the importance of introducing ethical issues in the education and training of 
nurses, and the participation of nurses on ethics committees and the like, represents a 
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genuine process of professionalisation in the normative class of criteria of the professional 
model. 
(iii. c) Evaluative Professionalisation 
The degree to which nursing has significantly professionalised in the evaluative class of 
criteria varies. There can be no doubt that in the areas of autonomy and organisation 
nursing has professionalised considerably. This is largely as a result of the Nurses, 
Midwives and Health Visitors Act 1979 (mentioned above) which brought into being the 
UKCC and with it the autonomy of nursing to regulate its own standards of training, 
knowledge and conduct. This in turn has necessitated the development of a greater sense of 
identity, coherence and structure in organisation. However, there is no clear evidence 
available which gives an indication of whether the social status and prestige of nursing has 
increased in a way which might be described as an indication of achieving professional 
status. Undoubtedly, nurses are held in esteem by the general public, but the extent to 
which this esteem reflects a perception of nurses as professionals is very unclear. The very 
nature of professional prestige and social status is, of course, very complex; and if, as I 
suggested earlier, it is most plausible to see the prestige of the professions as having root in 
their fulfilment of the cognitive and normative criteria outlined in the professional model 
(see footnote 25) then the esteem in which nursing is held in the public imagination may or 
may not be an example of professional prestige. For example, it is undoubtedly true that 
part of the prestige of the professions arises from the public's perception that the profession 
concerned is devoted to serving the public good, and no doubt the esteem with which 
nursing is regarded reflects a perception that nurses are such individuals devoted to the 
welfare of others. To that extent, then, the esteem with which nursing is regarded reflects a 
perception of them as professionals. However, it is also undoubtedly true that part of the 
prestige of the professions arises in significant part from the public's perception that the 
profession concerned deals with a specialised area of knowledge which involves a great 
amount of learning and training to master, but it is far from clear that this perception forms a 
significant part of the public's esteem of nursing. To that extent, then, nursing seems to lack 
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professional prestige. This, of course, should come as no surprise given that nursing has to 
share the health care setting with the medical profession (a paradigm example of a 
profession) and as a result lives to some extent in its shadow. Further, nursing has only very 
recently been granted the autonomy to regulate its own practice (established by the 1979 
Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act) and has only very recently developed a 
substantial independent cognitive base creating a distinctive practice, and these facts 
inevitably will take time to enter fully into the public's perception of the profession. 
Whether these facts actually will come to ground the prestige of nursing more broadly in the 
cognitive attributes of the profession as well as in the normative public service ideal remains 
to be seen. 
Now, while I have some reservations about describing nursing as having professionalised 
significantly in one of the evaluative criteria it ought to be clear that I believe it has certainly 
undergone and continues to undergo a successful process of professionalisation in the other 
criteria. Further, I hope it is also clear that the changes in nursing organisation and practice 
that I have described only receive a proper articulation and explanation when they are 
understood in terms of the concept of professionalisation. 
It seems clear from all the preceding arguments of this chapter and from the example of 
nursing that there is a genuine distinction to be made between different types of occupations 
in terms of the concept of a profession, and perhaps more usefully, in terms of the concept 
of professionalisation. Accordingly attention must now turn to the question raised at the 
beginning of the chapter which concerns the nature of the link between ethics and the 
professions37. 
................................................ "... 1 .......................... 
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II. 
Ethics and the Professions 
Q) The shape of the Debate 
The need for a heightened concern with ethics in professional life arises inevitably from the 
features of a profession identified in the definition above. Fundamental to this requirement 
is the trust clients must invest in the professions (and professionals) to intervene in areas of 
their lives which are crucial to their effective functioning in modern society. Each of us as 
actual and potential clients depend upon the expertise of professionals to ensure our 
individual well-being. Health care professionals, civil engineers, architects, and lawyers 
(etc. ) all perform services without which we could not adequately live. Further, the expert 
knowledge and techniques practised by professionals is something we either do not have the 
ability to perform for ourselves or do not have the time to perform; either way professionals 
serve our fundamental needs. As Eliot Freidson has emphasised, the "torrent of criticism" to 
which the professions have been subject has singularly failed to answer the practical 
question "What are the alternatives to professionalism? ". He concludes that "... 
professionalism is both necessary and desirable for a decent society. "". He is supported in 
his view by Bernard Williams who argues: 
"Academics (in particular) are sometimes tempted to feel superior to such professional labours. They should 
not do so. Those labours serve our needs, which are often the deepest we have - the need for a social order, 
among others. If those needs are essentially served by some activity or institution, such as a profession, then 
there is nowhere to go to be superior to that institution, except by climbing out of oneself. " 
(B Williams, 1995, Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 201) 
However, the reliance which we have on the professions inevitably creates an imbalance in 
the power relation between professional and client and leaves the client vulnerable to the 
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abuse of professional prerogative. Ethics consequently becomes the central focus for the 
legitimation of the trust clients must have in professionals that abuses of power and 
prerogative will not occur. Thus the case for the need for professional ethics is prima facie 
incontrovertible and I shall take for granted from here on that there is no need to consider 
this case further. Rather, the important question, about which this thesis shall be entirely 
concerned, is the question about how ethics is to be incorporated into professional life. 
As Bernard Williams has pointed out, what is significant in the very idea of a professional 
morality (or ethics) is the possibility that such a morality may diverge from everyday or 
general morality, indeed that some sort of a divergence is fundamentally what gives the idea 
of professional ethics any real content39. For example, it is commonly accepted that 
professionals in virtue of occupying some professional role are morally permitted, or 
required, to do things that would be considered unethical if performed by a non-professional 
(say, performing intimate medical examinations, or conducting military operations)4o 
Further, as Williams notes, we understand that in order to perform effectively in their role 
professionals often need to develop certain dispositions of character which would be 
morally objectionable in a non-professional context (for example, a lawyer's doggedness in 
cross-examination)41. It is precisely with the question of how to account for this divergence 
that the whole of this thesis is fundamentally concerned. That is, in examining how the 
ethical is recognised in professional contexts, and in considering how the ethical decision 
making of professionals might be enhanced, it becomes crucial to answer the general 
question about the relationship of professional ethics (its rules, acts, and dispositions) to 
ethics generally. Now in discussing the divergence and relation of professional to general 
ethics it is necessary to consider two things. First, one must enquire into the distinctive 
nature of the ethical concerns of the professions to examine the extent to which they 
represent a substantive difference from the general ethics of society. Secondly, one must 
provide an account of how a distinctive professional ethics is related to, or justified by, the 
general ethics of society. The first task requires giving actual content to the idea of a 
professional ethics or morality. I shall claim in what follows that it is precisely for the same 
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reasons cited in distinguishing professions from non-professions that the distinctiveness of 
the ethical concerns of the professions, and hence the divergences from general ethics, is to 
be found. The second task involves providing an explanation, and ultimately a justification, 
for this divergence from general ethics. The two tasks are inextricably linked and in order to 
move quickly I propose to treat them together by addressing the fundamental question about 
the source or derivability of professional ethics. Broadly speaking there are two 
alternatives: one account I shall label the "Deductive Paradigm" and the other the 
"Contextual ist Conception ". 
According to the deductive paradigm the distinctive ethical concerns of the professions turn 
out ultimately to be nothing more than an application to a particular case of morality in 
general: "... everyday morality ... contain[s] professional morality as an application of 
itself 
to special circumstances. "". This incorporates two main claims. First, that professional 
ethics is derivable from the more basic or fundamental principles, rules and values of 
general morality. Secondly, that the "special circumstances" constituted by professional 
practice centre on the notion of filling a public role. On this account it is precisely the 
demonstration of a deductive connection from an independently describable general 
morality to professional ethics that a particular profession's ethics are thought to be 
justified". According to the contextualist conception, by contrast, the distinctive ethical 
concerns of the professions are generated directly from the particular features (or "special 
circumstances") of professional practices themselves, and although they must in some 
important sense cohere with general morality, they are, nevertheless, not in any significant 
sense derivable from it. In this sense professional morality is seen as a specifically distinct 
category within general morality but crucially not an application of ita4. Thus, general 
morality on this view does not supply an independent set of principles, rules and values 
against which (or from which) the particular ethics of a profession can be justified. 
There are enormously important implications that rest on which of these specific accounts 
one adopts, and it is very much with these implications that this thesis is concerned, 
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Accordingly to finish off this chapter I will provide a very brief sketch of the two 
alternatives in order to map out the general territory of the dispute which I intend to explore 
in subsequent chapters. 
(i) The Deductive Paradigm 
According to the deductive paradigm the special ethical concerns of the professions are 
derived by applying the moral principles, rules and values of general morality to the specific 
contexts of professional practice. The main presupposition lying behind this is the thought 
that the principles, rules and values of general morality are universal in scope, That is, they 
represent a set of principles, rules and values that apply to anyone no matter who they are or 
what their job is. Professional ethics on this picture is largely a matter of giving specific 
content to the moral obligations of professionals by applying higher order universal 
principles to their particular practice. For example, a universal principle requiring that one 
tell the truth applied to the special circumstances of a health care setting might make a more 
specific and stronger demand that a professional actively ensures the truth is known by the 
person it affects (in a non-professional context the requirement need be no stronger than that 
one does not actively deceive another about the truth). The appeal of this approach is 
immediately apparent. As I noted above, the very case for a specific concern with 
professional ethics rests fundamentally on the need to legitimate the trust clients must have 
in professionals not to abuse the power they necessarily exert over them. The threat that this 
might occur focuses in the main on the idea that the professions and professionals might 
abuse their position in order to pursue their own organisational and personal interests. 
However, if professional ethics is derived from a universalistic ethics, then the specific 
interests of the professional organisation and the individual professionals within it are 
always subject to the overriding claims of ethical principles and values which treat those 
interests as immaterial to what the professional is morally required to do. 
The deductive approach has very important implications for the basic structure of 
professional ethics which arise inevitably as a result of the essential features of the 
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universalism upon which it depends. In particular it makes the notion of moral obligations 
almost exclusively the focus of attention, side-lining other moral concepts like the virtues 
and moral goods to (at best) a secondary and derivative function. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the fact that to apply to the actions of everyone, irrespective of the particular 
differences between them, universalistic theories must focus on moral concepts that are 
neutral between different conceptions of the good, or goods, which particular individuals 
and groups seek to realise. Moral obligations provide exactly the sort of concept that fits this 
requirement4S. The pursuit of particular goods become a relevant consideration only insofar 
as they represent (or prevent) the instantiation of some neutral (general) moral obligation. 
And the development of certain moral virtues are relevant only insofar as they enable 
individuals to fulfil their moral obligations (for example, honesty enables one to fulfil the 
moral obligation to tell the truth). Inevitably, then, adopting the deductive conception of 
professional ethics focuses attention upon the development of more specific moral 
obligations (relevant to the professional context concerned) as an application of those that 
are universal. For example, a nurse may see the restoration to health of her clients as a 
particular good which she is motivated to pursue as a significant part of her understanding 
of what it is to fill her professional role, however, insofar as this is morally permissible, or 
required, it is so in virtue of being the instantiation of an obligation to do so. This 
particular obligation can be seen as a construct of the universal obligations of beneficence, 
non-maleficence, respect for autonomy (etc. ) applied to the health care context where they 
are conjoined to a specific contractual obligation to serve the health care needs of her 
clients46 , What is crucial to note is that it is the universalistic principles invoked which 
justify her particular professional obligations (not vice-versa). 
The main upshot of adopting a deductive universalistic approach to professional ethics is 
that its distinctive ethical concerns, to the extent that they are distinctive, focus almost 
exclusively upon a heightened requirement for impartial rules presented as a set of 
obligations to perform certain duties. The extent of the requirement for impartial obligations 
is comprehensive and is the result of adopting universalism in the "special circumstances" 
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of action in a public role. This is in contrast to private or individual morality. As Thomas 
Nagel, Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf, Samuel Scheffler, Michael Stocker, et al. have 
argued, any plausible (universalistic) theory based upon obligations must create a space in a 
person's life for the individual to pursue (non-impartial) private attachments and personal 
interests47. However, room for the influence of such attachments and interests is totally out 
of place in the public arena of professional conduct. This is a natural consequence of the 
particular type of specialised interventions that professionals are called upon to make, and 
the trust required of clients to allow such interventions to be made (which I have already 
discussed above). According to the deductive paradigm such trust is legitimated by the fact 
that the professional is guided in her conduct at all times by a set of impartial obligations to 
serve each client's interest. This ensures that she will dispense her services in a strictly 
disinterested fashion seeking no illegitimate gain to herself, her profession, or to other 
particular clients (this in turn justifies the autonomy that is accorded to the professions)48. 
The dominance of this conception of professional ethics is demonstrated very clearly by the 
overwhelming focus of attention within the professions and also in much of the literature on 
the professions in developing formal codes of conduct (or ethics). Codes of conduct on this 
reading just are lists of impartial obligations set out as ethical principles, rules and side- 
constraints designed to direct and regulate professional activity. Nigel Harris in a survey of 
150 codes of conduct noted that all of them consisted of a series of clauses expressed as 
imperatives obligating the professional to perform (or refrain from) certain acts49. The 
impartiality of a code's clauses work at two levels: first, they apply to any individual who 
takes on the role concerned, secondly, they are morally justified by being shown to be an 
application of universal principles and rules. 
Now, while it is undoubtedly true that developing codes of conduct forms a very important 
part of the ethical life of the professions, its predominance as a concern should be seen first 
and foremost as a reflection of the dominance of the deductive paradigmSO. However, the 
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idea that impartial principles and rules (codes of conduct) are the locus of professional 
ethics is challenged by the contextualist conception. 
(ii) The Contextualist Conception 
The contextualist conception locates the distinctiveness of professional ethics much more 
fundamentally and directly in the features of professional practice itself, i. e. in the "special 
circumstances" of practice within which professionals act. The key thought here is that 
there is no set of (external) universal principles which can be applied to practice, either to 
guide or justify ethical conduct within the professions. The questions immediately arise 
concerning just what sort of practice professional practice represents, and in what way does 
it entail distinctive ethical concerns. In answering these it is most fruitful to turn to the 
definition of a practice described by Alasdair Maclntyre in his seminal work "After Virtue" 
(1985,2nd ed, London, Duckworth): 
"... [A practice is]... any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. " 
(A Maclntyre, 1985,2nd ed, After Virtue, London, Duckworth, p. 187) 
It is particularly significant that among the sorts of activities that Maelntyre identifies as 
examples of practices (including games such as chess and football, the making and 
sustaining of family life, the enquiries of physics and history et cetera, pp. 187-8) he picks 
out certain professions such as architecture (p. 187) and medicine (p. 194) as paradigm cases. 
Further, it is possible (quite easily) to superimpose the definition of a profession outlined 
earlier quite neatly onto this definition of a practice. A quick way in which to grasp this 
idea, and also to grasp how it provides an argument for the contextualist conception, can be 
supplied by focusing on the key notion of "internal goods". 
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Maclntyre claims that in the course of engaging in a practice it is possible to realise goods 
that can be categorised into two kinds, those which can only be realised by engaging in that 
particular form of practice, and those that can be realised in other forms of practice or 
activity as well as the one in which they are actually realised in. The former represent the 
goods "internal" to practice and the latter represent goods "external" to practice. The 
difference between these two kinds of goods can be brought out clearly by the use of an 
example. Suppose that an individual, let us call her Kylie, is a songwriter for musicals, i. e. 
she engages in the practice that we might call musical song writing, it is possible for Kylie 
in the course of her practice to realise or achieve two sorts of goods or goals. On the one 
hand she can excel in the art of musical song writing, she can demonstrate the sort of 
complex imagination required to meld the particular combination of melody, lyric and 
drama that is distinctive of a good musical song; this represents a good internal to the 
practice, it is something that is necessarily connected to the practice concerned, it can only 
be achieved by engaging in that particular practice, indeed, can only be specified by 
reference to that practice. On the other hand she might realise or achieve a number of other 
goods by excelling at musical song writing, for example, she might become famous and 
wealthy. However, in this case the goods concerned are only contingently connected to the 
practice concerned for it is logically conceivable and empirically possible that she might 
achieve these particular goods by engaging in an entirely different sort of practice or 
activity, such as acting or novel writing, et cetera. This distinction can be emphasised by a 
further consideration. If we suppose that Kylie genuinely wants to be a good songwriter 
then one option denied to her is cheating; for example, she cannot become a good 
songwriter by murdering Tim Rice, stealing his songs and passing them off as her own. 
Admittedly if she was successful in such a scurrilous enterprise she might generally be 
perceived to be a good songwriter but, of course, she would not actually be a good 
songwriter and thus could not realise the internal goods of song writing. On the other hand, 
if her only genuine interest in song writing is to achieve certain external goods such as 
wealth and fame then cheating becomes a very real option. Success in assassinating Tim 
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Rice and passing off his songs as her own could indeed realise the goods of wealth and fame 
she craves. 
Now, it should be clear from what has been said above that professions represent paradigm 
cases of practices which centre upon the realisation of internal goods. If one considers the 
definition of a profession outlined earlier more fully it is very apparent that professions 
represent an excellent example of a "... coherent and complex form of socially established 
co-operative human activity... " in which such goods are realised. A highly developed level 
of organisation fostering a cohesive sense of community and shared form of life was 
identified as an essential element for professionalism, and as we have just seen it is precisely 
this sort of organisation which provides the environment in which internal goods are 
achieved by conforming to, and extending, the standards of excellence (and the conception 
of goods) which in practice largely define the nature of the profession concerned. Indeed, 
fulfilment of the cognitive, normative and evaluative criteria in any particular case of a 
profession consists largely in defining the internal goods of a practice, in providing the 
training professionals need in the skills and standards of excellence required for realising 
those goods, and also in orienting the dispositions of the professional to pursue those goods. 
Further, in the very act of distinguishing between professions our natural resort is to 
describe the specific knowledge with which a particular profession is concerned and this 
consists primarily in describing the internal goods of practice and the means by which those 
internal goods are realised. So the notion of a practice, as MacIntyre defines it, with its key 
notion of internal goods shows a striking resemblance to the concept of a profession defined 
earlier. 
Clearly much more could be said about the nature of a practice and the identification of 
professions with practices; however, such an expanded account belongs to later chapters. 
My purpose here is simply to show that there is at the very least a prima facie case for such 
an identification and to show how this in turn lends support to the contextualist conception 
of professional ethics. It is to the latter task I must now turn. In what way(s), then, do the 
37 
distinctive ethical concerns of the professions arise directly from the distinguishing features 
of professional practice? 
Maclntyre's answer, again, centres crucially on the notion of internal goods. Put very simply 
he argues that the internal goods of a practice can only be realised if the individuals engaged 
in the practice concerned act in accordance with certain moral dispositions or virtues: 
"A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those 
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods" 
(A Maclntyre, ibid, p. 191) 
The example used earlier elucidates this point, it was noted that Kylie could not realise the 
internal goods of musical song writing if she cheated; thus honesty is a moral disposition 
(virtue) necessary to realising internal goods. Maclntyre makes the same basic point with 
regard to other virtues such as justice and courage (ibid. p. 191, passim), and it takes little 
reflection to see that he is right in this. His point, however, goes even deeper: virtuous 
behaviour is also required for there to be any internal goods to realise in the first place. For 
example, acting justly is necessary within the context of a practice for it to be possible even 
to define the shared goods, standards and objectives that constitute that practice. Unless the 
members of a practice distribute the goods (internal and external) of the practice according 
to the established impersonal criteria that identify who deserves what in that particular 
context then the very idea that there is a shared practice being engaged in at all is seriously 
undermined. For example, if a consultant surgeon arranged the priority of treatment of 
patients X and Y on the ground of the urgency of their condition but placed patient Z, whose 
condition is more urgent, at the bottom of the list on the grounds that she finds the patient's 
taste in ties sartorially objectionable then she would have defined a new relationship to the 
patient (Z) which falls outside of the description of it in terms of the (professional) practice 
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in which she is putatively engaged". Similarly, rewards within the profession (promotion, 
financial etc. ) need to be distributed among professionals in accordance with the merit 
warranted by the nature of the internal goods and standards of excellence being pursued. 
Insoluble dispute over what counts as the just distribution of rewards in a practice is a sign 
that there is a deep-seated disagreement over what counts as the standards of excellence and 
goods in the practice concerned. Indeed, in both of the situations just described there is the 
very clear implication that the practice has become an activity pursued solely for the purpose 
of realising external goods. 
It should be becoming clear by now in what sort of way the contextualist conception 
represents a distinct alternative to the deductive paradigm of professional ethics. In relating 
ethics primarily to the pursuit of internal goods within a (professional ) practice 
contextualism eschews the appeal to universal (impartial) principles in favour of developing 
a professional's ability to exercise particularistic moral judgements within specific 
contexts32. The particularism of Maclntyre's contextualist account comes over in at least one 
very important way. Any particular virtue can only be given substantive content by direct 
reference to the practice concerned. For example, while we might say generally that courage 
is the "... disposition to overcome fear, for the sake of that judged to be right"", what it is to 
behave courageously as, say, a nurse or a soldier will differ in significant ways such that it 
is impossible to recognise or display the virtue of courage in these particular contexts 
without reference to the nature of the practice (goods) concerned. Whereas the nurse in her 
role as a nurse is seldom called upon to endanger her life in behaving courageously 
(although she may endanger her livelihood as in cases such as whistle blowing) for the 
soldier this represents the typical example of courage. Similarly in unifying all the virtues 
required in a particular professional role, the hierarchical ordering and balance that needs to 
be struck between the virtues, can only be established by reference to the context of practice. 
Accordingly we expect the nurse and the soldier to establish quite different orderings of the 
virtues which reflect the requirements of the very different sorts of (internal) goods with 
which their practices are concerned34 
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A further important difference between the two positions should also now be clear. 
According to the deductive paradigm professional ethics centres upon the development of 
specific rules of conduct derived from universal principles and rules which guide the 
professional in what she should do. According to the contextual conception professional 
ethics centres upon the development of moral dispositions, the virtues, which first and 
foremost guide the professional in what she should be. This, of course, reflects the general 
distinction in ethics between ethical theories that prioritise the "right" and those that 
prioritise the "good"; Kant is a distinguished representative of the former and Aristotle of 
the latter. As we have seen, according to the deductive paradigm, in deciding what it is right 
to do the professional begins from outside her professional context by applying universal 
and impartial principles to her practice (a top down approach). In contrast in developing a 
conception of what it is good to be a professional must, according to the contextualist 
conception, begin from the context of the practice itself, she must begin, that is, from some 
conception of what a good nurse, doctor, soldier, teacher et cetera is (a bottom up approach). 
Naturally the questions about what it is right to do and good to be are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, conceptions of what constitutes a good nurse to be will have an 
inevitable consequence for views about what it is right for a nurse to do (and vice-versa). 
However, the priority that one affords to either of these approaches is of the utmost 
consequence. 
This, then, represents the question that both dominates the philosophical theory of 
professional ethics and, accordingly, my particular thesis. In ethical reasoning and decision 
making from where should the professional begin, is it from a set of impartial principles 
that apply universally, or is it from a conception of the goods and virtues developed in the 
context of practice? 
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CHAPTER 2 
ETHICAL THEORY: MORAL THEORY AND CONTEXTUALISM 
"No doubt most decent people disagree with Hitler and Pot Pot on many matters of fact as well as ethics, but it 
seems likely that, even if the factual differences were cleared away, some utterly fundamental ethical 
differences would remain. Are we then content to say that there is no further basis for judging between us and 
the Nazis or the Khmer Rouge? Is there no sense in which our opposition to the murder of millions of people 
is, when compared to any possible defence of such policies, better grounded, more rational, more defensible, 
more justifiable- in one word, right? " 
(Peter Singer, Ethics) 
"I shall argue that philosophy should not try to produce ethical theory, though this does not mean that 
philosophy cannot offer any critique of ethical beliefs and ideas. I shall claim that in ethics the reductive 
enterprise has no justification and should disappear. "
(Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limit of Philosophy) 
"... it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy. " 
(G. E. M Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy) 
Introduction 
In reaching this chapter I have been concerned solely to lay out the case for regarding 
professional ethics as a distinctive area of ethics meriting consideration in its own right. As 
such I attempted in chapter 1 to distinguish the "special circumstances" of professional 
practice from other occupational forms (and other contexts of action generally), and very 
briefly sketched two ways in which the distinctiveness of professional ethics can be 
accounted for philosophically. In the Introduction I identified the various forms and styles 
of reasoning uncovered by the empirical survey of ethical thinking and practice in nursing in 
order to provide data with which to test the alternative accounts of professional ethics. 
From this chapter onwards the task is to subject that data to philosophical theoretical 
analysis. 
However, as I noted in chapter 1 just what a philosophical theoretical analysis of ethics is is 
itself a subject of great debate, and inevitably what one takes philosophical ethics to be in 
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general determines, to a very significant extent, one's account of a specific phenomenon like 
professional ethics. Failure to recognise the full significance of this has played, I shall 
claim, an influential role in the dominance of the deductive paradigm in applied 
(professional) ethics. Accordingly, the task of this chapter is to pick up from where I left off 
at the end of chapter 1 and provide a fuller account of the main alternative conceptions of 
philosophical ethics. In the course of doing this I shall identify the key issues which will 





Bernard Williams provides the following definition of an ethical theory: 
"An ethical theory is a theoretical account of what ethical thought and practice are, which account either 
implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot 
be such a test. " 
(B Williams, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London, Fontana Paperbacks. p. 72) 
Here Williams incorporates into his definition two general elements that any philosophical 
ethical theory must contain. These elements one might label, following tradition, the "meta- 
ethical" and the "normative" (or "substantive") components of an ethical theory'. The meta- 
ethical element of an ethical theory is represented by a theoretical account of what ethical 
thought and practice are. Its concern is with establishing the meaning and logic of our 
ethical discourse and behaviour rather than with establishing any truths about what 
particular principles or values one should incorporate into a morally good life. The latter 
task falls upon the normative or substantive part of an ethical theory. Very important 
differences in conceptions ofphilosophical ethical theory emerge at this point and focus 
centrally upon what a meta-ethical analysis of our ethical intuitions implies about what (if 
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anything) a substantive ethics should contain in terms of values, principles and tests for 
correctness. However, before I consider these differences it is important to make some 
further points about the use of the term "meta-ethics". 
Williams himself actually avoids distinguishing between the "meta-ethical" and "normative" 
elements in his definition. As he correctly points out the term "meta-ethics" was used by 
certain philosophers (usually of positivistic persuasion, for example, AJ Ayer and CL 
Stevenson') earlier in this century to identify a type of philosophical reflection upon the 
ethical which they claimed had no substantive moral implications whatsoever. Now, this 
was not merely the idea that meta-ethical thought itself does not establish any substantive 
conclusions. Rather, it is the stronger assertion that meta-ethical reflection by its very 
nature is non-substantive and can yield no substantive ethical conclusions of any form. In 
effect "meta-ethics" was a term they reserved for an entirely "philosophical" activity where 
such philosophical reflection is conceived as a value free, purely theoretical and descriptive 
enterprise. Under this sort of conception philosophy and philosophers appeared to have 
nothing useful at all to say about ethical conduct. However, Williams is undoubtedly right 
when he says: 
"... it is now obvious (once again obvious) that what one thinks about the subject matter of ethical thought, what 
one supposes it to be about, must itself affect what tests for acceptability or coherence are appropriate to it; 
and the use of those tests must affect any substantive ethical results. " 
(B Williams, ibid, p. 173) 
Indeed an analysis of meta-ethical theories suggest that meta-ethical judgements can and do 
have an impact upon how we understand the nature and role of moral values; about what we 
take moral values to represent and what this suggests about how we should go about 
formulating our ethical judgements. For example: a meta-ethical theory supporting an 
analysis of ethical judgements as judgements about individual character, say, in terms of the 
virtues, might support a style of reasoning which begins from a conception of the good life 
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(as opposed to a conception based upon what is right) which in turn leads to specific ethical 
judgements in the light of the good (as opposed to establishing a set of obligations)'. 
With this lineage it is perhaps no surprise that Williams thinks there is little point in 
preserving the term "meta-ethics" and suggests we should instead just talk about ethical 
theory generally as it is defined by him in the quote above. However, while I agree 
wholeheartedly with Williams' criticisms of this particular interpretation of meta-ethics I 
think a reconstructed understanding of the meta-ethical, which rejects the detached 
perspective with which writers like Ayer and Stevenson identified it, and which clarifies its 
substantive links with actual ethical practice, can do some very useful (philosophical) 
ethical work4. A meta-ethics thus reconstructed represents, I would argue, that part of 
ethical thought (in general) which is concerned with philosophical reflection upon the 
substance and form of ethical thinking and behaviour and which, while connected with 
substantive first order judgements, is not concerned directly to put forward a specific set of 
first order judgements. The point of carving up ethics in this way is not to identify some 
naturally distinct boundaries within the field of ethical phenomena and thought but rather to 
serve the particular interest of the theorist in identifying the common points of agreement 
and departure that are generated within and across substantive ethical viewpoints which 
require some sort of philosophical interpretation, explanation and guidance. In effect this 
understanding of meta-ethics shares with the traditional conception of that term a concern to 
situate the philosophers' role in contributing to ethical thought'. It departs from the 
tradition, however, in situating that role within the substantive productive processes of 
ethical life as opposed to a situation somewhere on the outside of ethical life looking in. 
The interpretation, explanation and guidance involved in fulfilling the meta-ethical role of 
the philosopher focuses largely upon two questions. First, "How is the ethical actually 
recognised and instantiated by particular individuals and groups in empirical reality? ". 
Secondly, "How, in the light of reflection upon the first question, can (or should) 
modifications be made to the empirical reality of the lived ethical existence of those 
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individuals and groups? ". It is important to note that in answering the second question the 
concern is not in any direct sense to put forward suggestions about what specific substantive 
changes an individual or group should make to their particular set of value judgements, for 
example, that they should liberalise abortion laws, ban invitro fertilisation, promote the two 
parent family etc.. Rather, the concern is more generally about making explicit the nature or 
form of the ethical reasoning which best explains the set of intuitions and practices 
concerned and showing where this seems to generate conflicts with particular ethical 
judgements they make or the practices in which they engage. The guidance the meta- 
ethician offers, then, concerns the actual moral reasoning process itself, suggesting ways in 
which the agent can improve or "perfect' 'her reasoning in order that she is able to identify 
her moral obligations and resolve conflicts that arise6. As such, meta-ethics on my 
conception attempts to describe the general form that ethical reasoning actually does, or 
should, take. Thus, depending upon what sort of epistemological, metaphysical and moral 
ideas and presuppositions underlie the particular conclusions of meta-ethical analysis it may 
indeed entail specific changes when applied to a specific context, but in its full 
philosophical mode it is essentially concerned with the form of the reasoning that leads to 
specific conclusions. The task of practically cashing out the specific consequences which 
arise from adopting a particular form of ethical reasoning is not the primary concern of the 
meta-ethicist, In the production of ethical life there is a division of labour and the 
distinctively philosophical task of the meta-ethician does not carry through to a distinctively 
philosophical task of practical application. The practical application of meta-ethical 
analysis in which the specific set of ethical values of a society is generated is a task for all 
the relevant members of the community concerned. In so far as philosophers contribute to 
this specific task they do so primarily as participant members of the community and not 
purely as specialists in philosophical ethical analysis'. 
The thesis I present here provides a good example of the distinctions I am attempting to 
make: my concern in this work is not to produce a specific set of first order principles and 
values which represents what a professional nurse ethically should do in the variety of 
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actual situations she confronts in working practices. Rather, my concern is with the type of 
moral reasoning process that the nurse should engage in. In examining the particular 
substantive ethical views of professional nurses and analysing them in the light of ideas of 
ethical theorists I am attempting to derive conclusions about how they do and how they 
might enhance their recognition of the ethical. My aim is to present a picture of practical 
moral reasoning that arms the nurse with the conceptual and theoretical resources to 
determine for herself what is ethically demanded of her professionally. More generally, my 
aim is not only to assist nurses in establishing their particular substantive ethical concerns, 
but, insofar as the example of nursing represents an example of the more general concept of 
a professional practice, also to assist other sorts of professionals in establishing their 
specific ethical concerns. My interest, then, is with establishing conclusions largely about 
how to do ethics rather than directly with what to think ethically about some particular 
moral problem. As such I am tempted to describe the current thesis as an attempt to 
provide a meta-ethical foundation of applied /professional ethics. With these qualifications 
about my use of the term "meta-ethics" in place I can return to the issues raised at the point 
of departure into the previous digression. 
(ii) Two Styles of Ethical Theory 
I claimed above that very important differences in conceptions of ethical theory emerge at 
the point where meta-ethical reflection generates implications for substantive ethical 
practice. I argued further that it is at this point that philosophical (meta-ethical) analysis 
finds its distinctive role in the collective production of ethical life. What these two 
propositions together imply is that the key philosophical issue with which the philosopher 
working in the field of applied ethics must engage is the problematic relationship of theory 
to practice. Accordingly it is against the background of this general question that most of 
my comments in the present work should be viewed. In what follows I shall claim that at 
the interface of theory and practice meta-ethical reflection generates substantive 
implications that take on one of two general forms. In one form ethical theory contains a 
sub-theory, what I shall label distinctively as "Moral Theory", which, briefly described, 
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provides a set of universal principles and general axioms which justify or entail a systematic 
set of rules or duties from which particular moral judgements are to be deduced9 (in chapter 
1I described this as the "deductive paradigm"). In the other form of ethical theory Moral 
Theory is absent and instead an account of what constitutes a good or worthwhile life is 
either explicitly stated or implicitly presupposed. In this second form the notion that there 
are a systematic set of universal principles, axioms, duties, and rules from which particular 
ethical judgements can be deduced or justified is explicitly rejected and replaced by an 
account of the good in which situated practical wisdom (what Aristotle called phronesis) 
forms the heart of a non-rationalistic, account of ethical decision making10 (in chapter 1I 
described this as the "contextualist" approach). This distinction between two different 
approaches to ethical theory represents one of the most crucial distinctions in applied 
(professional) ethics, for it should be apparent already that which of the two forms proves to 
provide the correct account of the relation of theory to practice will naturally be of the first 
importance for the project of providing philosophical guidance for the ethical practice of 
professionals (among others). For reasons that will become apparent shortly I shall label the 
first form of ethical theory "The Moral Theory Approach", and the second form of ethical 




ETHICAL THEORY I 
THE MORAL THEORY APPROACH 
INTUITIONS 4 META-ETHICS 4MORAL THEORY 4 PRACTICAL ETHICS 
ETHICAL THEORY II 
CONTEXTUALISM 
INTUITIONS- META-ETHICS 4 ACCOUNT OF THE GOOD- PRACTICAL 
ETHICS 
Some examples of theories that exemplify these different forms should help clarify what I 
am attempting to identify as the crucial structural divergence in their respective approaches. 
(ii. a) The Moral Theory Approach 
In the first form of ethical theory the substantive implications of meta-ethical reflection 
upon our moral intuitions are concentrated into a Moral Theory which, as I have just 
mentioned, consists of a systematic set of universal principles and general axioms justifying 
or entailing rules or duties which are applied (apriori) to particular circumstances (as such 
this represents the most literal interpretation of the term "applied ethics"). A good example 
of an ethical theory that takes this form is the utilitarian theory advanced by Henry Sidgwick 
in his The Methods of Ethics (1962,7th ed, London, Macmillan). Sidgwick understood the 
ethical intuitions of common-sense morality to be largely correct but recognised that as they 
existed as a part of the everyday currency of social commerce they could yield no clear set 
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of principles which would be suitable to provide justification or guidance in new or 
different cases. 
"Can we then, between this Scylla and Charybdis of ethical inquiry, avoiding on the one hand doctrines that 
merely bring us back to common opinion with all its imperfections, and on the other hand doctrines that lead 
us round in a circle, find any way of obtaining self-evident moral principles of real significance? It would be 
disheartening to have to regard as altogether illusory the strong instinct of Common Sense that points to the 
existence of such principles, and the deliberate convictions of the long line of moralists who have enunciated 
them. At the same time, the more we extend our knowledge of man,... the less disposed we are to believe that 
there is any definite code of absolute rules, applicable to all human beings without exception. " 
(H Sidgwick, 1962 (7th edition), London, Macmillan. p. 379) 
However, he claimed that we can indeed establish "that there are certain absolute practical 
principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest... ". Sidgwick 
argues that philosophical (meta-ethical) reflection upon our common sense intuitions could 
provide the grounds for establishing a principle or set of principles "... more absolutely and 
undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules might be deduced, either just as 
they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications"". The first 
principle he tries to establish in this way is what he describes as the familiar principle of the 
"Golden Rule" - "Do to others as you would have them do to you. '"' Sidgwick notes that 
such a principle is not typically formulated in this abstract and universal way but is 
repeatedly recognised and expressed contextually in the particular situation of two 
individuals relating to each other in some form of social intercourse. Philosophical analysis 
of such instances, however, enables us to see that what underlies the authority we attribute 
to the common sense moral intuition is indeed a self-evident universally applicable 
principle. Sidgwick recognises that the principle in itself is insufficiently determined to 
provide complete guidance as to what to do in each new instance in which it must be 
acknowledged. It provides guidance insofar as to "... throw a definite onus probandi on the 
man who applies to another a treatment of which he would complain if applied to 
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himself;... " (ibid, p. 380). Naturally, he argues, no principle at this level of generality can 
anticipate in advance all the possible scenarios of social interaction or prescribe the vast 
range of specific acts which people might possibly perform therein: he notes, for example, 
that applied to the sphere of legal justice the principle incontestably demands impartiality in 
the application of general rules, what it cannot determine, however, is which particular rules 
should be impartially applied. Thus, what is beyond question, according to Sidgwick, is that 
the principle must indeed be acknowledged in any exchange between individuals, and the 
particular substantive content of any social exchange must represent a particular expression 
of the general principle. It is in this sense that the principle is apriori, universal and 
practical. 
The second fundamental principle that Sidgwick attempts to demonstrate is the principle of 
Prudence which states that it is rational to pursue the good of one's life as a whole, where 
this means that "... the mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable 
ground for having more regard for the consciousness of one moment than for that of 
another. " (ibid, p. 381). Again Sidgwick seeks to show how this universal principle can be 
derived from philosophical reflection upon common-sense moral intuitions. A typical 
everyday expression of it is "... that a smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater 
future good" (ibid, p. 381). He notes further that this is not simply constrained to a purely 
hedonistic calculus but is applied to any other interpretation of "one's own good" in which 
particular episodes are considered as a part of a whole lifetime. From these sorts of 
observations Sidgwick claims to show that the principle of Prudence - an impartial concern 
for all parts of one's conscious life - is demonstrated to be self-evident, practical, and 
universally applicable. 
The third fundamental principle that Sidgwick seeks to demonstrate as self-evident is the 
principle of Universal Benevolence. Relying on the same observations discussed in relation 
to the principle of Prudence Sidgwick argues that just as we moved in that case from the 
consideration of particular goods to the integration of those goods into consideration of 
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"... the Good on the Whole of a single individual, " so too can we move by self-evident 
reasoning to the integration of the good of each whole individual into the Universal Good: 
"... by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other, I obtain the self-evident 
principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) 
of the Universe, than the good of any other, unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that the more 
good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other. And it is evident to me that as a rational being I 
am bound to aim at good generally, - so far as it is attainable by my efforts, - not merely at a particular part of 
it. From these two rational intuitions we may deduce, as a necessary inference, the maxim of Benevolence in 
an abstract form: viz. that each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his 
own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or 
attainable by him. " 
(H Sidgwick, ibid, p. 382) 
With this third fundamental principle in place Sidgwick claims to have demonstrated that 
Utilitarianism is the Moral Theory that best accounts for the common-sense moral intuitions 
that are current in society and which further systematises those intuitions according to 
principles that enable us to reject, amend, or confirm them, and generate new rules of moral 
behaviour" 
Now it is at once noticeable that the course of meta-ethical reflection on common-sense 
moral intuitions could not carry Sidgwick to this "systematising" conclusion with quite the 
ease that he seems to suggest. There are undoubtedly problems with his depiction of 
common-sense morality (which at best is highly selective), and with his conception of the 
meta-ethical which is underpinned by some disputable epistemological, metaphysical and, 
indeed, moral, ideas and presuppositions". It is very much these ideas and presuppositions 
which Sidgwick shares with many other Moral Theorists that I shall subject to criticism 
later. However, my direct concern in this chapter is simply to identify the form and not 
challenge the content of his reasoning. Suffice it to say, then, that his ethical theory 
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exemplifies the structure of The Moral Theory Approach: he begins with common-sense 
moral intuitions, and subjects these to meta-ethical reflection which he believes 
demonstrates the existence of fundamental underlying universal principles, these principles 
are then systematised into a Moral Theory, in this case a form of Utilitarianism, and this in 
turn is demonstrated to have application to all practical ethical situations. Thus Sidgwick's 
theory represents that form of ethical theory which moves from intuitions to meta-ethical 
analysis to development of Moral Theory to practical application. 
It is crucial to notice that in describing ethical theory at this level, in terms of its general 
form, I am grouping together a number of ethical theories that in actuality contain 
substantive Moral Theories that are diametrically opposed at that level. Thus I would argue 
that as well as various forms of Utilitarianism the various forms of Kantianism also take the 
same form as The Moral Theory Approach. It might be thought that the thorough-going 
apriori nature of Kant's theory coupled with his "distrust" of deriving moral principles from 
the "particular constitution of human nature"" does away with reflection which draws upon 
moral intuitions. However, Kant's theory depends heavily upon the first section of the 
"Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" in which he supports his view of the 
unconditional good of the good will by drawing upon ordinary common-sense morality16. It 
is only from this that he is able to move on to build up a Moral Theory specifying duties 
based upon application of the categorical imperative. Thus Kant (and the Kantian) also 
moves from moral intuitions to meta-ethical analysis to Moral Theory to practical 
application. It should be clear, then, that my point of entry into the debate about the nature 
of applied (professional) ethics is not the standard approach, which compares and contrasts 
various forms of Moral Theory, in particular Utilitarianism and Kantianism. That 
Kantianism and Utilitarianism should share the same form as ethical theories should come 
as no surprise when it is recognised that they share a number of crucial meta-ethical ideas 
and presuppositions". I shall discuss these shortly, but first I will mention very briefly an 
example of an ethical theory that takes the form of Contextualism. 
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(ii. b) Contextualism 
Aristotle's ethical theory represents a classical example of Contextualism (see his 
"Nicomachean Ethics"), indeed, his theory represents a particularly strong form of 
Contextualism because he explicitly rejects the idea that ethical reflection can yield what I 
have called Moral Theory (i. e. a set of universal principles from which one can deduce 
practical moral conclusions). His starting point is to locate his discussion of ethics clearly 
and unambiguously within the realm of the practical life of the individual, who seeks an 
answer to the general question, "What is the good for man? " (1976, Nicomachean Ethics, 
London, Penguin, 1094a22-b12). He does this by distinguishing between three distinct 
(although related) realms of human activity and knowledge: science (episteme), production 
(techne), and practical action (phronesis). The realm of science concerns absolute or eternal 
knowledge, that which "... cannot be otherwise than it is,... " (I 139b18-36) and the sort of 
knowledge and intellectual virtue suitable to this realm is "episteme" which is knowledge of 
universal truths and first principles. The realm of production is concerned with the art of, 
"... bringing something into being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into 
being something that is capable either of being or of not being,... " (1140a1-23). "Techne", 
the knowledge and intellectual virtue appropriate to this art, is thus concerned with the 
pragmatics of production, which concerns neither, universal truths (episteme), nor 
knowledge of what constitutes a good life (phronesis). The realm of practical action 
concerns the question about what sorts of activities and actions are, "... conducive to the 
good life generally. " (1140a24-b12), and "phronesis", practical wisdom, is the type of 
knowledge and intellectual virtue appropriate to determine which particular acts are 
accordingly felicitous. Like techne phronesis is not concerned with knowledge that is 
universal (invariable) but with that which is subject to variation (which is why it involves 
deliberation not deduction). However, it is unlike techne in that the activity or practice of 
techne is absorbed entirely in the item of production (i. e. the technical skill involved aims at 
an end other than itself (1140a24-b12)), whereas phronesis concerns the practical evaluation 
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of acts that constitute "doing well" which itself just is the aim or end of phronesis. The 
reasoning involved in techne is always instrumental and seeks to discover the best means to 
a given end, whereas the reasoning involved in phronesis is fundamentally concerned with 
the evaluation of the ends themselves. 
From these observations Aristotle argues that ethical knowledge, knowledge of how to 
behave according to right reason, cannot be formalised into universal principles and rules 
because "in a practical science [ethics], so much depends on particular circumstances that 
only general rules can be given" (1103b26), and these in turn would always be subject to 
revision or refutation by the occurrence of future situations in which it could be shown that 
they fail. Not only did he recognise that "instances of morally fine and just conduct ... 
involve so much difference and variety.... " (1094b13), but also "instances of goods involve 
a similar kind of variety" (1094b13). As such Aristotle concluded that "... in discussing 
subjects, and arguing from evidence, conditioned in this way, we must be satisfied with a 
broad outline of the truth; that is, in arguing about what is for the most part so from 
premises that are for the most part true we must be content to draw conclusions that are 
similarly qualified. "(1094b13). Thus "... agents are compelled at every step to think out for 
themselves what the circumstances demand... " (1103b26: italics mine). It should be clear, 
then, that Aristotle is explicitly rejecting what I have labelled Moral Theory: when he 
suggests that each individual is "compelled at every step to think for himself' he is rejecting 
the idea that an individual has recourse to a system of universal principles and rules from 
which it is possible to deduce what to do in any given situation. Thus ethical decision 
making is not a matter of discovering a pre-existing (universal) rule under which to 
subsume a particular act, but is instead an activity in which the deliberative action taken by 
the individual expresses her conception of the good generally and the relation of her own 
individual good to the general good. Put simply, the focus of the question that motivates the 
deliberative process moves from, what it is right to do, to, what it is good to be. Thus while 
rules (of thumb) may still play some part in the moral deliberation of the Aristotelian agent 
no rule in itself can determine the correctness of any particular decision, each rule will stand 
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or fall in so far as the conception of the good which underlies it (and which the rule seeks to 
instantiate) stands or falls. 
The rejection of Moral Theory does not mean, of course, that Aristotle abandons the moral 
agent to a life of solitary and arbitrary ethical speculation. Indeed, from the outset it is clear 
that Aristotle takes very seriously the fundamentally practical nature of ethics that he has 
described and is determined that the Nicomachean Ethics should not merely describe what 
good individuals do but also inspire and direct us to actually act as good individuals do. 
Accordingly he provides an account of an ethical life in which moral education (habituation) 
in the virtues plays a central role in schooling the practical wisdom (phronesis) of each 
individual in order that they should develop the ability to exercise contextually sound moral 
judgement "Moral virtues, like crafts, are acquired by practice and habituation" (1103a14): 
"... the virtues ... we acquire 
by first exercising them, just as happens in the arts. Anything that we have to 
learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it: people become builders by building and instrumentalists by 
playing instruments> Similarly we become just by performing just acts, temporate by performing temporate 
ones, brave by performing brave ones. " 
(Aristotle, ibid, 1103a14-bl) 
Put very briefly, then, a morally good person is an individual who has been immersed in 
society and has developed through guidance and habituation the dispositions of character 
(the virtues) which along with phronesis enable her to exercise appropriate moral judgement 
in each particular instance in which it is required. 
It should be clear from what has just passed that Aristotle's ethical theory exemplifies the 
structure of ethical theory identified as Contextualism above. Aristotle moves from the 
observation of everyday intuitions, to meta-ethical analysis of those intuitions from which 
he discerns that no universal principles are forthcoming and instead claims that an account 
of the good is presupposed (and manifested) in our actions, the articulation of this good in 
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turn enables us to reflect critically on the practical ethical problems with which we continue 
to be confronted. 
Much more could, of course, be said about both Aristotle's and Sidgwick's particular 
accounts. However, enough should have been done to show how their respective theories 
represent the general ethical theory forms of The Moral Theory Approach and 
Contextualism. And it should be clear even from these brief sketches that which of the 
forms of ethical theory one adopts is going to have profound implications for one's 
understanding of how to proceed in professional ethics and applied ethics generally. 
Now, while these two forms of ethical theory represent radically different conceptions of 
what a successful theory should look like there must be - for genuine disagreement about 
what constitutes the right approach to ethical decision making to be possible- some form of 
common understanding of what represents the basic question(s) for ethical theory, which in 
turn derives from the most basic and commonly accepted facts or presuppositions about 
morality and moral decision making". 
(iii) The Moral Point-Of-View and the Basic Question for Applied Ethical Theory 
Naturally there is some disagreement about what the presuppositions are that underlie the 
very possibility of moral reasoning. However, I wish to argue that there is a fundamental 
configuration of the moral point-of-view which contains two necessary aspects that all 
authors must in some way presuppose. Roger Scruton puts it as follows: 
"Morality, in its fundamental meaning, is a condition upon practical reasoning. it is a constraint upon reasons 
for action, which is felt by most rational beings and which is, furthermore, a normal consequence of possession 
of a first-person perspective. Morality must be understood, therefore, in first-person terms: in terms of the 
reasoning that leads to action. " 
(R Scruton, 1986, Sexual Desire, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p322) 
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In essence what Scruton refers to as the first-person perspective is the simple fact that when 
any individual is faced with a situation in which she must act, the practical reasoning 
involved always confronts her with the question "what should I do? ". In providing an 
answer to the question "what should I do? " she provides herself with the motivation to act 
accordinglyl9. So, a stretch of practical reasoning is always the reasoning of some particular 
"I", and seeks to answer a practical question faced by some particular "I". This point seems 
to me to be irrefutable; liberal individualists and communitarians alike must accept that 
particular episodes of practical reasoning are grounded in the dispositions of particular 
individuals. Indeed, Bernard Williams notes that: 
"... the primacy of the individual and of personal dispositions is a necessary truth - necessary, at least, up to 
drastic technological changes such as cloning, pooling of brainstores, and so on. This is the sense in which 
even radical structuralist descriptions of society, whatever they may say, suppose there to be individuals who 
acquire certain dispositions and aims and express them in action. " 
(B Williams, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London, Fontana Paperbacks, p. 201) 
The first necessary aspect of the moral point-of view, then, concerns the first person 
perspective of practical reasoning within which any moral judgement and action must be 
expressed 
Now, leaving aside the possibility of adopting some sort of amoral position (see footnote 10 
above), any stretch of practical reasoning must be constrained or guided by concerns which 
in some important sense lie outside of one's own particular personal concerns: this is one 
reason why they represent a constraint or form of guidance. Thus in answering the question 
"what should I do? " my answer is both, an answer to a question that arises specifically for 
me and is specifically designed to motivate me (the first-person perspective), and an answer 
that is constrained or informed by moral considerations that are (in a sense to be 
established) external to me. Thus the second necessary aspect of the configuration of the 
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moral point-of-view is the consideration of concerns that are generated externally, which 
one might label (with qualification) the "third person perspective"'. Put in these terms it 
becomes easy to see why the development of a coherent ethical theory, and, indeed, simply 
living an ethical life, turns out to be the difficult task that it is, for within the moral point-of- 
view are necessarily united two perspectives, the first-person and the third-person, which 
prima facie seem to represent two (potentially) conflicting perspectives. 
Thus we are presented with what I shall label as the "Basic Question for Applied Ethical 
Theory 
"How can a stretch of practical reasoning incorporate the fact that it needs to reflect 
reasoning that is specifically mine (and motivate me as such) yet at the same time reflect 
standards that transcend my own specific concerns? ". 
This question should be seen as a more specific adaptation of the key issue I identified 
above on page 51 which concerned the relation of theory to practice, for an answer to the 
Basic Question must provide a plausible philosophical theory or account of how an 
individual's practice can be justifiably adapted or constrained by external (moral) 
considerations. The force of this question is very apparent in the world of professional 
ethics because the adoption of a specific social role explicitly introduces the professional to 
a set of standards that are essentially established quite independently of herself but which 
must be incorporated into the first-person perspective of her practical reasoning. But it is 
also clearly a question implicit in the most private acts of moral decision making, and even 
if it is true that theorists do not always explicitly refer to this question as the Basic Question, 
it is true, I shall argue, that it is always a central question that underlies any ethical theory 
that seeks to address the issue of the relation of theory to practice. Thus, for example: 
Ethical Egoists attempt to answer the question by conscripting moral constraints directly 
into the service of the desires of the first-person perspective. Kantians seek an answer in 
uniting the third-person (moral) and the first-person perspective within the perspective of 
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pure rationality itself, which at once incorporates autonomous self-legislation and universal 
principle. Utilitarians attempt to answer the question by identifying the single good of 
pleasure (or happiness), which is at once a specifically personal and universal good. 
Aristotelians invite the individual to realise their personal good by achieving human 
excellence in accordance with standards "objectively" described in an account of the good 
life generally. Other authors despair of the "schizophrenia" involved in trying to unite the 
first and third personal perspectives21, or decry the "sainthood" required to bring first- 
personal desires under the control of third-personal constraints", and seek instead to justify 
the existence of a space for individual action free of moral constraints23. What I have called 
the Basic Question seems, then, to be quite fundamental and I want to suggest that 
ultimately it is a satisfactory answer to the Basic Question that represents the final 
validation of any theory. So, in describing and assessing the rival claims of The Moral 
Theory Approach and Contextualism I shall focus centrally upon the ways in which the 
Basic Question is addressed. In particular I shall seek to uncover what resources the rival 
theories make available for providing suitable answers to the practical problems faced by 
professionals in which the inherent tensions of the Basic Question are made manifest. 
Naturally, I accept there are a number of possible alternative questions around which I could 
have constructed the discussion which will concern the rest of this thesis. However, I hope 
it is apparent that the Basic Question represents a particularly apposite question for the 
present thesis in that it brings to the fore a central problem for any theory in applied ethics, 
namely, the relation of theory to practice. I hope to show in what follows that in focusing 
upon the Basic Question it is possible to illuminate some of the more profound and 
complicated problems that obstruct a proper understanding of the phenomena of 
professional (applied) ethics. 
.................................................................... 
As this chapter is pivotal in this thesis it is perhaps worth briefly summarising the main 
points I have discussed so far. First, I located the distinctive contribution of the philosopher 
to applied ethics as a provider of meta-ethical analysis of ethical phenomena. Secondly, I 
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described meta-ethical analysis in a way, which dismisses the implausible idea that it has no 
impact upon substantive practice, and accordingly identified the key issue for meta-ethical 
analysis in applied ethics as the problematic relationship of theory to practice. Thirdly, I 
identified and distinguished between two main approaches to ethical theory which represent 
fundamentally different ways in which the theory/practice problematic is addressed (The 
Moral Theory Approach and Contextualism). Fourthly, I established the common ground 
upon which these two approaches to ethical theory can be assessed: in this respect I 
identified the basic configuration of the moral point-of-view (which united first-person and 
third-person perspectives in an inherently tense relationship), and, connectedly, identified 
what I labelled the "Basic Question for Applied Ethical Theory". 
....................................................................... 
II 
The Rejection of The Moral Theory Approach 
Introduction 
It is ethical theory in the form of the Moral Theory Approach that represents what has been 
appositely labelled the "dominant tradition" or "dominant conceptioni24, for it has indeed 
represented the dominant form of ethical theory at least since the Enlightenment2S. This fact 
in itself suggests that philosophers and others have found much in this approach which is at 
least prima facie plausible or simply inevitable. However, I shall argue that The Moral 
Theory Approach represents a fundamentally misguided conception of the ethical. Calling 
upon the empirical research outlined in the previous chapter and identifying the theoretical 
issues that arise out of these data along with the works of philosophers I shall attempt to 
show that The Moral Theory Approach represents both a radically distorted description of 
our actual ethical practices and an implausible account of how actual ethical practice 
might be perfected or improved. I shall seek to show that the constraints of Moral Theory 
render impossible any satisfactory answer to the Basic Question. Thus, the Moral Theory 
Approach, I shall argue, cannot provide an adequate account of professional ethics. 
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Accordingly in the chapters that follow my strategy will be to attack the fundamental 
principles, ideas, and presuppositions upon which Moral Theory and The Moral Theory 
Approach are founded and in the process of doing that construct my own positive account in 
support of an ethical theory taking the form of the Contextualist Approach. But to carry out 
this task I must, of course, first identify what the main principles, ideas and presuppositions 
are that underlie Moral Theory, and it is with this preliminary task that the rest of this 
chapter will be concerned. However, just before I attend to this it is important to emphasise 
why the rejection of Moral Theory does not entail the rejection of ethical theory. 
(i) The Distinction Between Ethical Theory and Moral Theory 
In footnote 9I stressed that my use of the capitalised term "Moral Theory" is used 
specifically to describe a sub-theory of ethical theory consisting of a systematic set of 
universal principles and general axioms justifying or entailing rules or duties from which 
particular moral judgements are to be rationalistically deduced (what I have described as the 
Moral Theory Approach is thus meant to identify an ethical theory in which Moral Theory is 
used to resolve the Basic Question). It follows, then, that I do not use the terms "ethical 
theory" and "Moral Theory" synonymously. I point this out for the obvious reason that 
many authors, and indeed many lay persons, interchange the terms unhesitatingly. Now 
while I shall use the terms "ethical" and "moral" as interchangeable in all other contexts, for 
example, as in the use of phrases like "ethical intuition" and "moral intuition", when I speak 
of Moral Theory I shall always be referring to the specific sub-theory of ethical theory as I 
have just defined it above. Understanding this is crucial as my rejection of The Moral 
Theory Approach centres on the rejection of Moral Theory and this does not entail at all the 
rejection of ethical theory per se. This point is particularly important because writers who 
reject Moral Theory are frequently described as anti-theorists, many, in fact, even apply that 
very appellation to themselves in their own work. However, I would argue that in virtually 
all instances their anti-theory is actually anti-Moral Theory, and need not at all involve 
rejecting ethical theory as such, in particular if ethical theory be articulated as some kind of 
contextualism. For example, Robert Louden makes the mistake of conflating anti-Moral 
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Theory with anti-ethical theory in his book "Morality and Moral Theory -A Reappraisal and 
Reaffirmation" (1992, New York, Oxford University Press). Louden accuses anti-theorists 
of trying to "... achieve [an] intended goal of ushering in a culture without moral theory 
where moral considerations have no dominant place in human life" (ibid, p. 10). Yet the 
individuals Louden cites as anti-theorists, among them, Stuart Hampshire, Bernard 
Williams, Edmund Pincoffs, Stanley Clarke, John McDowell, et al. can in no way be 
described as philosophers where rejection of a certain form of Moral Theory anti-theory 
means that they see no dominant place for moral considerations in human life. Their 
writings certainly reject the idea that there can be any such thing as a coherent Moral Theory 
but equally their writings are marked by the comprehensive accounts they give of how 
moral considerations are incorporated into an individual's life, and how the recognition of 
the ethical can be further enhanced by rejecting Moral Theory and resorting instead to some 
form of Contextualism. Indeed, even Bernard Williams, who is explicitly anti-theory and 
probably represents the most sceptical of all the philosophers listed, makes quite clear that 
in rejecting a theoretical approach to ethics "... it is quite wrong to think that the only 
alternative to ethical theory [Moral Theory] is to refuse reflection and to remain in 
unreflective prejudice. Theory and prejudice are not the only possibilities for an 
intelligent agent, or for philosophy. " (1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
London, Fontana, p. 112, emphasis mine)". The problem Louden has in recognising this 
stems from the fact that he finds distinguishing between [M]oral [T]heory and ethical 
theory, "... historically unpersuasive and too much of a strain on ordinary ways of speaking", 
thus he treats "the terms morality and ethics as synonyms. " (op. cit. p. 167, fn 20). But this 
just renders opaque the crucially important distinctions that the anti- [Moral] theorists wish 
to make and consequently leads Louden to see these philosophers as global sceptics as 
regards ethical theory, which is a patent falsehood. 
(ii) The Principles and Presuppositions of The Moral Theory Approach 
What, then, are the distinguishing features of Moral Theory? Unsurprisingly, different 
authors focus on different aspects and some include principles and axioms that others leave 
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out. However, I intend to isolate four attributes, which I will claim, are central to any Moral 
Theory. There are two core principles, and related to these, two core presuppositions 
(structural features) that are the mark of any Moral Theory. 
The core principles are: 
a) The principle of universalizability. 
b) The principle of impartiality. 
The core presuppositions (structural features) are: 
c) Commitment to a rationalistic procedure in moral argument. 
d) Prioritisation of conceptions of what it is right to do over conceptions of what it is good 
to be. 
Each of these aspects will be discussed at length in the chapters that follow; however, a 
brief description of how they combine together should help focus the debate. 
(ii. a) The principle of universal izabilit 
This is first and foremost a justificatory principle and states that action according to a 
principle or rule or any sort of value judgement can only count as moral insofar as it is a 
principle or rule or value judgement that any other relevantly situated individual could or 
should act upon. Accordingly, it is also a principle that enables the individual to identify 
which principles and rules and value judgements are moral. (Kant points out, if an 
individual should ask herself if the maxim upon which she intends to act is a morally 
acceptable maxim she needs to ask herself if it is a maxim that she could will that all others 
could likewise act upon, if it is then it is identified as moral). 
(ii. b) The principle of impartiality 
This states that actions can only count as moral in so far as they reflect the reasons of a 
neutral agent. The particularities of an individual's life - her personal attachments to 
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particular individuals, projects, and desires - are for an agent who is in this sense "neutral" 
regarded as strictly irrelevant to morality. At many levels the principle of impartiality is 
virtually identical to the principle of universalizability, indeed, an impartially described rule 
will be a universal rule. Thus an attack on one of the principles seriously undermines the 
other. For example, if there are no universal principles it becomes difficult to see what 
would justify adopting a neutral perspective (indeed the very possibility would be suspect) 
and likewise if it proves impossible to adopt a neutral perspective it becomes difficult to see 
how we could arrive at universal principles. However, there are significant differences 
between the principles, most importantly, whereas the principle of universalizability is 
foremost a justificatory principle, the principle of impartiality is foremost a principle of 
individual agency, i. e. it directs and constitutes the actual rational process of arriving at 
universal judgements. Accordingly a defence or criticism of either of these two principles 
needs to proceed along different (although quite clearly connected) lines. In the case of 
universalizability the first concern must be with the very idea that morality is to be 
identified with a realm of universal maxims. In the case of impartiality the first concern 
must be with the very idea that moral agency, the process of moral decision making, can be 
subsumed under an impartialistic perspective. 
(ii. c) Commitment to a rationalistic procedure in moral argument 
Acceptance of universalizability and impartiality leads inevitably to the adoption of a 
rationalistic form of moral argument. There are two interrelated ways in which such 
argument is rationalistic. First, the abstraction from personal concerns entailed by adopting 
an impartial perspective means there is no alternative in moral reasoning other than an 
appeal to universal principles and rules. This in turn requires, secondly, that the principle or 
rule upon which an individual intends to act is statable in explicit terms (either by the 
individual concerned or else by someone else, as in "Government House Utilitarianism"). 
That is, Moral principles and rules must be codifiable: their content must be describable in 
terms that transcend any particular interpretation or application. The combination of 
abstraction and codifiability means that Moral Theory is thoroughly rationalistic in its 
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procedure. It proceeds by the identification and statement of abstract principles and rules, 
which form the premises and conclusions of arguments structured according to the 
deductive paradigm. The motivation for doing this, according to Onora O'Neill, is to "... 
reach beyond assertion to argument. " Z'. In order to "convince", she claims, a moral 
argument must appeal to principles and rules that can (or should) be assented to by rational 
agents on rational grounds alone. 
It follows from this that a whole variety of common ways of "arguing "for, or presenting, a 
moral view are ruled out. In particular, all those forms of expressing a moral position 
where we attempt to get another to see the moral point of what we did (or what we intend to 
do) using descriptions that appeal to (and attempt to extend) her moral imagination and 
sensitivity are considered suspect (unless they can be shown ultimately to point to a 
universal and impartially described principle or value). Thus the engaged, narrative and 
dialogical structure of much ordinary moral discussion is not seen as fit for the purposes of 
(philosophical) moral justification: instead it is seen as too personal and particularistic 
because it requires that the individuals concerned are appropriately situated in a specific 
context where there is some collective focus upon the goods at stake. Participants are 
invited mutually to utilise all the resources of their moral sensibilities - intellect, emotion, 
and imagination - in an attempt to identify and articulate the salient moral features of the 
situation before them. Moral justification is not seen as separate from this process but is, in 
fact, constituted by it. It is in describing some act as involving, say, cruelty that I justify not 
doing it, and, crucially, in describing it thus I am saying that this particular act of cruelty is 
wrong and I appeal to those around me to see this particular act in the same way. Typically 
I do not appeal to some higher level theory to justify my opinion, nor feel the need to do so. 
Now, while some sort of descriptive activity is a necessary part of Moral Theory it is only 
necessary as a means by which non particularistic universal and impartial principles can be 
identified as relevant to a situation. For the Moral Theorist, a particular morally salient 
feature identified in a specific context does not carry any intrinsic ethical value in itself 
separate from some universal principle of which it represents an instantiation: it is not the 
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particular act of cruelty that makes it wrong but the fact that the particular act breaches the 
universal principle of non-maleficence. For example, if I am moved to protect and nurture 
my child because I love my child my parental activities reflect no intrinsic moral motivation 
or value on The Moral Theory Approach, it is only when those activities can be shown to be 
the actions that any parent has a duty to perform, even where the relationship might lack any 
love, that the actions concerned gain moral worth. 
The Moral Theorist par-excellence, Immanuel Kant, explicitly adopted this rationalistic 
approach and thus provides a perfect example to consider in order to clarify my claims. 
Kant argued that it is so important to distinguish the rational(istic) reasons morally 
justifying a particular act from the non-moral feelings and inclinations that might motivate it 
that: 
"... the sublimity and inner worth of the command is the more manifest in a duty, the fewer are the subjective 
causes for obeying it and the more those against - without, however, on this account weakening in the slightest 
the necessitation exercised by the law or detracting anything from its validity. " 
(I Kant, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Paton IHJ, 1981, The Moral Law, 
London, Hutchinson, p. 88 (425) (italics mine)) 
However, some modern-day followers of Kant: for example, C Korsgaard, and, MW Baron, 
argue that the sort of rationalistic reading of his views I have just mentioned above misses 
the point that Kant, himself, actually locates morality in acts of the will (indeed he begins 
the Groundwork with the famous claim that a good will is the only thing that can be taken as 
good without qualification), which suggests that personal motivation is key to his 
philosophy28. Baron argues that: 
11 ,.. 
it is not strictly correct to say that Kant's conception of virtue and the virtuous person presupposes an 
independent ethical notion [like duty]. The virtuous person is in essence the person of good will, and duty is 
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explicated via the notion of a good will, as is the Categorical Imperative.... If we did have to pick one concept 
on which all the other concepts in Kant's ethics are based, the good will would be the winner. " 
(MW Baron, P Pettit, and M Slote, 1997, Three Methods of Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 39-40). 
However, Baron misses the fundamental point, that Paton makes very clear in the 
introduction to his translation of the Groundwork, that the Categorical Imperative is not 
explicated via the notion of a good will, rather, a good will is identified with consciously 
acting in accordance with the Categorical Imperative: 
"The a priori part of ethics is not to be confused with a philosophy of willing as such, since it deals, not with 
all willing, but with a particular kind of willing - namely, with willing that is morally good. " 
(HJ Paton, 1981, The Moral Law, London, Hutchinson, p. 15) 
As the quote from Kant above makes very clear, willing that is morally good is willing from 
duty (the Categorical Imperative)and not from personal motivation29. This distinction is 
emphasised in Kant's later work "Critique of Practical Reason": 
"The principle of one's own happiness, however much reason and understanding may be used in it, contains no 
other determinants for the will than those which belong to the lower faculty of desire. Either, then, no higher 
faculty of desire exists, or else pure reason alone must of itself be practical, i. e., it must be able to determine 
the will by the mere form of the practical rule without presupposing any feeling or consequently any 
representation of the pleasant or the unpleasant as the matter of the faculty of desire and as the empirical 
condition of its principles. Then only is reason a truly higher faculty of desire, but still only in so far as it 
determines the will by itself and not in the service of the inclinations. Subordinate to reason as the higher 
faculty of desire is the pathologically determinable faculty of desire, the latter being really and in kind different 
from the former, so that even the slightest admixture of its impulses impairs the strength and superiority of 
reason, ... Reason determines the will in a practical law directly, not through an intervening feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure, even if this pleasure is taken in the law itself. Only because, as pure reason, it can 
be practical is it possible for it to give law. " 
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(I Kant, 1778, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by L White Beck, 1993 (third edition), New York, 
Macmillan, p. 24 (all italics and emphasis mine)). 
Indeed, so much are our "inclinations" lacking in moral value that Kant argues it "_ must ... 
be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. " (1981, p. 90 
(428)). In short, to say all this is to say (among other things) that moral argument must be 
rationalistic in its procedure. Kant, unlike some modern-day "Kantians", recognised that to 
make universalizability fundamental to morality necessitates such a consequence. Universal 
principles and rules are not open to personal interpretation but command our respect as 
"laws", and can only do this if they are codifiable as such in abstraction from any particular 
instance(s) (this is why they are a priori rules and not empirical generalisations). It is only 
in the light of this understanding that one can make any sense of Kant's vehement resistence 
to the common-sense notion that moral rules can be subject to exceptions. He recognised 
that to admit exceptions is to admit that moral principles and rules are uncodifiable and 
hence not universalizable (I demonstrate the truth of this crucial claim below in chapter 3). 
The utilitarian Sidgwick, too, presents a very clear example of a Moral Theorist who adopts 
a rationalistic conception of moral argument. While he was very reticent to disparage the 
common dispositions people had to respond in the particularistic ways I have mentioned 
above, he argues that ultimately these dispositions are only morally justified insofar as they 
support a utilitarian maximisation of the general good30. Thus Moral Theorists must 
always resort to a rationalistic form of argument, which ultimately excludes the personal, 
and appeals to impartially described universal principles. This, in turn, leads naturally to 
the fourth feature, the prioritisation of conceptions of what it is right to do over conceptions 
of what it is good to be. 
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(ii. d) Prioritisation of conceptions of what it is right to do over conceptions of what it is 
good to be. 
The abstraction from particularities involved in the generation and application of universal 
and impartial principles and rules necessarily elevates acts to the primary focus of moral 
evaluation rather than individuals. Individuals are only the subject of moral assessment 
insofar as the acts that they perform are independently considered to be right or wrong. 
Thus the question concerning what it is good to be is either something to be derived from 
the prior specification of what it is right to do, or, more typically, is considered an area for 
private choice that is separate from the moral realm (although it is, of course, constrained by 
it). Either way the discussion of what constitutes the good life, or a worthwhile life to lead, 
is marginalised under The Moral Theory Approach. Accordingly, Moral Theorists devote 
most of their attention to establishing universal rights and duties, which provide a 
framework within which individuals can pursue their own conception of the good. 
Clearly the foregoing pages represent a very general sketch of what I take. the central 
principles and structure of Moral Theory to be, and naturally, different examples of Moral 
Theory will incorporate the four elements I have identified in different ways and to different 
degrees. What is certain, however, is that all four elements must inevitably be incorporated 
in some kind of combination. In the following two chapters I shall directly attack the 
principles of universalizability and impartiality; in the course of which I shall also attack the 
presuppositions privileging a rationalistic procedure in moral argumentation and 
prioritisation of the right over the good. I shall reject universalism as mistakenly motivated 
and incapable of providing the type of principles and rules which its application demands. 
In particular I shall claim that the attempt to codify unambiguous principles and rules upon 
which universalizability depends is not possible, and on that basis show that the principle of 
universalizability cannot provide any sort of plausible bridge between theory and practice. I 
shall conclude that the professional cannot hope to justify any particular ethical stance by 
invoking universal principles or rules as these would always be too open-ended or too 
remote from actual practice to establish any genuine form of legitimisation. Impartiality 
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will be rejected on the grounds that it rests on an implausible abstraction of moral agency 
from the personal interests and motivational structure of the individual. I shall claim that 
excellence in ethical behaviour is secured not by abstraction from personal motivation but 
by the professional coming to be motivated to realise the goods of her professional role. I 
shall conclude that in acting in a role an agent reasons from a perspective which inextricably 
unites personal and impersonal aspects such that it is impossible to split the two 
components in the way demanded by Moral Theory. The rationalistic structure of moral 
argument (under Moral Theory) will be rejected on the grounds that it fails to account for 
the multifarious ways in which we gain access to, and act in accordance with, a plurality of 
moral values and considerations. I shall claim that it is not rationalistic argument that 
enables the professional to understand and enhance her perception of her moral 
responsibilities and values, but rather a commitment to critical reflectiveness where this 
consists in an engagement in open dialogue with others about the goods and standards of 
excellence that define her professional role (reflection will thus be narrative in nature and 
will involve transitions between different conceptions of the goods at stake, not a 
rationalistic transition from universal premise to deductive conclusion). Prioritisation of the 
right over the good will be rejected on the grounds that in marginalising dialogue about 
what constitutes a good life to live and a good person to be Moral Theory neglects the most 
significant area of ethical life. I shall claim that Moral Theory, at best, can help in 
determining issues of social policy, but argue that this is only a marginal (if important) part 
of the ethical life of the professional, that the substance of professional ethics is concerned 
with the everyday articulation and embodiment in practice of what constitutes a good 
professional (priority will thus be given to developing the appropriate dispositions of 
(professional) character rather than attempting to establish rules of conduct). 
In the course of these criticisms my own positive account in favour of a contextualist 
approach to professional ethics will emerge. 
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1 See, for example: TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, 1994 (4th edition), Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
New York, Oxford University Press, pp5-6. JP Demarco and RM Fox (eds), 1986, New Directions in 
Ethics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 5. R Norman, 1985, The Moral Philosophers, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, pp. 1-4. A Maclntyre, 1991, A Short History of Ethics, London, Routledge, pp. 1-3. P 
Singer (ed), 1994, Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 10-13. G Warnock, 1967, Contemporary 
Moral Philosophy, London, The Macmilan Press ltd, pp. 1-3 and pp. 56-7. ER Winkler and JR Coombs (eds), 
1993, Applied Ethics: A Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 3-8. B Williams, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, London, Fontana Paperbacks, pp72-74. The distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics 
is also sometimes labelled a distinction between "Second" and "First" order ethics. 
2 See: A. J Ayer, 1967, Language, Truth and Logic, London, Victor Gollancz. And, C. L Stevenson, 1944, 
Ethics and Language, Yale University Press. 
3 The effects of meta-ethical theory or analysis need not work as explicitly as this, For example, Alan Bloom 
argues that moral relativism (a meta-ethical position) has become embodied in the social institutions and 
exchanges of much of American culture, and that this has happened not so much through explicit argument 
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New York, Simon and Schuster). 
4 Here I am in agreement with ER Winkler and JR Coombs (eds), 1993, Applied Ethics: A Reader, Oxford, 
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s In a spirit of generosity one might note that at least a part of the motivation lying behind the traditional 
distinction of meta-ethics from normative ethics was to disabuse those in the grip of an overblown conception 
of the moral philosopher as some sort of expert in living a moral life purely as a result of their skill in 
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outside of practical ethical life is certainly to dislocate her. 
6 This suggests that the moral philosopher and the audience she addresses engage in a mutual activity working 
back and forth between theory and practice, and between particular judgements and more general concepts. A 
process similar to what John Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium", see: J Rawls, 1971, A Theory of Justice, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. esp. pp48.51. 
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Chichester, John Wiley and Sons. R Chadwick and W Tadd, 1992, Ethics and Nursing Practice: A Case 
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London, Methuen. RS Downie and KC Calman, 1987, Healthy Respect: Ethics in Health Care, London, 
Faber and Faber. J Harris, 1985, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. I Haywood Jones, 1990, The Nurses Code, London, Macmillan. G Hunt (cd), 1994, Ethical 
Issues in Nursing, London, Routledge. M Lockwood (ed), 1985, Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. K Melia, 1989, Everyday Nursing Ethics, Basingstoke, Macmillan. JL 
Muyskens, 1982, Moral Problems in Nursing: A Philosophical Investigation, Totowa, Rowman and 
Littlefield. P Ramsey, 1970, The Patient as a Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics, New Haven, Yale 
University Press. G Rumbold, 1986, Ethics in Nursing Practice, London, Bailliere Tindall. R Pyne, 1992 
(2nd edition), Professional Discipline in Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting, Oxford, Blackwell 
Scientific Publications. RM Veatch and ST Fry (eds), 1987, Case Studies in Nursing Ethics, Philadelphia, ID 
Lippincott. V Tschudin, 1986, Ethics in Nursing: The Caring Relationship, London, Heinemann. 
9 From here on I shall use the capitalised term "Moral Theory" specifically to refer to those sub-theories of 
ethics which provide universal principles and rules, accordingly I am not using the terms "Moral Theory" and 
"Ethical Theory "as synonymous (1 shall discuss this important distinction more fully below). 
10 It might be protested here that there is a third option available after meta-ethical reflection, namely the 
possibility of amoralism. I hope it is apparent that a discussion of this option would be out of place in the 
75 
present work which begins from the fact of a perceived need for ethics in professional life. However, in a 
purely dogmatic mode I would claim that amoralism represents at best a weak theoretical option, and more 
importantly, an almost impossible practical option. For an illuminating discussion of just how difficult a 
practical option amoralism represents see, B Williams, 1972, Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, esp. pp l7-28. 
11 H Sidgwick, 1962 (7th edition) The Methods of Ethics, London, Macmillan, p. 102. 
12 Sidgwick refines this principle further and casts it into the negative form: ""it cannot be right for A to treat 
B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different 
individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can 
be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment. " (ibid, p380). 
13 To fully identify the three fundamental principles which he has specified with utilitarianism Sidgwick does 
see the need to further demonstrate an identity between the Universal Good and universal happiness, see, ibid, 
P. 387, and also B Williams, 1995, Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 162. 
14 For a thorough account of the epistemological, metaphysical and moral presuppositions I am thinking of 
here see: C Taylor, 1989, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp3-107. 
15 See, I Kant, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by IIJ Paton, 1981, The Moral 
Law, London, Hutchinson (p. 88, (425)). See also footnote 27 below. 
16 On this point see HJ Paton's very clear reconstruction of Kants argument in: HJ Paton, 1981, The Moral 
Law, London, Hutchinson, pp. 14-16 
17 I would argue that it is these shared presuppositions that explain why some philosophers find it conducive 
to combine elements of both Kantian and utilitarian theories, for example: RM Hare, 1963, Freedom and 
Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press. J Rawls, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. ]
18 On the necessity of this requirement see M Baron, P Pettit, and M Slote, 1997, Three Methods of Ethics, 
Oxford, Blackwell, chapter 2. 
19 The question could also be phrased "What should I be? ", either way the questions "What should I do? " and 
"What should I be? " are inescapably first-personal in nature. 
20 The qualifications I wish to add in describing the external constraints of morality as the "third-person 
perspective" is that I do not want to identify the third-person perspective with a purely objective realm of facts 
as many theorist do in using this terminology (especially where issues concerning the epistemological status of 
science is concerned). More importantly, as I shall discuss extensively below, I do not wish to identify the 
third-person perspective with a realm of universal truths. Rather I wish to use the term more simply as a way 
of identifying the fact that a necessary feature of the moral point-of-view involves the consideration of claims 
upon one's reasoning that generate externally to one's first-order desires. Indeed, it is one of my major critical 
themes in what follows in this thesis that Moral Theorists go wrong by making an assumption that there must 
be an identification of the third-personal requirements of the moral point-of-view with (pure) objectivity (and 
hence with what is universal) if justification of a set of moral values is to be possible. 
21 See M Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 1976, 
pp. 453-466. 
22 See S Wolf "Moral Saints" in RB Kruschwitz and RC Roberts (eds), 1987, "The Virtues", Belmont, 
Wadsworth. 
23 See, B Williams, 1981, Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, ch. 1. Even proponents of 
Moral Theory have sometimes felt the need to justify a space for personal action set free of moral 
considerations, for example, S Scheffler, 1982, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A philosophical 
Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, Oxford, Clarandon Press. 
Scheffler attempts to show how such a space can indeed be justified by consequentialist thinking itself. For 
further brief discussion of Scheffler's view see chapter 4 of this thesis. 
24 These labels can be found in, A. Macintyre, "Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake? ", The Monist, 
1984, vol. 67, pp. 498-513. And: D Jamieson, "Method and Moral Theory" in, P Singer (ed), 1993, A 
Companion to Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell. 
25 The genealogy of its rise to ascendency has been illuminated with great insight in the work of Alasdair 
Maclntyre, see: A MacIntyre, 1985, After Virtue, London, Duckworth. 
26 See also his "Professional Morality and its Dispositions" in Williams B, 1995, Making Sense of 
Humanity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 192-202. Williams provides explicit advice on how 
professionals might understand and develop their understanding of ethics by engaging in a reflective 
consideration of the sorts of ethical dispositions professionals could be expected to cultivate. 
27 Quoted in C Diamond, 1995, The Realistic Spirit, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p. 291. 
76 
28 C Korsgaard, "From duty and for the sake of the noble: Kant and Aristotle on morally good action" in, 
J Whiting and S Engstrom (eds), 1996, Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. MW Baron "Kant's Ethics" in, MW Baron, P Pettit, and M Slote, 1997, Three Methods of Ethics, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
29 As further evidence that this is what Kant means it is worth noting that he argues that each individual in the 
course of her moral reasoning has a "duty of apathy" (I Kant, 1797, Metaphysics of Morals: Part II, The 
Metaphisical Principles of Virtue, 408). By which he means that each individual must ensure that "... the 
feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling ... because respect for the moral 
law is more powerful than all of these feelings together. " (translated by JW Ellington, 1983, Kant's Ethical 
Philosophy, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 408) 
30 This, of course, introduces the very real possibility that what we typically take our "moral" dispositions to be 
i. e. genuine responses to real values, is radically mistaken. And, as Sidgwick himself recognised, if this were 
so, and if our dispositions are to continue to serve this (instrumental) role in securing the greater good we must 
continually delude ourselves of their true nature. For an alternative conception of ethical theory which makes 
the role of moral dispositions central and which preserves their status as intrinsically moral see: C Diamond, 
1995, The Realistic Spirit, Massachusetts, MIT Press, chapters 11-15 passim. Also, LA Blum, 1994, Moral 
Perception and Particularity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, chapters 1-3,5,7,8-11, passim. 
77 
CHAPTER 3 
UNIVERSALIZABILITY: PRINCIPLES, RULES, AND CODES OF CONDUCT 
"When we talk about ethics, we mostly mean a series of rules and principles by which we act, and which tell us 
what to do ... it saves us 
from the difficult and the often dangerous task of making our own judgements and 
deciding things for ourselves. " 
(William Barclay, Ethics in a Permissive Society) 
"When we are trying, in a concrete case, to decide what we ought to do, what we are looking for is an action to 
which we can commit ourselves (prescriptivity) but which we are at the same time prepared to accept as 
exemplifying a principle of action to be prescribed for others in like circumstances (universalizability). " 
(RM Hare, Freedom and Reason) 
"Part of the reason why people are reluctant to abandon universalizability is that with it they would lose certain 
argument forms to which they are attached and to which they can see no alternatives. " 
(Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons) 
Introduction 
This chapter divides into two main sections. In the first part I shall describe three of the 
most important and influential versions of the principle of universalizability and show that it 
represents a central requirement of The Moral Theory Approach to ethics. In doing this I 
shall (seek to) draw out two crucial aspects of the principle. First, I will show how it is 
supposed to serve as the primary principle ofjustification for the more particular moral 
principles, rules, and values which are to be tested against it. Secondly, I shall show that the 
sort of justification the principle of universalizability provides has inevitable implications 
for the sort of practical reasoning that can provide the moral principles, rules, and values 
that meet its standards. In short, I shall argue that its adoption leads inevitably to a 
rationalistic approach to moral argument in which principles and rules become the 
dominant currency in moral exchange. 
In the second section I shall show how the adoption of the principle of universalizability 
(Moral Theory) has very specific and extremely important implications for the resulting 
picture of professional ethics. I shall identify two essential features in this respect. First, I 
shall show how it leads inevitably to a "top-down" or "deductive" approach to applied 
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(professional) ethics. This involves developing a neutral and independently described 
Moral Theory (utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractarianism etc. ) which is then literally 
applied to professional practice. The account of practical reasoning presupposed by this 
involves drawing universal principles and/or rules from Moral Theory to serve as the major 
premises in practical arguments where they are conjoined with minor premises drawn from 
some particular area of professional practice, to yield a specific conclusion'. Secondly, I 
shall show that this approach to applied ethics explains the predominance of codes of 
conduct in professional ethics2. Drawing upon the conclusion reached in the first section 
that The Moral Theory Approach requires the identification of explicit principles and rules 
for application I shall argue that codes of conduct appear to provide just what the Moral 
Theorist is looking for. This is because they just are explicit statements of the principles 
and rules of a particular profession. Accordingly they have come to be seen (explicitly and 
implicitly) as the central tool for justification and guidance in moral decision making. 
I shall argue that profound flaws in the principle of universalizability which relate both to 
claims about its authority in justification and a deep misconception about the nature and 
application of principles and rules are transmitted to, and reflected in, profound flaws in an 
approach to professional ethics which makes codes of conduct central to the incorporation 
of ethical values in professional life. I shall not argue for a rejection of codes of conduct per 
se, but rather a rejection of the dominant conception of them in terms of The Moral Theory 
Approach which sees them as documents which: a) gain authority insofar as they can be 
shown to be justified by some kind of universalistic Moral Theory, and, b) provide explicit 
(universalizable) principles and rules for direct guidance and application to professional 
practice'. I shall argue that both aspects of the Moral Theory reading of codes require that 
principles and rules are explicitly codiflable, this I will show is impossible (I shall label this 
"the problem of codifiability"). In contrast I shall argue for a contextualist understanding of 
codes of conduct in which they can play an important (if less dominant) role in providing a 
narrative structure within which professionals can articulate and transform their 
understanding of the ethical goods at stake in any particular case4. 
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I 
Universalizability and The Moral Theory Approach 
(i) The Principle of Universalizability 
Proponents of Moral Theory all incorporate some notion of universalizability. It is, indeed, 
a precondition of any system of principles, rules or duties designed to bind agents in the way 
that Moral Theories supposedly do that those principles rules or duties have universal 
application. It is in virtue of this specific feature in particular that one is compelled as an 
agent to accept the conclusions of a Moral Theory or else reveal oneself as subject to some 
kind of error similar, say, to claiming that one is not subject to the law of gravity (this might 
be because of sheer ignorance, wilful irrationality, or some other reason but whatever the 
case I am subject to the principles identified in Moral Theory as much as I am subject to the 
law of gravity whether I recognise it or not)'. 
To begin, it is, perhaps, important to distinguish the principle of universalizability from a 
much weaker (although very important) idea that the domain of ethical consideration is in 
some sense universal: for example, that it concerns all human beings, or all sentient 
creatures, or the whole environment, etc.. This view is perfectly consistent with arriving at 
particular ethical decisions that do not apply universally (I take it that modern day 
contextualists typically adopt some form of both these two ideas; for example, that all 
humans belong to the moral community but that some personal relations such as those 
among members of one's own family have a certain moral privilege). The principle of 
universalizability holds much more strongly that any particular principle or rule that one 
adopts could or should be a principle or rule that anyone in relevantly similar circumstances 
could or should adoptb, and that each individual is subject to the same moral principles and 
rules as any other individual. Naturally there are different versions of the principle but all 
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of them in one form or another derive it from some feature of rationality or practical 
reasoning. Cicero typically provides a lucid and strong interpretation of the principle in his 
discussion of justice, right and wrong, in "On the State": 
"True law is reason, right and natural, commanding people to fulfil their obligations and prohibiting and 
deterring them from doing wrong. Its validity is universal; it is unchangeable and eternal. ... Neither the Senate 
nor the assembly can exempt us from its demands; we need no one to interpret or expound it but ourselves. 
There will not be one law at Rome, one at Athens, or one now one later, but all nations will be subject all the 
time to this one changeless and everlasting law. " 
(Cicero, ibid, III, 22,337) 
(i. a) Immanuel Kant 
This passage just quoted is remarkably similar in tone and content to the work of Immanuel 
Kant who many centuries later made the principle of universalizability absolutely central to 
his theory, in the process making it appear so important that it became considered the very 
mark of the morals. However, whereas Cicero derived the universalizability of moral 
judgements from the "fact" about reason that it is the, "... first common possession of man 
and God .... " ("On Laws", I, 7,22), Kant 
derived the principle from the very structure of 
pure rationality itself. To see how he achieves this we need to turn briefly to the first 
section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals9. 
In the "Groundwork" Kant draws upon ordinary common-sense morality to show that the 
moral judgements we make however much they might be influenced or obscured by desires 
and inclinations etc. commit us to a (particular a priori) conception of morality in which the 
only unconditional good is a good will. From this he draws three important conclusions: 
first that the goodness of a good will consists in what its intentions are and not what it is 
successful in achieving (he notes that we typically do not morally blame people even if they 
fail in accomplishing a particular end); second, that the intentions of a good will consist in 
intentions to do what it is one's duty to do (he contrasts this with the fact that we are often 
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motivated to pursue happiness and argues that we only recognise intentions that arise from a 
sense of duty as moral); third, in intending to do what it is my duty to do I am showing 
respect for the moral law. With this last proposition in place Kant locates morality purely in 
the realm of the rational; in acting from duty I act regardless of my particular desires and 
ends, as such my reverence for the moral law is founded upon respect for the dictates of 
pure rational existence (since my desires cannot unconditionally command me to act it must 
be my reason which plays this role)". Kant stresses (in chapter II of the Groundwork) that 
although the categorical imperative (the concept of duty) can be drawn from our experience 
of practical reasoning it is not a concept of that experience: 
"For by what right can we make what is perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity into an 
object of unlimited reverence as a universal precept for every rational nature? " 
I Kant, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by HJ Paton, 1981, The Moral Law, 
p. 73,408) 
So, the universalizability of our moral principles holds in respect of our rationality and not 
because of any feature contingent upon our specifically human nature. Thus, crucially, the 
principle is founded not in any (recognisably) specific moral notion but purely within the 
very idea of rational existence. Kant concludes that the laws (duties) that determine the 
will of a rational agent must have their source "... completely a priori in pure, but practical, 
reason". 
Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative represents an explicit statement of the 
principle of universalizability: 
"I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" 
(I Kant, ibid, 1981, p. 67,402) 
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Now, of course, a question immediately arises concerning the derivation of such a 
proposition from pure reason alone, i. e. from what feature of our rationality does it follow 
that the categorical imperative has application to practical reasoning? Although Kant does 
not explicitly state it so it seems clear that the principle of universalizability rests ultimately 
upon the logical law of non-contradiction. In effect the moral duties we arrive at through 
application of the categorical imperative represent a practical application of the logical law 
of non-contradiction. Moral agents are rational agents, rational agents insofar as they are 
rational do not adhere to contradictory principles, rational agents insofar as they reason 
practically do not will contradictory principles of action, thus moral agents are concerned to 
act on maxims of action that are universally applicable and do not will any principle of 
action that is either internally inconsistent or in contradiction with other universal 
principles". It seems clear that this is the train of thought running through the examples of 
duties Kant briefly discusses (HJ Paton, 1981, The Moral Law, London, Hutchinson, 
pp. 85-86,422-426), in particular in his treatment of the "perfect" duties requiring us not to 
commit suicide and not to make false promises. In the latter example he says of the man 
who acts upon the maxim, "Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money 
and promise to pay it back, though I know that this will never be done. " (ibid, p. 85,422), 
that he cannot will it to become a universal law as it must: 
"... necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that every one believing himself to be in need can 
make any promises he pleases with the intention not to keep it would make promising, and the very purpose of 
promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh at 
utterances of this kind as empty shams. " 
(I Kant, ibid, p. 85,422) 
The practical contradiction which correlates to the logical contradiction consists in the agent 
formulating a maxim of action that she should P (she should make false promises where it 
serves her self interest) but in doing so makes it impossible that she should P, thus, in effect 
she wills that P. -P. 
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Thus the force of the categorical imperative results not from it being itself a substantive 
moral principle but rather from its being a formal logical principle that describes a 
fundamental feature, or requirement, of (practical) rationality. In effect, the categorical 
imperative represents a necessary condition of the very possibility of rational (moral) 
knowledge and decision making about what one ought to do. It is in that sense that it 
represents the "supreme principle of morality". 
Now, this immediately raises a question about moral agency: "What is it to be an individual 
moral agent practically determining one's moral duties in the light of the 'supreme' principle 
of universalizability"? It has to be said that Kant does not provide a clear or detailed 
account of the constituent elements of moral agency; however, he says enough, I feel, to 
support the following brief picture. First, in answering a practical moral question (eg. what 
should I do? ) an agent employs reason. Second, in acting for a reason an agent acts from 
that reason. Third, to act from a reason is to act from, or upon, a particular maxim or rule. 
Fourth, to act from a maxim or rule that is moral is to recognise that maxim or rule to be a 
duty or obligation. Fifth, to recognise that a particular maxim or rule is a duty one 
successfully tests it against the requirement(s) of the categorical imperative (the principle of 
universalizability). Conditions 1-3 represent conditions of rational agency per se, 
conditions 4 and 5 complete the conditions of moral rational agency. Taking condition I for 
granted" conditions 2 and 3, and conditions 4 and 5, provide an account of the moral agent 
that is quite distinctive and raises crucial questions. Conditions 2 and 3 present us with a 
picture of practical reasoning in which the form and content of practical reasoning is 
constituted by subsuming a particular action or intended action under a particular rule or 
maxim. And the particular rule or maxim under which an agent acts is identified with the 
intention with which she acts". Thus, in the case of the example I quoted from Kant above, 
the maxim under which the agent proposed to act is identified with the intention to make a 
false promise to pay back money she wished to borrow". The maxim of action thus 
identified is tested against the categorical imperative (conditions 4 and 5) and it is through 
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this application of the principle of universalizability that a moral duty may or may not be 
generated and justified. In the case of the present example, a duty not to make false 
promises is generated and justified. 
On the Kantian picture, then, the moral agent identifies the maxim (rule) of her action and 
asks herself if it is a maxim she could will that all other rational agents to adopt. In the 
process she discovers whether she is bound by some perfect or imperfect duty to refrain 
from or act upon the maxim of her action. Each agent is thus engaged in an act of self- 
legislative reason in which she lays down for herself the duties which she is required to 
obey in the form of universal rules. The plausibility of this picture thus rests fundamentally 
upon the idea that moral behaviour actually is, or could, or should be, governed by the 
application of universal principles and rules (in this way). 
A number of questions arise concerning Kant's account of universal principles and rules and 
how they are incorporated by the individual into moral decision making. Here I shall focus 
upon four main issues. First, what sort of judgement is involved in identifying a universal 
principle or rule? Second, what sort of judgement is involved in subsuming a particular 
situation under a rule? Third, how general or specific are universal principles and rules to 
be? Fourth, how do these principles and rules continue to obligate us in present and future 
cases? 
In response to the first question Kant has little to say. I have already noted, of course, that 
Kant identifies the maxim of an agent's action with her intention and that this is then 
subjected to the categorical imperative to yield a universal principle or rule; however, he 
does not say anything at all helpful about what he takes to be involved in Identifying one's 
intention (maxim) in the first place". A similar point can be made about the second 
question, where Kant again has little to say about what it is to subsume a particular situation 
under a rule. Indeed, the two problems are intimately related because as it turns out 
judgement just is the "... faculty of subsuming under rules... " and it is thus no surprise that 
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Kant declares "... judgement is a peculiar talent which can be practised only, and cannot be 
taught... i 16. As regards the third question Kant appears to offer a two-part picture in which 
we develop some very general moral principles and from these deduce more specific rules 
(an essential part of what I described in the introduction to this chapter as the "deductive 
approach" to applied ethics). So, for example, by employing the categorical imperative one 
can discover that one should never lie, and armed with this general principle one can 
determine in specific cases whether a proposed course of action is forbidden or permissible. 
Thus a nurse might engage in the following sort of process of moral reasoning: 
1. (general universal principle) Do not lie 
2. (proposed maxim of action) I will tell the patient a lie 
about her state of health. 
3. (conclusion) To lie to the patient would 
conflict with the universal 
rule "do not lie", therefore 
I will not lie to the patient. 
Of course, this example represents the process of moral reasoning in a crudely schematic 
fashion and Kant was well aware that one does not always articulate an argument in such an 
explicit way. However, it does seem clear that Kant believed one could in principle 
reformulate any particular stretch of moral thinking or behaviour in this sort of way in order 
to expose the implicit maxims (moral principles) concerned. Step 1 invokes a general 
universal principle which is initially yielded by testing a maxim against the categorical 
imperative. This, as we saw above, requires that at most we are familiar with one case as 
the test is fundamentally one of logic and specifically a practical manifestation of the law of 
non- contradiction. Thus the principle is established apriori (one cannot without self- 
contradiction assert both P. -'P whatever it is that actually fills the place of P) and can be 
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carried forward into all future situations and serve as a universal rule against which more 
specific maxims of action can be tested. Thus, in step 2 the nurse tests the proposed maxim 
of her action, that she should lie to the patient (perhaps because she feels this would be for 
the patient's overall good), against the general principle that forbids lying and should 
accordingly conclude, step 3, that she ought not to act as proposed and instead obey the 
more specific rule not to lie to the patient. This, of course, also answers the fourth question 
raised above; we are bound in future instances to obey the universal principles generated by 
application of the categorical imperative because as rational creatures we are bound by the 
relevant laws of logic as they manifest themselves in the practical domain yielding moral 
duties. 
(i. b) Richard Hare 
There have been a number of modern variants of Kant's theory and, in particular, his notion 
of universalizability. Most interestingly, utilitarianism, the much cited opponent of the 
Kantian view, also places universalizability in a central role in ethical theory. R. M Hare's 
work provides a good example. His neo-Kantian utilitarianism follows Kant very closely in 
its details of rational agency and like Kant stresses the idea that to determine what one ought 
to do one must subsume an action under a universal rule". Hare has a little bit more to say 
in respect of the first question raised above: to make a judgement is to recognise that a set of 
features or properties P1, P2, P3... Pn were the reasons for one's action: universalizability 
simply requires that in a relevantly similar situation when the same properties 
(P1, P2, P3... Pn) are present one is obligated (rationally compelled) to make the same 
judgement (or reject the original judgement). This, for Hare, answers the second question in 
a quite different way to Kant'8. The properties P1, P2, P3... Pn may be very general or very 
specific; the only restriction is that together they constitute a universal principle of action. 
Thus a moral principle is laid down in the act of judging that any situation in which 
Pl, P2, P3,... Pn are present requires one to act according to the rule Rn. However, Hare 
argues that few if any of the moral principles we lay down in such judgements are Iikely to 
be general in nature (as they are with Kant): 
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"... universalism is not the doctrine that behind every moral judgement there has to lie a principle expressible 
in a few general terms; the principle, though universal, may be so complex that it defies formulation in words 
at all. But if it were formulated and specified, all the terms used in its formulation would be universal terms. " 
(R Hare, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 39) 
Rather in determining a principle of action: 
"We have to consider the particular case and make up our minds what are the relevant features, and what, 
taking these features into account, ought to be done in such a case. Nevertheless, when we do make up our 
minds, it is about a matter of principle which has bearing outside the particular case. " 19 
(R Hare, ibid, p. 38) 
Thus, in answer to question three; to subsume a particular situation under a rule is either to 
identify the relevant set of properties P1, P2, P3... Pn as having previously required one to act 
according to the rule Rn, or to identify them as a uniquely new set of properties which 
establishes a new rule obligating one to obey this new rule in future relevantly similar 
situations in which the same set of properties occur. Thus each practical judgement either 
confirms an old rule or establishes a new one. A similar demand for logical consistency, 
then, underlies Hare's answer to question four as it does Kant's: the universality of a moral 
judgement demands on pain of contradiction that I assent to the same rule in future 
situations where the same properties are present as they were in a past situation in which the 
rule was obligatory. 
(i. c) Discourse Ethics 
Hare is just one among a number of modern authors who seek to defend a Kantian 
approach to universalizability based upon the logical principle of non-contradiction20. 
However, I wish to conclude this section on universalizability by mentioning another 
Kantian inspired approach to the universalizability requirement which transforms it from 
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being about self-legislating rationality to being a central condition of interactive rationality 
forming the method or framework of enquiry in which a community of individuals seeking a 
mutually acceptable set of moral rules for governing society can proceed. Apel and 
Habermas represent the most prominent exponents of this position which has been labelled 
"discourse ethics" (or "communicative ethics")". They interpret universalizability as a 
regulative ideal that validates the moral principles that arise from a dialogue in which all 
those who are, or might be, affected by the proposed principles freely consent to those 
principles. Universalizability is thus no longer considered to be a process in which each 
individual alone determines what she can will without contradiction to be a rule for all but is 
instead a process of intersubjective argumentation in which communicative agreement is 
sought under conditions of free and fair debate. Construed in this way universalizability is 
founded not in the concept of rational agency per se but rather in the concept of rational 
argumentation, it is, to use Apel's terminology, a "transcendental-pragmatic presupposition 
of argumentation", or for Habermas a "universal pragmatic presupposition". The thought is 
that the structure and logic of argumentation in itself requires the application of the 
principle of universalizability, that without it there can be no genuine argumentation. In 
thus linking universalizability to consent as a condition of fair argumentation the question 
naturally arises about just what it is that links universalizability to consent and what as a 
consequence constitutes consent. For Habermas consent represents the result of a moral 
argument constrained by the principle of universalizability, the result being that the 
community of participants reach universal agreement on some particular principle(s). This 
position, however, has been criticised extensively for the implausibly strong demand it 
makes upon individuals to reach universal agreement on particular principles (hypothetical 
or real). Thus, Seyla Benhabib (1992, Situating the Self, Cambridge, Polity, pp26-38) 
suggests that a more plausible understanding of the link between universalizability and 
consent focuses on what we can agree as necessary for the structure and, hence, the very 
possibility of moral dialogue as a viable social practice: " It is not the result of the process 
of moral judgement alone that counts but the process for the attainment of such judgement 
which plays a role in its validity, and I would say, moral worth" (1992, p. 37). Indeed, 
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Benhabib argues that "consent" is a misleading term in capturing what is central to the idea 
of discourse ethics, which focuses rather on how agreement can be reached in an open- 
ended moral conversation constrained by principles of universal respect and egalitarian 
reciprocity (ibid). On this interpretation the validity of a moral argument does not depend 
upon reaching universal agreement about some substantive moral principle or principles (as 
with Habermas) but rather rests upon an agreement about how fairly to discuss such 
principles, thus we might, indeed, validly agree to disagree on substantive issues". 
Now, what should be clear from each of the three accounts of the principle of 
universalizability just described is the extent to which it is seen as fundamental in the 
production of Moral Theory. The very legitimacy of any particular moral judgement, rule or 
act is seen as resting ultimately upon it being universalizable. Thus while all three accounts 
differ in their explanation of what universalizability consists in none of them question the 
necessity of providing such an explanation in the first place. For all Moral Theorists, then, 
the search for a coherent Moral Theory is inextricably tied to a search for a coherent 
articulation of the principle of universalizability. However, rather than criticise each of 
these accounts of universalizabilty directly I will instead make good my claim made in the 
introduction to this chapter that there is a strong link between the adoption of the principle 
of universalizability and the adoption of an approach to professional ethics which centres on 
the production and application of codes of conduct. My claim will be that codes of conduct 
have come to dominate professional ethics precisely because they are the most amenable 
form of practical ethics able to respond to the justificatory demands of universalizability and 
a rationalistic procedure in moral argumentation (i. e. The Moral Theory Approach). In 
criticising this understanding and application of codes of conduct, by showing that codes 
cannot serve the role Moral Theorists seek to put them to, I shall show that the principle of 
universalizability, in whatever form, is itself fundamentally flawed. 
.......................................... 1......,.................... " 
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II 
Universalizability and Codes of Conduct 
(i) Codes of Conduct: The Problems of Codifiability and Justification 
Professional codes of conduct have become increasingly seen as the central means by which 
ethical principles and values and ethical conduct generally are cultivated within the 
professions. The development of a code has now become a sine qua non of any 
organisation, corporation, company, or aspiring profession which wishes to profess its 
ethical credibility to the general public it serves and to the society within which it exists. 
There are, no doubt, good reasons to be sceptical about the motivation lying behind the 
production of many codes, which can easily appear to be little more than public relation 
exercises. However, that is not my concern here. I shall be concerned, rather, to delineate 
the (putative) function and structure of codes of conduct and show that they cannot be 
interpreted in the way Moral Theorists suggest. 
The clearest link between codes of conduct and the principle of universalizability is evident 
in the most obvious structural feature of any code, namely, that it consists of a set of explicit 
principles and rules which are supposed to guide the conduct of anybody who happens to 
fill the professional role it covers. And, of course, what is apparent in the discussion of the 
three types of universalizability above is that its practical implementation depends 
fundamentally on our ability to be able to specify explicit principles and rules that all moral 
agents irrespective of their personal interests can come to understand as laying down 
maxims or reasons from which they should or could act a'. Thus, Kant's categorical 
imperative can only work as a (universalist) test for morality if one is able to specify (at 
some stage) the maxim/rule under which one intends to act. Hare's theory of 
universalizability demands (as essential to moral rationality) that we are able to subsume 
particular reasons for action under a rule which then binds us in all future instances. 
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Proponents of discourse ethics require the statement of clear and explicit principles as the 
subject matter upon which some kind of universal consensus can be reached or tested. In 
each case, then, the principles and rules of morality must be explicit and universal. Thus, 
the plausibility of the principle of universalizability depends crucially upon the codifiability 
of particular ethical judgements into principles and rules that apply invariably. The need 
for codifiability should be obvious: for Moral Theory to be able to provide genuine 
universal rules and principles for guidance it must be the propositional content of those 
principles and rules alone which provides guidance. That is, we should each independently 
be able to understand and act upon a principle or rule by determining directly the meaning 
of the propositional content of the principle or rule concerned (I shall discuss the ways in 
which this might be possible below, p. 96)24. Now, codes of conduct, prima facie, represent 
the most striking examples in practical ethics of an attempt to codify particular ethical 
judgements into a set of principles and rules. Thus, codes of conduct seem to present us 
with a prime practical example of an ethical practice (codifiability) that is central to the 
universalist's project. 
Accordingly, if it can be shown that codes of conduct suffer from deep irresolvable 
problems when understood (solely) as attempts at codifying principles and rules in the way 
Moral Theorists demand; that, indeed, the attempt to codify principles and rules can never 
provide the kind of clear and unambiguous statement of maxims of actions required to 
genuinely determine morally correct conduct, then a decisive blow will have been dealt 
against the principle of universalizability. And this is precisely what I intend to show by 
arguing that the sort of moral principles and rules to be found in Moral Theory and in codes 
of conduct must always be open-ended statements that point beyond their propositional 
content and thus require non-codifiable interpretation (I shall call this "the problem of 
coditIability"). 
It might be objected at this point that I am moving too fast, that the link between 
universalizability and codes of conduct is not so clear. An obvious argument for this view 
92 
is the fact that in the construction of codes of conduct it is evident that the individuals, 
committees, or groups who put a code together are very unlikely to have in mind the 
principle of universalizability; their concerns will be with specifying local principles and 
rules pertinent to the particular interests of their profession (organisation etc. ). There are 
two things I wish to say to this. First, it misses the point: as I shall go on to show in detail 
the problem of codifiability does not depend upon whether the principles or rules being 
codified are local or universal, in either case they will suffer from the fact that they will 
always need to be open-ended statements that require a non-codifiable interpretation. Thus, 
even if it is true that codes of conduct do not represent explicit attempts to codify universal 
principles and rules, it remains true that an attack on codes of conduct in terms of the 
problem of codifiability will also stand as an attack on universalizability because, as we 
have just seen, universalizability cannot do without codifiability. Secondly, there is another 
link between the principle of universalizability and codes of conduct which extends beyond 
the mutual concern with codifiability (although as it shall be shown, cannot be separated 
from it). This has to do with the with the justification of moral principles and rules. I have 
already shown above that the principle of universalizability has the central role in justifying 
moral principles and rules, likewise, then, it is clear that the overt function of any 
professional code of conduct is to justify or legitimate the principles and rules that guide the 
activities of a profession. A professional code of conduct ostensibly represents a formally 
written pledge to serve the best interests of the clients with which a profession deals (and, 
typically, to serve the public good generally) according to moral values and principles that 
uphold the highest levels of ethical integrity and trust. This, in effect, is a code's external 
function: it informs and assures those outside of the profession who are likely to be its 
clients that those who practise within the profession will serve the clients' best interests in 
accordance with morally unimpeachable values. The need for this assurance has been 
discussed earlier in this thesis (chapters 1 and 2) and rests upon the fact that the specialised 
knowledge which informs the distinctive interventions of the professional put her in a 
position of power over the client and leaves the client open to possible abuse. However, 
this external function of a code of conduct is only likely to serve a legitimating or 
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justificatory role if the general public become convinced of two things. First, that the code 
does not simply represent a set of parochial moral principles and rules which merely serves 
the self-interests of the profession and professionals concerned. Secondly, that the moral 
principles and rules of the code do in fact genuinely guide the conduct of the professionals 
they cover. It is the first issue raised here that has directly inspired Moral Theorists to claim 
that the moral principles, values, and rules of a professional code can only be justified or 
legitimated if it can be shown that they are ultimately grounded in universal moral 
principles. There is, then, another strong link between universalizability and codes of 
conduct, one that links them in a relationship of moral justification. Naturally this will form 
a second area of focus for my criticisms of universalizability and the problems I discuss in 
this respect I shall label "the problem of justification". The problems of "codifiability" and 
"justification" will be seen to be inextricably related; however, I shall begin with the second 
issue first and move quickly to the problem of codifiability. 
(i. a) The Problem of Justification 
Nigel Harris (1994) argues; 
"If the clauses of a code are thought of as having genuine ethical content then a question has to be faced, 
namely, what is the basis for that content? In traditional thinking about ethics principles of the level of 
generality found in codes of conduct are not self-justifying, but need to be seen as applied principles of some 
general moral theory. " 
(NGE Harris, "Professional codes and Kantian duties" in RF Chadwick (ed), 1994, Ethics and the 
Professions, Aldershot, Avebury, (pp. 104.115)) 
Harris is supported in his view by Robert Veatch who, in discussing the American Medical 
Association code of conduct, argues: 
"The foundation of a role-specific ethics for professionals that has impact outside the profession cannot be 
beliefs, values, mutual agreements, or a sense of self-definition of the profession itself. It cannot even be 
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rooted in some more universal basis if knowledge of that basis is limited to professionals. ... The underpinning 
must be some more universal source of morality viewed by physicians and patients alike as legitimate. If the 
origin is exclusively within the profession, no rational reason exists for patients to subject themselves to the 
behaviour seen by professionals as moral. ... The major normative ethical systems - utilitarianism, the principle 
of the golden rule, the deontological traditions - could all provide such a basis. " 
(RM Veatch, "Professional Medical Ethics: The Grounding of Its Principles", The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 1979, vol. 4 no. 1 ppl-19) (my italics) 
Both philosophers express a concern that we should not accept the moral authority of a 
professional code of conduct that has only been subject to considerations that are generated 
from within the views and behaviours of the very professionals that the code is supposed to 
regulate. Their concerns are well placed. However, they slip from this legitimate concern 
to the highly contestable claim that professional codes of conduct must be grounded in some 
form of universalistic Moral Theory if they are at all to be morally justified" 26. Veatch 
argues that the moral authority of a code is grounded in a "triple contract" theory of ethics: 
which links the universal conditions of a moral contract formed between humans as such 
(qua human), to a contract formed between profession and society, to a contract formed 
between the individual professional and individual client (ibid pp. 14-17). The latter two 
contracts, of course, are grounded in and justified by the first contract which identifies 
universal principles and rules of conduct. Veatch suggests that contractors in some sort of 
Rawlsian original position27 might agree upon principles of justice, veracity, beneficence, 
promise keeping etc. These principles establish universally applicable norms which then 
are to be applied to the specific contexts of professional life where they get their particular 
content in terms of the second institutional level of contract between profession and society, 
and so on to the individual level. He concludes: 
"The relevant principles governing behavior between professionals and lay persons must remain a matter of 
mutual contractual agreement bound only by the more universally grounded ethical principles established or 
discovered in the earlier social contract, " 28 
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(RM Veatch, ibid p. 16) (my italics) 
Harris, alternatively, argues that the authority of codes of conduct can be grounded by 
recasting or reformulating the principles and rules they contain in a "Kantian" deontological 
form (op cit. p. 105). He starts from the fact that codes of conduct typically contain clauses 
that are imperative and categorical in their nature: for example they frequently begin, "A 
member shall... " where the completed instruction is not hypothetically premised on some 
particular outcome (the nurse is meant to obey the principle of confidentiality simpliciter 
not conditionally). He suggests, then, that they already point in the direction of Kant's 
categorical imperative. Harris recognises that there are very real difficulties in fitting the 
imperatives of codes of conduct into the Kantian form (pp. 108-13), but having already 
dismissed the consequentialist and virtue based alternatives as their grounding he sees no 
alternative but the Kantian option. He concludes: 
"The defects or limitations in codes as they are now applied should not be taken to show that their clauses are 
not to be treated as Kantian principles at all, but rather that as Kantian principles they are flawed. So we 
should not look for a different theoretical basis, but try to ensure that codes fit the Kantian model better by 
seeking to rectify their current shortcomings. " 
(NGE Harris, op cit. p. 114) (my italics) 
What is striking about both these examples is just how strongly the authors feel the need to 
justify codes of conduct in universalistic terms. Harris's last comment is particularly 
revealing; having previously recognised the enormous difficulties that arise in trying to 
recast the principles and rules of codes into Kantian form he still insists at the end that it is 
the principles and rules of the codes that suffer "shortcomings" and need "rectifying" 
according to Kantian Moral Theory. It does not seem to occur to him that the principles and 
rules of codes of conduct might serve their moral purposes perfectly well without this sort of 
justification, that, indeed, it is his attempt to force them into some kind of Kantian 
framework that is "flawed". 
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Harris and Veatch are not alone here; all Moral Theorists feel the overwhelming need to 
justify particular moral outlooks in universalistic terms. The primary motivation for this is 
not hard to find. In an explicitly pluralistic world in which different and competing 
conceptions of the good vie, moral order (coexistence), it is thought, can only be sustained if 
we can establish an overarching neutral ethic justifiable to all the parties concerned. As 
Peter Singer has put it: " [we must understand]... ethics as in some sense necessarily 
involving a universal point of view. " 29 (my italics). The thought underlying this is that, 
unless there are reasons that are impartial/universal then there really are not any moral 
reasons at all, all reasons boil down to pure self-interest. However, this view rests squarely 
on a central presupposition of Moral Theory: that all reasons for action divide up into one 
of two types; those that stem purely from self-interest, and those that stem purely from 
impartial/universal considerations. Harris, Veatch, and Moral Theorists generally, all 
accept this presupposition, hence, the overwhelming motivation to justify specific 
professional codes of conduct in terms of universalistic Moral Theory (they can see no 
alternative). In the next chapter I shall at length challenge the Moral Theorist's fundamental 
dichotomy of reasons into those that are self-interested and those that are impartial/universal 
by showing that agents can and do act on reasons that are neither purely self-interested or 
purely impartial. However, for the remainder of this chapter I will tackle Moral Theory on 
its chosen ground. I will argue that even if we initially allow Moral Theorists the 
concession that ethical principles and rules must provide the justificatory grounds for moral 
thinking and action, those principles and rules cannot be what Moral Theorists both take 
them to be and need them to be. In short, I will show that they cannot provide the universal 
premises for the deductive form of argument that characterises The Moral Theory Approach 
to applied ethics. 
(i. b) The Problem of Codifiability 
It will take us to the heart of the matter to consider a very interesting paper by Alasdair 
MacIntyre "Does Applied Ethics Rest On A Mistake? 130 in which he recounts the 
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experiences of the philosopher Stephen Toulmin as a staff member on the "National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research". The striking thing that Toulmin noted about the conduct of the committee was 
that the participants found it: 
".., relatively easy to reach agreement, or in a minority of intractable cases at least local and isolable 
disagreement, on particular concrete issues raised by specific difficult types of case, but continued to have 
fundamental and radical disagreements on matters of moral principle, on what the rules of morality actually 
are, even although each of them individually aspired to justify his or her views on the concrete issues by appeal 
to his or her principles. " 31 
(A Maclntyre, "Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake? ", The Monist, 1984, Vol 67, pp. 498-513) 
Now, a situation like this is extremely alarming for The Moral Theory Approach as it 
suggests that the divergent principles appealed to have neither a justificatory role nor a role 
in guiding the moral reasoning of the individuals concerned, for they have clearly reached 
some kind of moral agreement irrespective of their theoretical differences. However, as 
Maclntyre notes, this sort of situation is hardly an isolated occurrence but is actually a very 
common feature of applied ethics. As any review of the extant literature will reveal 
individuals of quite different theoretical persuasions (Kantians, utilitarians, contractualists 
etc. ) can be found grouped together on either side of any major substantive debate (abortion, 
world poverty, animal rights etc. ). Maclntyre argues that there are three possible 
explanations for this situation. The first is that the application of rival moral principles to a 
problem unexpectedly yield the same substantive results in a large number of cases. 
However, he rightly dismisses this explanation out of hand on the grounds that it 
undermines the very idea that there are really rival principles competing at all, and since we 
have good reason to think that the principles proposed by Kantians and utilitarians etc. are 
genuinely in conflict this explanation is clearly inadequate. The second explanation 
suggests that the participants in moral debate reach agreement upon substantive issues 
because their actual moral reasoning appeals to cases about which they agree and not to the 
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principles and rules about which they disagree. The participants, then, are guilty of 
misrepresenting to themselves their own reasoning as the application of principles when in 
reality they are being driven casuistically from case to case. This explanation certainly has 
some initial plausibility and perhaps accounts for the burgeoning number of books in 
applied and professional ethics that focus on a case history approach. However, this 
approach has a major shortcoming in identifying what it is that drives one from case to 
case32. It is the third explanation that goes to the heart of what is wrong with the Moral 
Theory conception of principles and rules. Maclntyre suggests that in at least some cases, 
"... what is in fact a nonrational social transaction is being presented as though it were a 
process of rational argument. " (ibid. p. 501) (my italics). 
Maclntyre's argument can be a bit elusive in places; however, I think the rendering I shall 
give in what follows gets to the point of what he wants to say (and even if he does not want 
to say exactly what I want to say, the points I make will stand independently as an incisive 
criticism of Moral Theory). His point is fundamentally about what is involved in following 
a rule, and I take what he means by "nonrational social transaction" to mean that the social 
exchange among individuals in which certain ethical values are discussed and agreed upon 
is not based upon a rationalistic procedure in moral argumentation. That is: the individuals 
involved in the debate are not constructing their arguments according to the deductive 
paradigm of The Moral Theory Approach to applied ethics. That approach requires that an 
independently determined set of impartial/universal principles and rules constituting Moral 
Theory are applied to a specific (professional) context, This would require that an 
individual is able to formulate and grasp universal principles and rules in advance of any 
application and then determine what they call for in terms of action in some specific 
context. So, for example, a nurse should be able to grasp what principles, like those 
supporting autonomy and confidentiality, require in general and then enquire into what they 
demand in the specific context of her in actual professional practice. Maclntyre's claim is 
that the principles and rules needed for this approach are simply not available: "... It cannot 
be the case that we can first and independently comprehend the rules of morality as such 
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and then only secondly enquire as to their application in particular specialised social 
spheres. " (ibid. p. 501, my italics). The reason for this has to do with a necessary feature of 
any rule: that no rule exists apart from its applications. A further consequence of this is 
that neither can there be an understanding of a rule separate from its applications. And it is 
precisely this that causes the problem of codifiability. For principles and rules to be 
codifiable they must be statable in explicit terms and have unambiguous universal 
applicability within their domain, irrespective of the particularities of the individuals they 
address (this is what I mean when I say that their propositional content alone should 
determine correct application). However, if rules can never exist apart from their 
applications, and can never be understood (or made intelligible) separately from their 
applications, the possibility of codifiability cannot be fulfilled. Evidence for this is 
manifested most obviously by the fact that moral principles and rules cannot be stated so as 
to secure closure, reference (explicit or implicit) must be made to a whole range of 
exceptions which remains open to new additions. Even the most well established moral 
principles and rules- for example: "Do not kill. ", "Do not Lie"- have to be understood as 
invoking a long list of exceptions that is always subject to extension as circumstances 
dictate. Indeed, typically, moral dilemmas consist in trying to establish whether some 
particular act in the circumstances would count either as a breach of the principle/rule 
concerned or a further addition to its list of exceptions. And clearly, contemplation of the 
abstract propositional content of the principle or rule cannot itself determine this, it is only 
in the light of considerations that focus upon previous applications of the principle/rule and 
projections therefrom into present and future contexts that a decision can be made. Aristotle 
clearly grasped this point, as I noted in the previous chapter, and accordingly dismissed the 
idea that moral thinking had anything to do with codifying principles and rules. However, it 
is not until the arrival of Wittgenstein that we get a full and profoundly important 
explanation of why rules cannot be understood separately from their application (and 
therefore cannot be codified)". I shall try to give a very brief summary of his most 
important claims34 
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(i. c) Wittgenstein on Rule Following 
In his "Philosophical Investigations" (1953, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, translated by GEM 
Anscombe) Wittgenstein focuses on the issue of what is involved in successfully following 
a rule. One of the first thing he claims is that the bare propositional content of a rule alone 
can never fix the correctness of its own application because a rule (so understood) is nothing 
more than a "sign-post" (section 85); it specifies what is to be done but cannot specify what 
needs to be understood for the rule to be followed: 
"A rule stands there like a sign-post- Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? 
Does it chew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or 
cross-country? But where is it said which way 1 am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e. g. ) 
in the opposite one? " 
(L Wittgenstein, 1958 (second edition), Philosophical Investigations (translated by GEM Anscombe), 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 39 (85)) (italics mine)) 
The fundamental problem that Wittgenstein identifies is that there are potentially an 
innumerable number of ways in which a rule could be interpreted, so the ability of an 
individual to follow a rule correctly has to be fixed by something other than the bare 
statement of the rule itself. What, then, fixes or constitutes our ability to follow a rule 
correctly? Wittgenstein dismisses the only sorts of explanations that could preserve the 
Moral Theorist's rationalistic project3S. First, he rejects what might be described as the 
"intellectualist" explanation. This grounds one's ability to follow a rule in terms of one's 
grasp of a further (higher order) rule or set of rules and principles that determinately fix the 
application of the first rule. The second rule (or set of rules) constitutes an interpretation or 
a theory of the first rule which once understood enables one to know what the first requires. 
There are two overwhelming reasons to reject this account. First, exactly the same 
problems of what constitutes correct rule following in the case of the first rule arise for the 
second rule or set of rules, thus the problem cannot be resolved in this way but merely 
plunged into an abyss of infinite regress (see sections 84-87). Secondly, it seems quite clear 
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that intellectualist explanations have no role at all to play in accounting for the typical rule 
governed activities in which humans mutually engage. Conversations, for example, are our 
prime mode of human interaction and understanding, and involve following a complex 
weave of different types of rules (rules of word meaning, deference, intimacy, solidarity, 
appropriateness, disagreement etc. etc), but successful conversation quite clearly does not 
depend on each of the participants possessing a unified theoretical explanation either of 
their own (rule governed) interjections or the (rule governed) interjections of the other-". 
Wittgenstein rejects the only other alternative open to the Moral Theorist to explain correct 
rule following: this locates the ability of an individual to grasp and follow a rule in terms of 
some independent underlying psychological mechanism. The thought here is that it is some 
intrinsic feature of the human individual's cognitive apparatus which ensures that rules are 
"brutely" understood and followed". This "solution" in effect begs the question against 
Wittgenstein's argument, as he shows, with an ingenious example, it still leaves open the 
possibility of innumerable interpretations of a rule (sections 185-233). He imagines giving 
an instruction to a (previously) competent pupil to extend a series of numbers by "adding 2" 
to the previous number. The pupil proceeds perfectly up to 1000, and it is tempting to 
believe that she is successful at this because she has internally grasped the formula for "add 
2" which consists in mechanistically churning out the appropriate results. But suppose after 
reaching 1000 she continues 1004,1008,1012; no doubt we would protest that she was 
meant to "add 2" not "add 4", that she had simply got it wrong. However, suppose she 
rejoinders that "adding 2" was precisely what she was doing in continuing the series of 
numbers with 1004,1008,1012, that this is what she understands by the rule "add 2" (i. e. 
after 1000 continue on with 1004,1008,1012... ). What this shows, according to 
Wittgenstein, is that we explain nothing about the ability to follow a rule by positing an 
underlying psychological mechanism. While it was initially tempting to describe her ability 
to count to 1000 in these terms the fact that this ability comes apart after 1000 shows that 
positing such a mechanism actually provided no account at all of her ability before she 
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reached 1000. The problem remains, then, that innumerable interpretations of how to 
follow a rule are possible and consistent with any amount of previously correct behaviour. 
What, then, could provide an adequate account of the ability to follow a rule? According to 
Wittgenstein, it is nothing other than active engagement in the everyday shared forms of 
human life where one learns and demonstrates the ability to follow a rule (There can, then, 
be no apprehension of a rule separately from the range of its applications or instances). 
Wittgenstein's point is of the first importance. Moral Theorists picture rules as ultimately 
standing separate from a particular practice in order to provide justified criteria for guiding 
that practice (i. e. rules are codifiable). Wittgenstein radically overturns this account: not 
only cannot rules be abstracted from practices (forms of life) but it is the very practices 
themselves which actually give rules their content and authority in the first place. Our 
ability to follow a rule, then, has to do with "knowing" how to go on within a practice, and 
the reasons why one goes on in one way rather than another (1002,1004,1006, rather than 
1004,1008,1012) can ultimately refer to nothing other than the living practice itself. 
Wittgenstein puts it boldly: " "Have I reasons? " the answer is: my reasons will soon give 
out. And I shall act, without reasons. " (ibid, p. 84 (section 211). As John McDowell notes 
(1979, p. 338), probably no-one describes this point better than Stanley Cavell commenting 
upon the ability to use words: 
"We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to 
project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the 
grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and 
understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and 
feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of 
what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an 
appeal, when an explanation- all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of l f0 . ii38 
(italics mine) 
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The ability of an agent to follow a rule is largely a pre-reflective practical ability. It depends 
upon a situated competence to find her way around a practice by being sensitive (typically at 
an unreflective level) to a whole range of interconnected considerations and features that 
form the largely unarticulated framework (or point) of the practice within which the agent 
exhibits her knowledge and aptitude. The unarticulated framework of a practice provides a 
background (communal and pre-reflective) understanding that enables individual agents to 
exercise real-time judgements and actions. As the expression "real-time" suggests, the pre- 
reflective understanding embodied within a practice is a necessary condition of intelligible 
human action given the sorts of creatures we are and the lives we live at the pace we live 
them. 
It is crucial to recognise that none of what has just been said should be thought to 
undermine the idea or importance of critical reflection; Wittgenstein's claims are not to be 
taken sceptically39. When he argues that: "explanations come to an end", that "reasons soon 
give out", that when we reach "bedrock" and can "offer no more justifications" we must act 
"without reasons"- he does not mean that our actions are ultimately unguided or irrational. 
His point is that it is a mistake to think that for a rule to be genuinely guiding we need 
something other than the very rule itself as it manifests itself in practice4Q. Nothing 
Wittgenstein says suggests that we should not further investigate the practices in which we 
engage for a deeper understanding of why we follow particular rules in the way we do. 
And while, as I have just noted, practices provide a largely unarticulated framework within 
which agents follow rules, there always remains the possibility of articulating what is 
typically taken for granted (unarticulated) in moments of critical reflection41. What 
Wittgenstein does rule out is that in articulating what is unarticulated one will uncover some 
foundational set of rules or theory. 
Wittgenstein's arguments about rule following, I would claim, represent a knock-down case 
against the conception of rule following that lies at the heart of the Moral Theorist's account 
of the sort of practical reasoning involved in applied ethics. However, a brief sketch of an 
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alternative conception of practical reasoning which takes as central Wittgenstein's claim that 
rules cannot be understood separately from practice should confirm the superiority of this 
approach over the traditional view. 
(i. d) Contextualist Moral Reasoning 
For the contextualist it is always the present features of the practice (context) in which one 
is engaged that structures and directs practical moral reasoning. The agent is thus required 
to develop a sensitivity to what the particularities of the situation before her demand rather 
than abstract from context and apply universal rules and principles in a rationalistic 
fashion42. This leaves only one general mode of critical thinking open to the contextualist; 
one in which the primary task is making sense of what one does or proposes to do. That is, 
rather than attempt to argue you into acceptance of rationally provable (universal) first 
principles, what I seek to do is get you to see the point (sense) of why I think that a 
particular rule demands x in the circumstances rather than y. In doing this I will typically 
seek to make sense of the rule's previous applications and the applications I propose to 
make of it in the future. The activity of making sense of a rule's application is inherently 
descriptive and narrative in nature and consists in: a) identification of the salient features 
of a situation in virtue of which a rule is prima facie invoked, and, b) description of the 
various salient features of situation such that together they take on a certain moral shape43. 
Jonathan Dancy puts it thus: 
"To see a feature as salient is to see it as making a difference to what one should do in the case before one. 
Since there are normally several different salient features, related to each other in various ways, a full view of 
the circumstances will not only see each feature for what it is but will also see how they are related to each 
other. Such a view will grasp the shape of the circumstances. From saliences we move to shape. A situation 
has a shape in the sense that its properties have a practically related profile. 
(J Dancy, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 112) 
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So, for example, a salient feature of a situation might be that to do x would cause misery to 
P, and this prima facie invokes a moral rule prohibiting the infliction of misery (thus 
prohibiting x). However, another salient feature of the same situation might be that P needs 
to know the truth about y and this prima facie invokes a moral rule requiring that one tells P 
of y, and this as it turns out involves doing x. The situation is not uncommon in health care: 
to do x here might involve telling someone that they have terminal cancer, and y might be 
the actual fact that they have terminal cancer. At first sight it appears that we have two 
conflicting rules relating to two salient features of the situation at hand; however the 
appearance is misleading because we need to avail ourselves of the notion of shape to see 
how these different salient features practically relate. Very interestingly the last two or three 
decades have seen a radical change in the understanding of the shape that health carers have 
ascribed to these two features (among others). Under the paternalistic model of health care 
which dominated for most of this century doctors (and nurses) typically saw their role as 
deciding what was best for the patient and this was taken to mean that they should "protect" 
the patient from upsetting information. Thus they would standardly have seen the rule about 
not causing misery as taking priority over the rule about truth telling. However, the 
dominant model of health care now is founded on the notion of patient autonomy, and the 
patient's right to know the truth about any condition that might affect her autonomy is seen 
as taking priority over the concern not to cause her misery by telling her bad news. 
Irrespective of which of these views is seen as right what is evident is that the moral shape 
that each of these views take depends fundamentally upon the background features of health 
care practice which are explicitly and implicitly acknowledged by the professionals 
concerned. And in each case the way in which the shape of the situation is articulated 
depends upon telling a narrative in which one brings to the fore (previously unarticulated) 
features of the background practice enabling one to make sense of the importance and role 
of the various salient features present: 
"A narrative will typically have characters (who may be individual human beings,... organisations, classes and 
nations... ). Characters will have specific capacities, goals and abilities, moral strengths and weaknesses. A 
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narrative will have a narrator (who, as the 'point of view' from which the story is told, is distinct from the 
empirical author). In that the narrator does not and cannot aspire to a position of neutrality or objectivity in 
relation to the events narrated, the point of view adopted entails a specific judgement of the events .... This 
judgement is articulated in what Ricoeur terms the 'configuration' of a series of events, actions and interactions, 
actors and motives, circumstances and outcomes within a plot. ... 
[configuration] serves to bring the diverse 
events into a meaningful whole. The whole is the point, theme or idea of the account. Each event thereby 
acquires sense only through being placed and grasped in specific relationships to other events within the 
narrative. " 
(A Edgar, "Narrating Social Work", in R Chadwick (ed) 1994, Ethics and the Professions, Aldershot, 
Avebury, p. 127) . (my 
italics) 
However, not just any narrative will do, indeed the transition from a paternalistic model of 
health care to one centred upon patient autonomy can be seen as the (legitimate) triumph of 
the latter narrative over the former. This triumph is grounded in the recognition that the 
background assumptions and ideas drawn upon in the "patient autonomy" narrative enables 
us to make more sense of the salient features of health and health care than can be provided 
by the "paternalistic" alternative. For example, when we come to see that the whole point of 
desiring good health is that it enables us to flourish as autonomous beings, then the 
"paternalistic" narrative which actually undermines that autonomy becomes untenable. As 
Charles Taylor has argued: 
"Practical reasoning ... is a reasoning 
in transitions. It aims to establish, not that some position is correct 
absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some other. It is concerned ... with comparative 
propositions. We show one of these comparative claims to be well founded when we can show that the move 
from A to B constitutes a gain epistemically.... This form of argument has its source in biographical narrative. 
We are convinced that a certain view is superior because we have lived a transition which we understand as 
error-reducing and hence as epistemic gain. " 
(C Taylor, 1989, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 72)44 
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Critical moral reasoning, then, is essentially an activity in which rules are evaluated (and 
correctly followed) in the light of the narratives (practices) within which they are embedded. 
This creates two general critical possibilities: a) that an individual's application of a rule 
does not cohere with the narrative upon which it depends, and, b) that the particular rule 
following demanded by a narrative shows the narrative to be suspect. Neither of these 
options are exclusive, typically there is a working back and forth between narrative and rule 
in a hermeneutical circle. 
(i. e) Rules as Partial Specifications of Goods 
Thus it is, then, that rules can never be understood separate from their application, or 
practice. Understanding the salience of a particular rule will always be parasitic on some 
level of implicit and explicit understanding of the practice (or narrative) which gives moral 
shape to the salient features (rules) concerned. Indeed, it is in this sense that we should 
actually understand rules to be a partial specification of the goods which the practice 
embodies and seeks to realise. As MacIntyre claims, when we seek to extend a rule to cover 
new cases, reformulate a rule to exclude certain behaviour, reject a rule outright, formulate a 
new rule, or whatever, "... it must always be because members of that particular 
community could agree in seeing some substantial good at stake in responding in one way 
rather than another. " (op. cit. p. 506). It is in this light, for example, that we can understand 
why the rule of truth telling has come to be seen as much more salient under the patient 
autonomy model of health care than under the paternalistic model. The rule relating to truth 
telling is in fact a partial specification of the good which health seeks to realise, namely 
autonomous agency. 
This means, of course, that there can be no impartial or universal set of rules to which one 
can appeal in trying to justify one moral position over another. The rules of morality will 
always express some conception of the good at stake, and the rationality in following a rule 
in one way rather than another will always be correlative to the conception of the good(s) 
expressed". This has the consequence of removing one of the most important motivations 
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for the principle of universalizability- that it provides a neutral position from which radical 
criticism of current ethical beliefs is possible. Not only is this shown not to be a possibility 
but also it exposes how the principle of universalizability actually masks a failure to engage 
in genuine moral criticism. The problem of codifiability shows that there are innumerable 
possible interpretations of a principle or rule, thus it is no surprise that different authors find 
that the principle of universalizability enables them to justify quite different sets of moral 
beliefs. So, far from providing a source of radical criticism, Kant's categorical imperative 
merely confirms the Christian morality he already promulgated. Equally, there is an 
inherent (although often overlooked) conservatism in utilitarianism as the problem it has 
with respecting the interests of minority groups attests. Moral justification on the 
contextualist approach I have outlined will be less ambitious in its scope (it will not be a 
case of trying to justify a set of beliefs universally), but for precisely that reason a much 
more honest and substantive activity. Crucially, justification and description will not be 
regarded as two separate processes. In describing a moral situation in one way rather than 
another one will in the very same act also be justifying the position described, this, of 
course, is an inevitable consequence of adopting the narrative approach just discussed. 
(i. f) The Role of a Code of Conduct in Moral Reasoning 
The implications that the foregoing discussion on the non-codifiability of principles and 
rules has for our understanding of the nature and role of codes of conduct is of the first 
importance for professional ethics. In particular, it means that the common-place 
conception of codes as documents that provide principles and rules for direct application to 
professional contexts as a means of resolving ethical dilemmas is fundamentally flawed. 
That this is a common-place conception of the role of a code is one of the more interesting 
features to arise out of the survey of nurses for this thesis. The UKCC code of conduct was 
unanimously regarded as an important and welcome addition to the ethical life of the 
professional nurse yet at the same time seen by the majority as ineffectual in guiding 
conduct. This tension reflects a widespread assumption that the principles and rules of the 
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code should be able to fix determinately what ethically should be done in any particular 
situation, and dismay and disappointment were frequently expressed that the code failed to 
do this. What this suggests is that the majority of nurses surveyed were working implicitly 
with a Moral Theory conception of the code expecting the principles and rules it contains to 
be directly applicable to practice. This can be seen in the following extracts taken from 
three of the interviews (in each case a copy of the 1992 UKCC Code of Professional 
Conduct for the Nurse, Midwife and Health Visitor, was present for the nurse to refer to). 
Example l 
Male, age 29, Macmillan nurse 
[question] Have you read the UKCC Code of Conduct? 
[answer] Yes. 
[question] How important do you think the code is? 
[answer] It's very important. Obviously if you deal with vulnerable people in the way we 
do it's very important that you do what is right. You must have some ethics otherwise 
patients could be abused in all sorts of ways. 
[question] Do you find the code useful in choosing what you should do when you confront 
a real-life situation? 
[answer] In what way do you mean? 
[question] Well, try to think of situations you have been in where you were not really sure 
what you should ethically do, did you actually use the code of conduct, and if so, in what 
110 
way did you use it? Or if you have never used the code in this way could you imagine doing 
so? 
[answer] I wouldn't say that I use the code in situations like that, I can't think of a situation 
in which I have. I usually use my experience to make a decision. ... I do sometimes look at 
the code later to check if what I did is ok. We also sometimes use the code when we have 
staff meetings if we are discussing cases. 
[question] Do you think if you carried the code around with you, you could use it to make 
an ethical decision when a problem arises? 
[answer] No not really, the problem is the code asks you to do lots of different things and 
you can't do all of them. Number 1 [interviewee points to clause I of the code] says act 
always to promote the well-being and interests of the patient, but number 10 [interviewee 
points to clause 10 of the code] says that you can reveal confidential information about the 
patient if it is in the public interest. You can't do both of these at once can you?. The code 
can't tell you which one of these you should do, so in the end you have to make your own 
mind up. 
[question] Do you think this is a weakness in the code? 
[answer] Yes. 
[question] Can you think of anyway in which the code could be improved to get round this 
problem? 
[answer] Not off-hand, but I think they [the UKCC] need to make it clearer so that we 
know which rule is meant to apply in different situations. 
III 
Example 2 
Female, 52, sister (general ward) 
[question] Have you read the UKCC Code of Professional Conduct? 
[answer] Yes. 
[question] How important do you think the code is? 
[answer] I think it's very important, although I'm not sure much notice is taken of it? 
[question] Can you explain what you mean by that? 
[answer] I think ethics is absolutely important to our relationship with patients. The trust 
that a patient has to have in the doctors and nurses that treat him can only be got if he thinks 
that we only act in ways that are ethical. ... You wouldn't give your money to a bank 
manager that you thought was a thief, so why should a patient trust a nurse who he thinks is 
unethical? 
[question] But what did you mean when you said that you didn't think nurses took much 
notice of the code? 
[answer] I suppose I mean that there is not much evidence that anyone actually uses the 
code to make ethical decisions. Speaking for myself I make my own decisions based on 
years of experience ... and I think other nurses 
do the same thing, anyway, that's what my 
colleagues certainly do. 
[question] So why did you say that you thought the code was very important? 
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[answer] I think it's important that there is some sort of statement of ethical principles for 
the profession as a whole so that everyone can see that we work according to ethical 
principles. 
[question] How do you square that with your claim that you yourself don't actually use the 
code to make ethical decisions, that seems a bit contradictory don't you think? 
[answer] I can see that that's a bit of a problem. ... I think the code of conduct acts as a sort 
of safety net to prevent abuses of a nurse's power, but it's too vague to tell you what to do in 
real situations on the ward. In the end you have to make your own judgements and accept 
responsibility for what you do. 
[question] Do you think the code could be improved in any ways to get round the problems 
you have identified? 
[answer] I'm not sure. I suppose it could be made a lot clearer so that we [nurses] know 
how to use it. Perhaps we could also be given more training on how to use it. 
l: xamnlc 3 
Female, age 32, Health Visitor 
[question] Have you read the UKCC Code of Conduct? 
[answer] Yes. 
[question] How important do you think the code is? 
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[answer] I'd say that it is important that we've got a code, ethics are really important these 
days, 
... 
but I think most of us are not sure what we're meant to do with it. 
[question] Can you explain what you mean when you say you're not sure what to do with 
the code? 
[answer) ... We're given the code and told 
how important it is, in fact we're told we can be 
struck off the register for breaking any of its clauses, but no one tells us how to use it. It 
seems a bit woolly to me ... if you look at the things 
it says you should do they're all too 
vague to help ... in the end it's a matter of what you personally think is right. 
[question] I think I get what you mean, but can you give me any examples so I can get 
clearer? Which clauses would you say are too vague to help? [interviewer passes the code 
of conduct to the nurse] 
[answer] All of them really. ... Look at clause 
15 [for example]: as a health visitor I often 
visit the same clients on a regular basis which means I build up a bond with them, which I 
think is good practice. However this means that I am often given little gifts as a sign of 
their appreciation- it might be some flowers, a bottle of wine or something else. If I was to 
refuse these gifts most of my clients would take it as an insult and it would ruin all the effort 
I had put in to building up a good relationship with them. I think, because they receive so 
much care from me they like to give a little something back so they don't feel a complete 
burden, it puts them at ease.... But according to clause 15 it could be argued that I am in 
breach of my duty not to accept gifts. The code doesn't help in deciding what is right: I 
would say I was right to accept these small gifts but someone else might say I was wrong, 
who's to say? 
[question] Do you think the code should be able to help you decide what is right to do in 
the sort of situations you have just described. 
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[answer] Well, yes, if we are going to be judged by a code it only seems fair that we should 
be able to see clearly what the code says we should do. It's not fair that we could be struck 
off for breaking the code if it isn't clear what the code actually means, it's all a bit arbitrary 
in my view. 
..................................................... 
In each of the extracts above there is a clear expectation that the UKCC Code of 
Professional Conduct should, somehow, provide explicit principles and rules that can be 
applied in specific circumstances to resolve specific moral problems. There is an 
accompanying sense of frustration and concern that the code fails to do this. However, the 
arguments of this chapter show that codes of conduct could never fulfil this function. The 
fact that principles and rules are intrinsically non-cod f able, and can never be understood 
separately from practice (the actual instances of their application), means that there is a 
central and irreducible role for situated individual judgement and deliberation (Aristotelian 
phronesis, or the like). It is of the utmost importance that the professions and professionals 
understand this fundamental point if the abuse of codes and a consequent scepticism 
towards them is to be avoided. There has been a tendency to see the production of a code in 
itself as a sole means to realising ethical conduct in the professions (even more so in the 
world of business ethics). Codes are handed out to professionals with little or no other form 
of guidance on the assumption that the individuals concerned should be able to read straight 
off from the clauses of the code what it is that they are required to do. This has been fuelled 
largely, I would argue, by an implicit acceptance of the Moral Theory dogma that the 
principles and rules of a code are to be applied deductively to practice. The failure of this 
dogma, however, has led to scepticism about the usefulness of codes (as evidenced in the 
examples above) and a consequent claim from many writers that codes of conduct merely 
serve an ideological function in protecting the power of the professions. Both of these 
attitudes are justified so long as a profession sees a code of conduct alone as the sole tool of 
ethical reasoning and justification of its practice. The reason for this should be clear. A 
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code of conduct serves as a profession's primary statement of its ethical values and thereby 
represents its explicit claim to moral justification for its practice. However, if it stands 
alone as a profession's ethical resource then the radical openness to innumerable 
interpretations that follows from the problem of codifiability means that it can serve no 
useful function other than to "... protect professional autonomy from general moral 
scrutiny. "". As the nurses themselves recognise, the inherent indeterminacy of the stated 
principles and rules of the nursing code render it open to all sorts of possible interpretations 
such that almost any form of behaviour could be justified (for example, by playing one 
principle off against another, as suggested in example I above)". It is deeply ironic that the 
strongest case for adopting The Moral Theory Approach to professional ethics arises from a 
perceived need to justify the ethical values of the professions, yet it is the very adoption of 
this approach which makes it possible to avoid providing a genuine justification. 
(i. g) Codes of Conduct as Narrative Frameworks 
However, codes of conduct need not be seen as useless for guiding practice, or incapable of 
playing a justificatory role for a profession's ethics. Once we are freed from the dogma of a 
Moral Theory conception of codes of conduct there remains the possibility of providing a 
contextualist account of their use. Indeed, properly construed, codes of conduct slip very 
neatly into the contextualist account of rule following I gave above (pp. 103-106). Key to 
this account is Wittgenstein's claim that rules cannot be understood separately from practice. 
This has the crucial implication that practical moral reasoning makes ineliminable reference 
to the goods at stake in following a rule one way rather than another. This in turn ultimately 
depends on providing some sort of narrative account which enables the morally salient 
features of a situation to be practically related so that they take on a certain moral shape 
which itself justifies (or fails to justify) why one follows a rule in the way one does. In 
providing such an account I try to get you to see the sense of what I do rather than argue for 
the acceptance of some universal principle. My claim is that codes of conduct can be 
usefully construed as providing a framework within which professionals can construct the 
narratives essential to the production and justification of ethical hfe4ß. This entails a 
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rejection of the idea that the principles and rules of a code represent ready-made premises 
for application to practical situations as a part of a deductive argument (The Moral Theory 
Approach). Instead, the principles and rules of a code should be understood as a (partial) 
specification of the central goods that a practice seeks to realise. They identify the 
important and recurrent moral values that lie at the heart of a professional practice. In the 
daily life of the professional they direct her to address those values practically in the course 
of carrying out her duties. And in moments of critical reflection they demand that the 
narratives professionals construct to describe and justify their practices are likewise 
structured and constrained by the fact that they must plausibly account for the role of the 
values that the code embodies. On this reading the principles and rules of a code cannot 
determine what should be done but rather act as reminders of the values that professionals 
must consider in the conduct of their professional life49. 
The contextualist conception of a code's function not only explains why no code can 
determine what particular action should be done in a specific circumstance (and thereby 
dissolves the main objection levelled against codes by professionals and others), but also 
shows why codes nevertheless have an important role to play in professional ethics. As 
Jennifer Jackson has argued, it is crucial to a profession that divergences in practice are 
avoided; public confidence in a profession depends fundamentally on the assumption that 
all the professionals in a practice speak with one voiceSO. A well functioning code which 
provides a clear framework that professionals recognise as making specific demands on how 
they (narratively) account for their practices (by, for example, demanding that they show 
how confidentiality is protected, competence perfected, autonomy respected etc. ) provides a 
key to ensuring consistency and coherence in practice across a profession. 
(i. i) Codes of Conduct and Professional Dialogical Structures 
Clearly a code alone could not guarantee this, It is crucial to the whole contextualist 
(narrative) approach to the use of a code that it is embedded within a variety of dialogical 
structures that enable professionals to engage in an ongoing debate regarding the correct 
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interpretation of the code. The sort of dialogical structures I have in mind here include: 
ethics committees, staff meetings, conferences, professional training, professional research, 
advisory documents, interest groups etc. A well functioning code is precisely a code that 
facilitates and focuses wide ranging professional debate across these various forms of 
communication. However, it must be stressed that a code can only serve this function if it is 
indeed the case that it is explicitly incorporated into these sorts of dialogical processes. The 
widespread scepticism about the usefulness of the UKCC Code of Professional Conduct 
exhibited by the nurses surveyed for this thesis can in large part be located in a failure to 
incorporate the code more centrally into the dialogical structures of nursing. For example, 
out of 369 respondents to the nursing ethics questionnaire distributed for this thesis only 42 
nurses claimed to have received "adequate" training in how to understand and use the code, 
all the rest claimed their training was "inadequate", none claimed that it was "more than 
adequate" (see appendix I (a) and (b)). 
However, the interviews conducted for the thesis did provide one clear example of a nurse 
who worked in team where the Code of Professional Conduct was incorporated into practice 
in the contextualist way I have outlined. 
Example 4 
Female, age 24, staff nurse (psychiatric ward) 
[question] Have you read the UKCC Code of Conduct 
[answer] yes. 
[question] How important do you think it is? 
[answer] Very important. 
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[question] In what ways is it important? 
[answer] 
... In my 
job I deal with people who suffer all sorts of psychiatric disadvantages. 
And we [the nursing team] recognise that it's really important that we consider all the moral 
implications of the way we treat them [patients]. These people are some of the most abused 
people around so its even more important for us to be aware that we treat them with the 
respect they deserve. We see ethics as a part of their treatment ... to get them back to a state 
where they are capable of becoming an independent person again. ... Psychiatric medicine 
and nursing doesn't have a good record on these issues and I think we're now very aware 
that we have to show that we do what is right. 
[question] I'm interested by what you said about ethics being part of the treatment of the 
patient, can you tell me a bit more about that? 
[answer] ... One of the biggest problems we 
have to deal with is the patient's low sense of 
self-esteem, they've usually been abused in one way or another all their life and constantly 
made to feel like dirt or told their useless ... they're usually shunned by society. A part of 
our nursing regime is to treat them according to the same ethical standards as we like to be 
treated ourselves. This is an important part of building up their self-esteem, to make them 
feel they belong again. 
[question] Can I get back to the code of conduct for a moment, would you say the code 
helps you in deciding what is ethically right to do? 
[answer] Yes, we find it very useful. We use seven different models of nursing on the ward 
depending on what's appropriate for the patient concerned and we use the code alongside 
these models. 
119 
[question] Can you tell me a bit about how you use the code? How do you use it alongside 
the models of nursing you use? 
[answer] Basically the different models of nursing we use relate roughly to different levels 
of psychiatric disfunction or ability in the patient so we select the appropriate model for the 
patient. We then interpret the code according to the model we're using. 
[question] Can you give me an example? Take clause 5, for example, which says that you 
must "foster independence" in the patient, I presume that's an important principle in your 
field? 
[answer] Yes it is. ... the level of independence you can encourage in a patient though 
depends on the psychiatric state of the patient concerned, some are more able than others. 
What we've done at work is try to define what concepts like "independence", "autonomy" 
mean depending on the model of nursing used. For one person independence could mean 
going to the toilet alone, for another it might be going to Tescos. 
........................................................... " 
As a result of this interview the nurse in the last example was subsequently shadowed (by 
the author) on her ward for a day in order to establish the nature and extent to which the 
code of professional conduct was integrated into everyday nursing practice. There was 
ample evidence in this instance that she and her colleagues on the nursing team had 
incorporated the key principles (goods) of the code into the structure of their actions and 
decision making procedures. As suggested in the account of following a rule described 
above, the real-time integration of the principles and rules of the code into working practice 
was largely pre-reflective. For example, the nurse (and her colleagues) did not appear to 
stop to reflect upon what the principle of promoting patient autonomy required in any 
particular situation but acted directly (pre-reflectively) to realise this goal. Ilowever, when 
interviewed again after her shift had finished the nurse was able, when questioned about her 
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specific nursing interventions, to account for her actions precisely in terms of promoting 
patient autonomy, for example: 
[question] I noticed that at lunch you got Tom to make his own food even though he said he 
didn't want to- some people might say that you breached his autonomy by doing that, what 
would you say? 
[answer] Not at all, it's to get him to be more autonomous that I got him to do his own 
dinner. A big problem for our patients is they've become so used to having things done for 
them all the time and they'll let you do everything if you let them. We have to force them to 
do things for themselves sometimes to encourage them to take responsibility for their own 
lives. ... The whole point of what we're aiming at 
is to get them into a position so that they 
can look after themselves independently, doing the small everyday tasks like cooking and 
shopping might seem trivial to other people but they're really important. 
Responses like this were typical and reflected a concern and ability to articulate the goods 
lying behind the principles and rules that were implicitly acknowledged and incorporated in 
working practice. In this case the UKCC Code of Professional Conduct was not seen as 
useless in guiding practice but provided a constructive tool for focusing critical reflection on 
how central ethical values could be incorporated into nursing practice. What is crucial to 
note about the nurse's use of the code is that it is overtly contextualist and anti-Moral 
Theory, and it is precisely because of this, I would argue, that it is seen as helpful rather 
than useless (or even hostile). 
To conclude the chapter I hope to have demonstrated two major claims in the course of the 
preceding arguments. First, that the principle of universalizability cannot serve the 
justificatory role that is the primary motivation for invoking it in the first place. This, I 
claimed, rests fundamentally upon the problem of codifiability. Universalizability requires 
that a principle or rule is (explicitly) codifiable or statable separately from any particular 
121 
context of application in order to be applicable to all contexts. The radical uncodifiability 
of principles and rules demonstrated by Wittgenstein's arguments about rule following show 
that this essential requirement cannot be fulfilled; no rule (or principle) can be understood 
separately from its applications (separately from practice), thus the principle fails. 
Secondly, however, I hope to have at least begun to have shown that the loss of the principle 
of universalizability is not to be mourned as a loss of the very possibility of moral 
justification and moral reasoning per se (as Moral Theorists fear). Rather its rejection 
should be seen as a liberation. It enables us to focus upon the development of a 
contextualist/narrative conception and process of moral reasoning which preserves the idea 
that we can engage in genuine critical reflection but in ways that are not uselessly 
formalistic. The genuine adoption of a contextualist approach to codes of conduct, which 
would involve a commitment from the professions to establishing the appropriate structural 
resources for professionals to engage in open dialogue about the role of key ethical values in 
practice, would have two major benefits. First it would negate the scepticism of individual 
professionals concerning the use and function of their particular code of conduct. Secondly 
it would signal to the general public that a profession takes its code seriously thereby 
negating the sceptical view that a code of conduct serves no purpose other than to protect 
the status and vested interests of a powerful group of people. It is precisely this 
commitment to providing a contextualist incorporation of codes of conduct into practice that 
would provide a code with all the justification that it could reasonably have. 
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t It is also sometimes described as the "deductive paradigm" in applied ethics see, for example: A Maclntyre, 
"Does Applied Ethics Rest on A Mistake? ", 1984, The Monist, Vol 67, pp498-513. A Maclntyre, 1985 
(second edition), After Virtue, London, Duckworth. J McDowell, "Virtue and Reason", 1979, The Monist, 
Vol. 62, pp. 331-50. ER Winkler and JR Coombs (eds), 1993, Applied Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell. As 
Maclntyre puts it: "Applied ethics derives its conclusions from sets of premises in which conclusions drawn 
from ethics [Moral Theory] are conjoined to factual finding about some specific social and intellectual area. 
Its rational claims upon our attention depend first then upon the justifiability of the account of morality which 
it presupposes; secondly, upon the warranted character of its account of the structures of medical or legal or 
political or military or business institutional and social relationships; and thirdly, upon its ability to derive its 
conclusions rationally from its premises. " (ibid. 1984, p. 499). Note, none of the authors cited, nor myself, 
claim that typically professionals in practice explicitly draw upon Moral Theory in this way. Rather the claim 
is that Applied Ethics, which is concerned both with justifying and guiding particular moral judgements, 
demands this sort of deduction. So, for example, the Applied Ethician will seek to show that a particular 
stretch of practical reasoning can be demonstrated to conform to some explicit or implicit universal principle. 
Much more about this claim below. 
2 Andrew Edgar, ("Narrating social work" in RF Chadwick (ed), 1994, Ethics and the Professions, 
Aldershot, Avebury. ) notes that the term "code of conduct" suggests that the code concerned is overtly a 
disciplinary tool whereas "code of ethics" suggests a more general statement of the principles guiding a 
particular practice (p. 132). His point is well made, however, the expressions "code of conduct" and "code of 
ethics" are typicaly used much more loosely in the literature and are frequently interchanged with no intended 
change of meaning. Accordingly, I shall use the terms as synonymous unless I explicitly state otherwise. 
3 For a clear exposition of this view see, NGE Harris, "Professional codes and Kantian duties" in RF 
Chadwick (ed), 1994, Ethics and the Professions, Aldershot, Avebury. I mention his work below. 
4 For a clear exposition of this approach to codes of conduct see, A Edgar, "Narrating social work" in RF 
Chadwick (ed), 1994, Ethics and the Professions, Aldershot, Avebury. 
s It is, perhaps, not insignificant in the light of this comparison that one way in which Kant formulates the 
categorical imperative is "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law 
of nature. " (my italics) 
6J Dancy, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 79-80, notes that there is an important difference 
between universalistic theories which universalize principles according to whether others could or should do 
likewise in similar circumstances; he argues that Kant belongs to the former school of thought and R. M Ilare 
the latter. flare's conception of universalzability contains a prescriptive element which is absent in Kant's 
conception. 
7 Quoted in Cicero, On the Good Life, translated by M Grant, 1971, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Limited 
11. 
See, P Singer, 1993 (second edition), Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Singer sees 
the practical life of the individual as split between self-interest and the moral point of view which he argues 
necessarily involves the universalizability of judgements: " [we must see] ... ethics as in some sense necessarily 
involving a universal point of view. " (ibid, p. 316). See also, RM Bare, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
9I Kant, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by 1IJ Paton, 1981, The Moral Law, 
London, Hutchinson. 
1° See: R. J Sullivan, 1994, An Introduction to Kant's Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, ch. 2. 
And, HJ Paton, 1981, The Moral Law, London, Hutchinson, pp. 18-23. 
" in seeing the contradictions uncovered by application of the categorical imperative as practical I am 
following the work of C Korsgaard and 0 O'Neill. See: C Korsgard, 1996, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 0 O'Neill, 1989, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of 
Kant's Practical Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Both Korsgaard and O'Neill argue 
that the practical contradictions uncovered by the categorical Imperative include a "contradiction-in- 
conception test" and a "contradiction-in-the-will test". 
" At this stage I do not want to raise the question about whether acting from certain moral dispositions, 
emotions, or sentiments counts as employing a reason for one's action. If one understands the idea of a reason 
liberally then one could say that if I act in the way I do because I feel the cruelty in doing otherwise would be 
immoral, this counts as acting for a reason. However, my concern here is to identify the particular sort of 
reasons employed by Moral Theorists such as Kant which require that they are explicitly stated in the form of 
maxims, rules or principles. 
13 See, R Audi, 1989, Practical Reasoning, London, Routledge, pp. 64-5. 
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14 Kant does obviously recognise that we do not always formulate our intentions (reasons) into explicit 
maxims of action in every act of practical reasoning. However, the crucial point is that this can always be done 
(by making the implicit maxim of action explicit), and indeed must be done if we wish morally to justify a 
particular action. 
ºs GEM Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy", sees this as a fatal flaw, " His rule about universalizable 
maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view 
to constructing a maxim about it. " reproduced in JG Haber, 1993, Doing and Being, New York, Macmillan. 
16 See footnote 12 above. fcprA133-134] 
17 RM Hare, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Is See, RM Hare, 1963, op cit, pp. 36-46. 
19 Hare, then, seeks to counter the usual objections against Kant that the general principles he "deduces" from 
the categorical imperative are either too vague to be any use or are too vulnerable to specific counter examples 
(as in the case of the beneficent lie). However, the very specificity of the principles "deduced" from Hare's 
version of universalizability brings into question how they can have "a bearing outside the particular case", and 
hence undermines the very point and purpose of universalizability in the first place. 
20 See for example: 0 O'Neill, "Consistency in Action" in NT Potter and M Timmons (eds) 1985, Morality 
and Universality, Dordrecht, Reidel. And, A Gewirth, 1978, Reason and Morality, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
21 See for example: K-O Ape], "Is the ethics of the ideal communication community a utopia? ", in S 
Benhabib and F Dallmayr (eds), 1990, The Communicative Ethics Controversy, Cambridge Mass. MIT 
Press. J Habermas, 1989, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge Mass. MIT Press. 
22 Benhabib's account of the principle of universalizability combines two self-consciously moral principles: 
the principle of universal respect, and the principle of egalitarian reciprocity (1992, pp. 30-38). For the claim 
that Benhabib's reformulation of the principle of universalizability is still strongly universalist in requiring that 
moral principles must be such that anybody could adopt them, see note 23 below. 
23 Benhabib's "proceduralist" reformulation of the principle of universalizability does not escape this 
requirement. First, to know that one's particular principles conform to the universalistic requirements of fair 
argumentation one must be able at some stage to state explicitly what they are. Secondly, if one's principles 
are genuinely to conform to the requirements of universalizabilty one must show that anyone could adopt them. 
As much as Benhabib seems to want to escape the full force of this second conclusion (because she wants to 
avoid the overly abstract versions of discourse ethics of Apel and Habermas and show ethics to be much more 
sensitive to the concrete experiences of individuals) her commitment to universalism make this impossible. 
She is able to reject the idea that all others should act on the same universalizable principles by rejecting the 
need for universal consent. However, she must retain the principle that one ultimately has be able to show that 
anyone could act on the same principle(s). This comes out very clearly in her own illustrations: for example, 
on page 45 (ibid) she notes that her theory would require that society tolerates the practices of various specific 
communities such as Muslims and Mormons. She argues, however, that where there is conflict between the 
specific practices of the group and society's charge to uphold the principles of universal respect and egalitarian 
reciprocity the latter always "trumps" the interests of the former: "In cases of a conflict between the principles 
of right which make coexistence possible among adherents of divergent conceptions of the good and principles 
of other more partial conceptions of the good, of which we know that they cannot be generalized beyond their 
specific adherents, the right trumps over that particular conception of the good. " (ibid, p. 45) (italics mine). 
This just is to require that any particular individual's or group's principles could be adopted by anyone (see 
also pp. 32-33). 
24 See, Bernard Williams, 1995, Making sense of humanity: and other philosophical papers, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp195-6. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that Williams argues we need to 
consider the "professional dispositions" if we are to make any sense of the idea of a specific professional ethics 
at all. The reason, of course, is that if the propositional content of rules alone fixes our moral requirements 
then there will be no substantive divergence between ordinary ethics and profesional ethics. 
2s Both philosophers, then, clearly represent adherents to theThe Moral Theory Approach to applied ethics 
which sees the philosopher's role as charged with applying universalistic Moral Theory to practical situations. 
They recognise that the committees of professionals who construct their own code of conduct are extremely 
unlikely to deduce its principles and rules from the universalistic principles of some form of Moral Theory, 
Thus, the grounding of a particular ethic in the universal ethics of Moral Theory is a distinctive task for 
philosophers, either in cooperation with the professionals concerned, or, as in the case of Harris's article for 
example, as an isolated act of showing how some code(s) could be (re)formulated in terms of a universal 
theory 
26 In fairness to Veatch he does argue that we do not have to wait for ",.. normative ethics disputes to be 
resolved before some rules are developed. " as "we can agree on some basic norms shared sufficiently to permit 
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social intercourse and the development of a shared sense of rights, duties, and responsibilities. " (p. 13). 
However, if the whole thrust of Veatch's argument is correct that commonly agreed norms amongst a group of 
people do not amount to a moral validation of those norms unless they are grounded in a set of universally 
applicable principles, then those basic norms he mentions also must be subject ultimately to the same form of 
validation. 
27 See, John Rawls, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
28 For a fuller exposition of Veatch's "triple contract" theory see, R Veatch, 1981, A Theory of Medical 
Ethics, New York, Basic Books. 
29 P Singer, 1993 (second edition), Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 3I6. 
30 A Maclntyre, "Does Applied Ethics Rest on A Mistake? ", 1984, The Monist, Vol 67, pp498-513. 
31 It seems quite clear from this quote that the members of this committee make the same assumption that 
Harris and Veatch do, that the concrete moral values adopted in the context of a particular sphere of interest 
stand in need of justification from the universal perspective of a set of moral principles. 
32 In short, the problem about what it is that drives us from case to case is that the only plausible candidate 
seems to be a principle, i. e. we note in one particular case that x was the reason why we did y so in the next 
case if we find x present we have reason to do y (this in effect lays down a principle). However, that would 
mean the case study approach is subject to the very same criticisms levelled at The Moral Theory Approach, 
which it is supposed to replace. If it is not to be a principle then what? I am not advocating here that one 
should not make good use of case studies (as will be seen, I will suggest they can be very useful). I am merely 
warning against the temptation to think that what we decide is relevant in one case can lay down a reason for 
acting in exactly the same way in another case. 
33 L Wittgenstein, 1958 (second edition), Philosophical Investigations (translated by GEM Anscombe), 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
34 Here I am indebted to John McDowell's very lucid explanation of Wittgenstein's views in "Reason and 
Virtue" (op cit) 
35 I should, perhaps, point out that Wittgenstein's arguments are addressed generally against the rationalistic 
account of rule following and not simply against Moral Theorists. 
36 Wittgenstein sums up what is wrong with the intellectualist explanation in the following quote: ""... how 
does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is 
never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall! "- As though an explanation as it 
were hung in the air unless supported by another one. " (op cit, p. 40-1, (87)) 
37 A modern example of this approach is provided by the computational theory of the mind. Key to this 
approach is the claim that the cognitive abilities of individuals are explained by the possession of internal sub- 
conscious programs (sets of rules). For a classic exposition of this approach see: D Dennett, 1986, 
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Sussex, Harvester Press. 
38 S Cavell, 1969, Must We Mean What We Say?, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. Quoted in J 
McDowell op cit. pp. 338-39. 
39 For one famous attempt to read Wittgenstein's claims sceptically see: S Kripke, 1982, Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language, Oxford, Blackwell. 
40 As Colin McGinn notes: "The feeling that I do need to turn to something else arises from the fact that the 
rule I am following could in principle be interpreted in indefinitely many ways, it just being a sign. 
Wittgenstein's claim is that when I am presented with such a sign ... I act unhesitatingly and am not paralysed 
by the lack of guidance from elsewhere- and not because my actions are somehow irrational. " (C McGinn, 
1984, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 20n) 
41 For this view of what Wittgenstein implies see, for example, C Taylor, 1995, Philosophical Arguments, 
Massachusettes, Harvard University Press, ch. 9, pp 165-180. 
42 See: L Blum, 1994, Moral Perception and Particularity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. J 
Dancy, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell. J McDowell, "Virtue and Reason", 1979, The Monist, 
Vol. 62, pp. 331-50. D McNaughton, 1988, Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell. I 
Murdoch, 1970, The Sovereignty of the Good, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. M Nussbaum, 1990, 
Love's Knowledge, New York, Oxford University Press. 
43 The terms "salince" and "shape" I take from: J Dancy, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell. 
44 See also: C Taylor, 1995, Philosophical Arguments, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. ch. 3, 
pp34-60). Taylor is heavily influenced by A Macintyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and 
the Philosophy of Science", The Monist, 1977, Vol. 60. pp. 453-472. For an example of the use of this 
conception of practical reasoning in the field of nursing see: P Benner, "The role of articulation in 
understanding practice and experience as sources of knowledge in clinical nursing", in J Tully (ed), 1994, 
Philosophy in an Age of Piuralism: The philosophy of Charles Taylor In question, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. pp. 136-155. 
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43 This has the important implication that rationality must be described substantively rather than procedurally 
(this issue will be addressed fully in the final chapter). 
46 A Maclntyre, op. cit. p. 512. 
47 The flip side of this coin, of course, is that the same indeterminacy makes it possible to interpret all sorts of 
different behaviour as immoral in light of the principles of the code. This possibility is recognised by the nurse 
in the third example above, who correctly sees this as a serious problem when the code is used as a disciplinary 
device. 
43 This is the view put forward by Andrew Edgar (op. cit. p. 127 passim). I would argue that there is a strong 
case for claiming that the narrative conception of a code implicitly underlies the explicitly stated functions of 
UKCC professional code of conduct which include: "Emphasising the primacy of the interests of the patient or 
client", "The Code as a portrait" [of the sort of professional a nurse should be], "The Code as an extended 
definition of 'accountability"', The Code as the 'misconduct' backcloth" (R Pyne, 1992 (second edition), 
Professional Discipline in Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting, Oxford, Blackwell Scientific 
Publications pp. 28-32). 
49 For a defence of this conception of the role of principles see, J Dancy, op. cit. pp. 66-71. 
so J Jackson, "Common codes: Divergent Practices" in RF Chadwick (ed), 1994, Ethics and the 
Professions, Aldershot, Avebury, pp. 116-24. Jackson notes that divergence in application of a rule or 
principle is an acceptable and natural part of professional judgement: for example, there are a variety of ways 
in which a nurse can maintain and improve her professional knowledge and competence (clause 3 of the 
UKCC code) or safeguard the interests and well-being of patients and clients (clause 1 of the UKCC code). 
What is intolerable is divergence in practice: for example, that some nurses simply disregard certain principles 
of the code of conduct, or see them as having no relevance to nursing practice. Interestingly, if such a 
divergence were to happen the best explanation of its occurence would have to refer to the idea that different 
conceptions of the goods of nursing was at stake. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPARTIALITY: THE SELF, AND PROFESSIONAL ROLES 
"To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else than to exhibit morality stripped of all admixture of 
sensuous things and of every spurious adornment of reward or self-love. " 
(Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals) 
"Putting your thumb on the scales on your own behalf, or on the behalf of those of whom you are fond, is not a 
particularly pretty picture, morally. " 
(Robert E Goodin, Utility and the Good) 
"In abstracting from my values, my everyday aims and preferences, from all that constitutes my contingent 
condition, I abstract also from the circumstances of my act - and, in particular, from the desires and interests 
which initially raised for me the question of action. " 
(Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire) 
Introduction 
The principle of impartiality is another crucial strand in the attempt of Moral Theorists to 
resolve the Basic Question for ethical theory I identified in chapter 2 (namely, to show how 
a stretch of practical moral reasoning can incorporate the fact that it needs to reflect 
reasoning that is specifically mine in order to motivate me, yet at the same time reflect 
standards that transcend my own specific concerns). What Moral Theorists typically 
attempt to do is show two things: first, that each of us individually has a reason to be 
impartial, and secondly, that each of us individually can in fact reason practically from an 
impartialistic perspective'. If this can be done, of course, room is made for reasons that 
satisfy both the need to reflect my specific concerns and also reflect transcendent or external 
standards. In this chapter I shall be concerned almost exclusively with the second of the 
issues raised above, and with the corresponding question of whether it is actually possible, 
or plausible to claim, that practical moral agency can be conducted from an impartialistic 
perspective. The reason for this is simple but very important. Moral theorists have 
standardly started with the first of the issues, with the question of whether we have a reason 
to be impartial, and typically rest the very possibility of moral conduct on a positive answer 
to this. The motivation for this is easy to see: I have already noted above (chapter 3) that a 
necessary feature of the moral point of view is that it involves third-personal considerations 
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that transcend the merely personal desires of an individual, and this immediately seems to 
provide an overwhelming prima facie case for adopting the principle of impartiality as this 
appears to offer the only thorough-going realisation of the third-personal perspective, the 
apparent alternative seeming to be a rejection of the very possibility of genuine moral 
reasoning2. The argument runs roughly as follows: each one of us lives out a unique life in 
which one's individual self-identity is significantly constituted by personal attachments and 
the way in which one responds to the particularities of the historical, social, and 
environmental contexts within which one acts (I shall hereafter refer to this conception of 
the self as the "narrative self"). A fundamental requirement of morality, however, demands 
that our principles and values apply to everyone irrespective of the individual differences 
between them. Thus, our moral values and principles must transcend the particularities of 
each of our individual lives and reflect demands that apply universally. It seems to follow, 
then, that the moral self or agent must reason from a perspective that significantly differs 
from the perspective of the narrative self where her concern is to express herself in and 
through all the various particularistic relationships in which she is involved. Thus, moral 
agency is identified with the perspective of impartiality. The moral agent through adopting 
the perspective of impartiality "unencumberst4 herself of the distorting effects of her 
attachments to particular persons and projects and reasons morally from a position that in 
some important sense is a position we all can or should adopt. 
It is deceptively easy, then, for Moral Theorists to convince us that the principle of 
impartiality is a necessary presupposition of the moral point of view (in effect identifying 
impartiality with the necessary third-personal element of morality). And if we accept this, a 
consequent task for ethical theory and applied moral philosophy inevitably becomes a 
search for a practical representation of the principle of impartiality in human agency, 
However, I shall argue that this general argument - moving from the (putative) reason(s) we 
have to be impartial to how impartiality can be instantiated in actual practical reasoning - 
has (mis)led to much fruitless philosophy. I shall argue that if we begin with the second 
question it becomes very apparent that the idea that moral agency can be conducted from an 
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impartialistic perspective is extremely implausible. I shall then argue further that adopting 
the principle of impartiality is actually unnecessary in providing an adequate account and 
validation of the third-personal component of the moral point of view. This in turn will 
show that the idea that the principle of impartiality is central to morality is fundamentally 
mistaken. 
..................................................................... 
(i) The Impartial Agent and the Narrative Self 
The question that immediately arises, then, concerns how according to The Moral Theory 
Approach one is supposed to incorporate the principle of impartiality into the actual process 
of practical moral reasoning. In short, the general answer is that one applies the principle by 
adopting the perspective of an impartial observer S, and from the observations made from 
this perspective one determines and justifies individual maxims of action. What this 
requires, in whatever form, is that the individual abstracts from the contingent features that 
constitute her self-identity, for example, her personal attachments to other particular 
individuals such as her family and friends, and to particular projects such as her career or 
ambitions, and considers what her duties are from the position of a detached and universal 
moral agent. 
It should be clear, then, that under The Moral Theory Approach any notion of the narrative 
self (incorporating all those sorts of personal attachments just referred to) is excluded from 
the development of final moral values and principles. This is not to deny, of course, that it 
is in the life of the narrative self that the possibilities for moral or immoral action are 
generated and sustained; rather the point is that the moral assessment and validation of those 
possibilities is conducted from a position outside of the particular involvement of the 
narrative self b. This has two very important implications for the structure of moral 
reasoning. First, the impartiality of the moral agent also implies the impersonality of the 
moral agent: for example, in viewing her own relationships from the moral perspective an 
agent must detach herself from the commitment she might have towards those relationships 
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as a narrative self and assess them from a position of neutrality'. Secondly, the impartiality 
of the moral agent supports a distinction between a private realm of an individual's life 
where she is free to pursue her own self-interests and a public realm in which the way in 
which one's activities affect the lives of others automatically invokes moral obligations. 
One might schematise the distinctions as follows: 
(figure 4) 




The split between the moral agent and narrative self (the partial and impartial, personal and 
impersonal, private and public) that is required for the practical implementation of the 
principle of impartiality, however, raises a very pressing question concerning how these two 
perspectives are supposed to relate to each other or be reconciled in the life of an individual. 
The principle is, of course, supposed to provide a solution to the Basic Question, However, 
once it is realised that the practical implementation of the principle requires the adoption of 
the perspective of an impartial observer who has to stand outside of her own actions and 
view them entirely neutrally, it is hard to see how the principle can provide anything other 
than a hindrance to a solution. In short: "How are the actions of a single individual 
supposed to incorporate the fact that she is both pursuing the life of a person in which she 
reasons practically from the position of a socially situated narrative self and pursuing the 
life of a moral agent in which her practical reasoning proceeds from the perspective of an 
impartial observer? ". Michael Stocker has strikingly described this picture of the moral 
agent as involving a "schizophrenic" conception of the individual,. Ile argues, that to 
identify the moral perspective with that of the impartial observer is to remove the source of 
moral motivation too far from the motivation of what I have called the narrative self. 
Morality is supposed to provide reasons for acting one way rather than another, yet the 
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moral agent construed as an impartial agent appears to have no reason to act all°. The 
problem this causes is, of course, a notorious one, for the moral obligations generated from 
the impartial universal perspective frequently come into conflict with the interests of the 
situated (partial, personal, and private) narrative self which give an individual life its 
meaning and worth. Thus on the one hand we find ourselves obligated by the prima facie 
"overridingness" of moral requirements10 and on the other hand the impossibility of living a 
worthwhile or meaningful individual life without ignoring very many of those same moral 
requirements. Moral sainthood (to coin Susan Wolfs phrase") is bought at the cost of 
living a life in which an identifiable, personal self is ignored or denied. This has driven 
many authors, such as Williams, Wolf, and Stocker et at, to conclude that we should 
frequently reject the moral (so construed) in pursuit of certain important self interests that 
lend a life its meaning or purpose12. However, this conclusion is deeply disturbing for 
theorists supporting The Moral Theory Approach (and indeed also for many not of that 
persuasion); the very idea that moral obligations can, or indeed should, be relegated beneath 
the claims of non-moral self interests presents a damning blow if not an outright refutation 
of Moral Theory (how could the universal be outweighed by the particular? )". 
Naturally many Moral Theorists have attempted to develop solutions to this situation by 
showing how the pursuit of self-interests can be reconciled with the dominant claims of 
morality. Samuel Scheffler, for example, argues that (impartial) consequentialist thinking 
represents the common ground between us (the moral given in our common experience is 
that the consequences of an act or proposed course of action will always count morally) but 
that there are other non-consequentialist reasons that we might resort to in deciding what to 
do in certain situations14. He claims that there are concerns that are naturally grounded in 
the independence of the personal point of view and which stand outside of the calculation of 
best state of affairs that is appropriate to impersonal consequentialist morality. The position 
we deliberate from is what Scheffler calls a "distributive hybrid" which requires the 
individual to maximise the greatest overall consequences except in cases where there is an 
option to do otherwise (where this option will in some sense be justified from the personal 
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perspective)". Scheffler also notes in the same work that instead of adopting the hybrid 
strategy it is possible for consequentialists to incorporate the personal perspective within the 
moral by accepting that it is ultimately for the overall good (the greatest amount of 
happiness) that individuals are permitted on occasions to pursue their personal interests16. 
However, rather than comment upon these and other attempts at solving the problem of 
reconciling the personal and impersonal (which I think all fail and which I shall mention as 
appropriate in passing) I wish to attack directly the principle of impartiality which generates 
the difficulties in the first place. Rather than separate the concept of the self and moral 
agency as The Moral Theory Approach demands I will argue instead that we need to see the 
two notions as inseparable in any adequate account of ethical life. Accordingly, I will 
support Charles Taylor's claim that: "Selfhood and the good, or ... selfhood and morality, turn out to be 
inextricably intertwined themes. " (C Taylor, 1989, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 3) 
My strategy will be to show that the distinction between the moral agent and the narrative 
self is untenable. I shall seek to do this by showing the account of practical reasoning 
implied by this distinction which divides reasons up into those which are impartial (and 
therefore purely moral) and those which are partial (and therefore purely personal) is 
seriously flawed. I shall identify a third category of reasons that is neither purely impartial 
or purely partial. These will be reasons that contain an inextricable mix of both impartial 
and partial considerations, properly construed. I shall then establish that this category of 
reasons does indeed provide genuine moral reasons for action. Finally I shall argue that 
these reasons provide an essential part of an accurate account of practical moral agency. 
The superiority of this alternative account to The Moral Theory Approach will be 
demonstrated by its ability to identify and invoke reasons that present a genuine resolution 
of the Basic Question which is simply unavailable to Moral Theorists". The reasons I shall 
discuss in this respect are those that are put forward by individuals in the capacity of 
occupying a professional role. I shall examine some extracts taken from the interviews with 
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nurses and show that the only plausible interpretation of them demonstrates that the reasons 
they articulate in thinking and acting as they do stem fundamentally from a personal 
identification they have with their professional role. 
(ii) Acting in a Professional Role 
The concept of a role and in particular the concept of a professional role presents, I shall 
argue, a clear case in which ethical reasoning proceeds from a perspective that is in crucial 
respects neither impartial or partial. If this claim can be upheld it will indeed deal an 
extremely severe blow to the principle of impartiality (and The Moral Theory Approach) 
because it is frequently argued that it is in acting in some public office or professional role 
that we can see the claim of the principle at its strongest. Thomas Nagel, for example, in his 
article "Ruthlessness in Public Life" (1979) argues that in filling a public role the 
individual filling it is "depersonalised" (p. 77) or "morally encapsulated" (p. 75) by the role in 
a way which isolates her in many important respects from her personal or private life. As 
functionaries carrying out a public service they instantiate a basic principle that: 
"Public policies and actions have to be much more impartial than private ones ... since there is no reason in 
their case to leave room for the personal attachments and inclinations that shape individual lives. " 
(T Nagel, 1979, Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 84. (my italics)) 
The main concern of Nagel's article is to consider how a public role can isolate the 
individual filling it from taking blame for actions performed in that capacity that would 
otherwise be blameworthy if she did it in purely a personal capacity. And the thrust of his 
argument is that the impartiality of the role bearer, the fact that she seeks to realise the goals 
prescribed of her office and not serve her personal interests (combined with a genuine 
justification of those public goals) justifies her in doing what in a purely personal capacity 
would be morally unacceptable. Nagel, then, supports the commonly held view that public 
roles more clearly than anything else demonstrate the moral importance of the principle of 
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impartiality. In particular he stresses the connection between the requirement of impartiality 
and impersonality of a public role (ibid, p. 89). 
Now there is a natural sense in which public or professional roles are impersonal in that the 
practical and moral obligations that define the role (in effect, the corresponding job 
description) apply to anyone that fills that role 1e. For example, if an individual is 
contemplating becoming a nurse it is possible to find out in advance what minimum 
obligations would apply in her particular case by discovering what minimum obligations 
apply generally to such a role (by consulting the UKCC code of conduct, job descriptions, 
etc. ). Indeed such is the case for virtually all occupational roles. However, this notion of 
the impersonality of roles is apt to mislead for it represents nothing like the sort of 
impersonality which requires application of the principle of impartiality when one comes to 
actually fill certain roles. In focusing exclusively or primarily upon the explicitly stated 
obligations and duties of a role there is a tendency to see these duties and obligations as 
exhausting both the definition of the role concerned and the moral responsibilities and 
values it entails. If this were indeed the case then it is easy to see why one might consider 
the moral values and responsibilities of a role as being generated from an 
impersonal/impartial perspective, because, as I have just noted, the role itself is initially 
defined in impersonal terms. However, what seems clear, both theoretically and from the 
empirical evidence gathered in this thesis (and elsewhere), is that at least for certain 
important roles when they come to be filled by an individual who relates to it in a non- 
instrumental fashion, the occupant of the role extends an understanding of its requirements 
far beyond the obligations and duties that are determined from a purely impersonal/impartial 
perspective. I shall go on to argue shortly that this extension cannot be accounted for by 
further impersonal considerations but requires that the role is in an important sense 
absorbed into the motivational set of the narrative seif of the agent filling the role. The idea 
that there is in certain cases an absorption of the role into the motivational set of the 
narrative self, will provide an important part of the answer to the Basic Question, for as I 
shall attempt to show, in absorbing the role into my motivational set I recognise reasons to 
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act that in stemming from a role represent considerations that transcend my purely 
personal interests but because they have been thus absorbed also represent reasons for 
action that are genuinely reasons for me. It is in this sense that I shall claim they represent 
reasons that are neither impersonal nor personal. However, in order to elucidate what I 
mean by this notion, and, to establish the credibility of my claim I first need to make an 
important distinction between two different sorts of roles, or perhaps more precisely two 
different ways in which a role can be filled. 
(ii. a) Instrumental and Identity-Conferring Roles 
Nagel, I believe, like many others, fails to take account of a crucial distinction between roles 
understood purely or primarily as a set of duties or obligations, and roles understood as 
vocations or as identity-conferring 19 20. The first type of roles I shall label instrumental 
roles. Instrumental roles are filled purely or primarily according to the set of obligations 
that delineate them; the occupant sees herself primarily as an instrument in realising the 
ends laid out by the role; thus crucially they do not in any significant sense contribute to the 
self-identity of the person filling the role. They are typically carried out in a way in which 
one's commitment to them is exhausted by performing the explicitly stated duties or tasks 
they lay upon one. For example, a dry-cleaner might find her commitment to her role 
exhausted in the fulfilment of the duties or tasks laid out in the job description of the role. 
She need not relate to it in any other way than in a purely instrumental fashion- as a set of 
tasks undertaken to realise a good (for example, money) external to the intrinsic nature of 
the tasks concerned. So considered she will not see that role as conferring any sense of 
identity upon her, and the duties and tasks concerned are not absorbed into the motivational 
set of her narrative self. By that I mean she is not motivated by the intrinsic nature of the 
tasks themselves but purely or primarily by the external good or goods she is able to realise 
in performing them. She does what she does for reasons that speak to her indirectly through 
the obligations she has taken on by accepting employment as a dry-cleaner. 
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The second type of roles, roles considered as vocations, are, however, significantly identity- 
conferring. Identity-conferring roles, as the name suggests, represent important constituent 
elements of the narrative self. They represent those roles to which individuals attach 
themselves in (partly) defining who they are. Thus a nurse who relates to her role as a 
vocation sees herself not merely as an instrument in realising the goals of certain pre. 
specified tasks but in an important sense also realises herself in and through performing the 
tasks which she is required to carry out. Understood as a vocation in this sense it is the 
intrinsic nature of the tasks of nursing themselves which provide the nurse with motivation 
to secure their ends independently of the presence of an external good. By this I do not 
mean that the realising of certain goods external to the intrinsic nature of the tasks of 
nursing are unnecessary, such as, for example, receiving a salary for the work completed, 
but rather, that there is a clear sense in which the realisation of this or another external good 
is bracketed off as a consideration in motivating the carrying out of particular tasks. She 
does what she does for reasons that speak to her directly as the nurse that she is. The goals 
of nursing are her goals, not merely the impersonal goals of an organisation that she is an 
instrument in realising. The nurse who sees her role as identity-conferring does not inhabit 
the role as she might inhabit a building- in a crucial sense she is (in significant part) the role. 
Thus, whereas she might leave a building unchanged she could not quit this particular role 
without some change in her self-identity. However, the dry-cleaner (nurse, etc. ) who 
perceives her role instrumentally could abandon her role with no real change in her self- 
identity. 
What I hope should be clear from this brief discussion is that the idea that roles are strictly 
impersonal only attaches to the instrumental model. The fact that an identity-conferring 
role is absorbed into the motivational set of the narrative self of an agent demonstrates that 
this sort of role is in very significant respects not impersonal. Now the respects in which the 
non-impersonality of an identity-conferring role is significant relate to the idea I mentioned 
above that an individual absorbing such a role will extend her understanding of its 
requirements beyond its explicitly stated, hence impersonal, job description. Shortly I shall 
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give some examples of this and in so doing attempt to show how an identity-conferring role 
while not being impersonal is also not to be described in purely personal terms either. 
I should perhaps note at this point that none of what has been said so far makes any claim 
about just what sort of occupational roles do or do not allow for the possibility of identity- 
conferring role absorption. I do not rule out, for example, the possibility that dry-cleaning 
may indeed provide the resources which would enable an individual, at least to some extent, 
to absorb the role into the motivational set of the narrative self. However, neither do I rule 
out the possibility that the empirical conditions of some occupational roles will indeed 
exclude such a possibility. My concern here is not to resolve that particular question but 
rather simply to note at this stage that the professions like nursing certainly do enable 
occupational roles to be undertaken as identity-conferring roles and that this is a quite 
distinct form of a role from an instrumental role. 
But do individuals fill occupational roles in an identity-conferring fashion? The empirical 
evidence (gathered for this thesis) that they do is overwhelming. Of all the nurses 
interviewed for this thesis only four participants could be described as taking a 
thoroughgoing, explicitly instrumental role view of their occupation (I shall discuss these 
cases below), the rest quite clearly (although to different degrees) saw their professional role 
as identity-conferring or vocational. In the majority of cases their responses show that in 
making professional decisions (practical and moral) they did not consider the situation from 
two different perspectives, the private self and the professional role, nor indeed, and this 
point is crucial, did they consider the situation simply from the perspective of the 
professional role as if it was detached from their "private" self. Rather, they make decisions 
from the perspective of the individual who is that particular nurse. In essence their sense of 
their professional role and their sense of their narrative self unite inextricably in one causal 
order 21. And this, in effect, is what I mean by role absorption. The dialogue that follows 
below is quoted from one of the interviews with a nurse and I think captures this point very 
well. The nurse concerned is a ward sister (manager) on a specialist renal ward, 48 years of 
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age, who was undertaking a nursing degree in which she had undertaken a module (taught 
by the author) in the philosophy of health in which an ethics component was studied 
Example 1 
Female, age 48, Ward Sister (Manager) (renal unit) 
[question] Do you think that the ethical theories of Immanuel Kant and utilitarianism are 
any use in making moral decisions at work? 
[answer] Well, I think they're very interesting to study and I enjoyed the discussions of our 
group in class, but in the real world they don't work do they? For one thing you just don't 
have the time to sit back and think what these philosophers would say, its just not like that. 
[question] Is it just a problem of time; I mean do you think that if you had the time to think 
the issues through one of these theories could prove to be useful in providing answers to 
particular moral problems? 
[answer] No, not really, well it's not just that anyway. When you gave us those examples in 
class, in our group we all sort of agreed on the answers but it wasn't because we had thought 
that Kant or Mill or whoever would have said so. We're just nurses and I think we just 
thought like nurses with a lot of experience of nursing patients. I can't see how you could 
stop being who you are .... I can't see how you can do it any other way, I am a nurse so I 
think like one. If I was to try to think differently I couldn't really do my job properly. 
[question] I'm interested that you say you don't think you could do your job properly if you 
tried to think differently, do you think you can explain that a bit more to me? 
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[answer] Well, it's not that we shouldn't listen to other ideas and that, it's that I can't see 
how I could stop thinking like a nurse. If I did then I wouldn't be treating my patients 
properly. 
[question] why would that be? 
[answer] It's hard to say really, but it's just like that you just act straight away because you 
are a nurse. ... 
My job is about caring for my patients; when you put your arm around 
someone who is upset you do it because you are a nurse. You don't stop and think would 
Kant accept this ... or Mill, you 
just see a patient who needs help and you help them as best 
as you can. 
I think it is quite clear throughout this extract that the nurse concerned is reasoning from a 
position in which her professional role is understood according to the identity-conferring 
vocational model. The idea that her comments might fit an instrumental role model just 
simply fails to observe the facts. Her role has indeed been absorbed to a very high degree 
into the motivational set of her narrative self. She thinks as a nurse in the way she does 
because she is a nurse; being a nurse just is a significant part of being her and the two 
aspects unite in a single causal order. Just how strong this identification is, is particularly 
apparent in the way in which she finds it unintelligible how it could be possible to separate a 
process of moral thinking from her understanding of herself as a nurse. The very attempt to 
do so leaves her at a loss. And this sentiment I found to be expressed consistently in the 
interviews with nurses generally, including those like the nurse above who were familiar 
with the ethical theories of Kantianism and utilitarianism and who were asked the same 
question. Not one felt that she could identify her own moral perspective with either of these 
approaches nor indeed felt that they ought to, and the prime reason that they cited for this is 
that it involved a detachment from the sense of herself as a nurse. Actions and behaviour 
that they felt to be of particular ethical significance in their working lives seem to lose that 
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significance if the impartialist, impersonal perspective is adopted. The most cited issue in 
that respect concerned the notion of caring for the patient. 
(iii) Caring in a Nursing Role 
The idea that caring is a central feature, indeed the fundamental feature upon which all of 
nursing is ultimately based, is, widely accepted. Patricia Benner, for example, notes that, 
"Caring practices are central to nursing. What it is to be a nurse cannot be separated from 
what it is to care about others" (1994, p. 141). Certainly this view has been confirmed by the 
research carried out for this thesis; it is articulated both by the profession itself in its code 
of conduct and by the professionals themselves in the interviews and questionnaires. That 
the nurses interviewed focus upon care and caring in expressing a rejection of the 
impartialistic perspective (both implicitly and explicitly), however, is a striking affirmation 
of the work of a growing number of authors (philosophers and nurses) who have likewise 
focused upon the notion of care in rejecting the impartialistic (and universalistic) 
perspective of Moral Theory". Accordingly I will focus upon (the issue of) caring in the 
next few pages as it presents an opportunity to clarify what my main objection to the 
principle of impartiality is. I shall seek to show that, first, caring is (indeed) understood by 
the professionals themselves as a central moral concept in nursing practice, and secondly, 
that it represents a very good example of the sort of moral concept that is neither impersonal 
nor purely personal that I need in order to reject and replace the principle of impartiality. 
It is undoubtedly no coincidence that most of the authors who reject the principle of 
impartiality from a care based perspective are women who approach the issue of care from a 
feminist viewpoint and that most nursing roles are, of course, filled by women. This 
strongly suggests that their understanding of caring as such cannot be detached from an 
understanding of themselves (in certain important respects) as a woman. Nell Noddings, for 
example, makes the following point: 
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"Women, in particular, seem to approach moral problems by placing themselves as nearly as possible in 
concrete situations and assuming personal responsibility for the choices to be made. They define themselves in 
terms of caring and work their way through moral problems from positions of one-caring ... the process of 
moral decision making that is founded on caring requires a process of concretisation rather than one of 
abstraction. " 
(N Noddings, 1984, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley, University 
of California Press. p. 8) 
The crucial point about caring is not that it is somehow essentially tied up with the very fact 
of being female but rather that its recognition and importance rests upon the fact that 
women typically experience morality in concrete relations to others rather than in terms of 
abstract rationalistic principles23. These facts are sociological rather than biological, and, as 
Noddings herself notes, there is no reason why men cannot come to share an understanding 
of the importance of care and caring in moral life. Indeed, in the empirical research carried 
out for this thesis in which I1 male nurses were interviewed there were no significant 
differences between them and female nurses with respect either to the importance attributed 
to care in nursing and in the expression of the qualities they felt caring entailed in practice. 
Accordingly, I shall focus my attention upon what is involved in filling the role of a nurse in 
bearing out Noddings' claim just quoted that "... the process of moral decision making that is 
founded on caring requires a process of concretisation rather than one of abstraction, ". 1 
shall argue that the process of concretisation required for caring in the nursing role is 
fundamentally a matter of absorbing the role into the motivational set of the narrative self. 
In other words, that caring as a nurse is crucially linked to regarding the role as an identity- 
conferring vocational role. It is, indeed, precisely in these terms that I would seek to explain 
the similarity of attitudes and behaviour between male and female nurses. 
(iii. a) Task Oriented Caring and Patient Oriented Caring 
Let me turn, then, to the specific case of caring as a nurse. Now as that role is laid out in the 
UKCC Code of Professional Conduct (1992) the requirement o care is expressed in many 
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formulations that set out certain conditions of caring, for example section 7 of the code 
demands that each nurse must, "... recognise and respect the uniqueness and dignity of each 
patient and client, and respond to their need for care, irrespective of their ethnic origin, 
religious beliefs, personal attributes, the nature of their health problem or any other factor. ". 
So stated, of course, these formal requirements represent an impersonal demand upon 
anybody filling the role of a nurse. However, all the evidence suggests that typically once 
the role is actually filled by someone becoming a nurse the substantive content that is given 
to the notion of caring in the actual practice of caring presents an extension of that concept 
in ways that cannot be reduced to those impersonal requirements nor accounted for by 
further impersonal considerations. To make my point it will be useful to distinguish 
between two possible notions of caring, one I shall label "task oriented caring", the other 
"patient oriented caring". 
Under the task oriented approach caring is in essence fulfilled by carrying out the formally 
specified duties of the nurse: for example, administering drugs, changing dressings, bathing 
patients, checking monitors, etc.. What it is to care for the patients is thus a matter of 
performing with efficiency those formally specified tasks that are required to restore them to 
health. This conception of caring is one promoted, for example, by JM Morse, J Bottorff, 
W Neander, and S Solberg, in an article "Comparative analysis of conceptualisations and 
theories of caring" (Image, 23,1991, pp. 119-26), indeed, they argue that such an approach 
to caring is essential to nursing: 
If the relevance of caring to practice and to the patient cannot be clearly explicated, or if it is claimed that 
caring cannot be reduced to behavioural tasks, and if caring is the essence of nursing, then nursing no longer 
will be a practice discipline. "24 
This notion of caring fits in very well with the impersonal instrumental model of a role: 
caring is indeed exhausted by performing the discrete tasks specified as belonging to the 
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role of the nurse. However, as Patricia Benner points out, it represents a conception of 
caring generated from the peculiar perspective of a certain sort of social scientist: 
When caring is studied in traditional social scientific ways, it is decontextualised, operationalised and turned 
into delimited behaviours or factors with the implied technical promise that performing these discrete caring 
behaviours will be perceived by a second private individual as caring and result in specifiable physiological, 
psychological and social outcomes. "25 
(P Benner, "The role of articulation in understanding practice and experience as sources of knowledge 
in clinical nursing" in J Tully (ed), 1994, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The philosophy of Charles 
Taylor in question, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 
Benner, who has conducted a considerable amount of empirical research into nursing care, 
argues that the task oriented approach to care is philosophically misconceived and 
empirically insupportable26. The research I have undertaken for this thesis strongly supports 
this claim. What is missing from the task oriented model of care is the sense in which 
caring involves two individuals in a particular concrete and contextualized relation to each 
other. It abstracts the concept of a patient and caring too far from the fact that each patient 
to be cared for is a unique person and that each nurse has interest in the particular care she 
provides for each patient. 
To make my point it will be useful, here, to apply and adapt some terminology introduced 
by Seyla Benhabib in her book "Situating the Self' (1992, Oxford, Polity Press). Acnhabib 
identifies two ways in which one can recognize and respond to another individual as a moral 
agent: as a "generalized" other and as a "concrete" other. In treating the other as a 
"generalized" other one treats her as "... a moral person endowed with the same moral rights 
as ourselves. " (ibid, p. 10). The generalized other is the other considered at the most abstract 
level in which individual differences are ignored and what is common to all is recognised as 
the appropriate source of moral action. The generalized other, then, is the other considered 
as an equal among the universal community in which each is treated identically. In treating 
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the other as a "concrete" other, however, one treats her as a "... unique individual, with a 
certain life history, disposition and endowment, as well as needs and limitations. " (ibid, 
p. 10). Here, the primary concern is to recognize the other as a particular individual with a 
particular identity; and the source of moral action lies in responses sensitive to the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular individual. 
Now, adapting this distinction to the phenomenon of caring it should be apparent that the 
task oriented model of caring treats the patient solely as a generalized other. The tasks and 
duties that constitute caring on this model are all defined in abstraction from the 
particularities of the individual patients in receipt of care. The only relevance that the 
particularity of the patient has for the care process is the fact that it is necessary that some 
particular patient contingently instantiates generalized symptoms which require 
generalized nursing interventions. 
Patient oriented caring is quite different: according to this model it is the patient identified 
as a whole individual that is the person cared for: i. e. the patient considered as a generalized 
and concrete other. Now, adapting Benhabib's distinction again, it follows that in caring for 
the patient as a concrete individual it is the patient as a particular individual that is the 
focus of care. Care particularity (as Lawrence Blum calls its'), identifies as a necessary 
feature of any actual and genuine care relation that the individual cared for cannot be 
reduced solely to a generalised or objectified receiver of care. The cared for is always a 
particular individual with a particular personality and history, and genuine care for her must 
always involve some response to her as that particular individual with that particular 
personality and history. Thus, on this model of caring the care for each individual patient 
must extend beyond a general and explicitly stated set of behavioural tasks to one which 
incorporates an individualised or particularised expression of care in the concrete relation of 
care giver to care receiver. The nurse cited above in example 1 made precisely this point; 
she claimed that while each patient on "her" renal ward could expect to receive the "same 
treatment", each patient needed to be "cared for differently" because each patient "responds 
144 
differently" to their condition and has "different care needs" in this respect28. Some further 
extracts drawn from interviews undertaken for the empirical research should bring out the 
significance and differences between the patient oriented and the task oriented models of 
care. In what follows examples 2-4 represent, I shall argue, cases in which a patient 
oriented model of care has been adopted; example 5 represents a case in which the task 
oriented approach to care has been adopted. 
Example 2 
Female, age 54, Matron (in a private nursing home) 
[question] Can you tell me what you believe caring for a patient actually involves? 
[answer] It involves a whole lot of things, and it depends very much on who the patient is 
and what he wants or needs. Some patients just want to be left alone and that's fair enough, 
but usually they want someone [the nurse] to show that they care for them as an individual. 
It's not just about wiping bottoms and giving them tablets, you need to show them that they 
matter, that they're still important. In my area of work people [patients] often feel like 
they've been abandoned, ... that they 
have become a nuisance, that they're just hanging 
around for no good reason waiting to die, so I think it's very important to get to know my 
patients as persons and give them something to live for. 
[question] How do you do that? 
[answer] ... I try to sit with them as much as possible and chat to them about their lives. I 
always ask them about what they did when they were younger, what job they had, where 
they lived, and things like that, and about their families and get them to show me 
photographs and momentos. If I show an interest in them they start to show an interest in 
themselves. 
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[question] Does that help? 
[answer] Yes, it makes a big difference for them to know that someone cares about them, 
about who they are. You can see a change in them when you get to know them as a person 
and they can see that you care. ... When they 
first come in they're usually very upset and 
ready to give up hope, if you care for them properly and get to know them like I have just 
said, you can really help them come to terms with their change in circumstances. 
Example 3 
Male, age 29, Macmillan Nurse 
[question] Can you tell me what you believe caring for a patient actually involves? 
[answer] For me caring for your patient means understanding what support he or she needs 
in coping with their illness. Each patient is an individual and each one will cope with their 
illness in different ways. ... You need to 
know what sort of person they are to know how 
best to care for them. 
[question] Can you give me any examples to explain what you mean? 
[answer] In my job I visit patients in their home and frequently I have to give them bad 
news 29. Usually I'll have visited the patient many times so will have got to know them quite 
well, so I will know pretty well what sort of person they are and how they have coped with 
the effects of their illness. So when I have to tell them some bad news I do it in a way that I 
believe is best for them to cope with. ... [For example], some patients don't like any fuss 
and just want you to tell them the truth and leave them alone to get on with it, others need 
you to sit with them and give them a hug or hold their hand while they have a good cry. 
With some patients you need to think very carefully about how to tell them the truth because 
you know that they might misunderstand the consequences of what you have to tell them; 
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for example, some think that if you tell them their cancer is inoperable they're going to die 
within days when the prognosis is that they might last a year or more. You always have to 
think very carefully what they are capable of understanding and how best to help them 
understand. ... Also some patients want you to tell their relatives 
because they can't face 
telling them themselves, others don't want the relatives told at all. Each person is different 
and each person has to be cared for differently according to their needs. 
[question] When you get to "know" a patient in this way how involved with them do you 
get? By that I mean do you get to know them in a way in which you detach your own 
personal feelings from the situation and observe what they require in a sort of scientific 
fashion, or do you get to know them in a way which is more like how you relate to your 
friends? 
[answer] I don't think either of those is right really. I am a nurse and they're the patient and 
it would be inappropriate to treat them as if they were just one of your friends; that could 
cause no end of problems and would be unprofessional. However, you can't just detach 
yourself from them either. I think if I was too detached I wouldn't be able to relate to my 
patients, I would seem too cold and they wouldn't want to share with me their own feelings 
about their illness and treatment, so I wouldn't really get to know them properly, I mean, 
would you tell a complete stranger your innermost secrets? ... It's somewhere in-between 
really: you need to keep a certain distance to be able to carry out your job, if you got too 
emotionally involved you'd have a breakdown, but if you don't get involved at all then there 
wouldn't be any point in being a nurse. 
[question] Why wouldn't there be any point in being a nurse? 
[answer] Well, the whole point of nursing is to care and if you can't care or don't like caring 
why be a nurse? 
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[question] So you would say that caring must include some sense of being personally 
involved with the patient then? 
[answer] Yes, in the way I just said. 
Example 4 
Female, age 43, Staff Nurse (working in a hospice) 
[question] You said that good caring was the most fundamentally important aspect of your 
work as a nurse in a hospice, can you tell me a bit more about why it is so important and 
what you think good caring involves? 
[answer] Any patient who ends up in a hospice is, as you know, terminally ill. What we 
can do for them is care for them in a way which makes the last stages of their life as 
comfortable, dignified, and meaningful as possible. Most of their problems are not to do 
with pain, we can control that with drugs ... mostly their problems are how to conic to terms 
with the fact they are going to die. How I care for them can make a huge difference in how 
they cope with their last moments. ... Providing quality care 
is essential. I would say that 
the most important aspect of the care I give is to be there as someone they can trust and 
confide in. They need to be able to tell me how they feel: how scared they are, how lonely 
they are, how they feel a burden on their family, how angry they are,... If they can open up 
about all these things they always manage to cope with their illness much better than if they 
bottle things up. 
[question] How do you gain their trust? 
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[answer] At first patients are usually very wary and unsettled so you need to be careful not 
to move too quickly in trying to gain their trust. I usually chat with them briefly, show them 
around the hospice, introduce them to other patients and so on. If you move too quickly it 
looks like you're intruding on their personal space. As they gradually settle in they become 
more familiar with the hospice and with me and you start to build up a closer relationship. 
You soon begin to get a picture of what sort of person they are, what they like, what they 
don't like, and you become able to respond to their needs. It's mainly a matter of being there 
for them when they need you, ... if you 
know them well enough you pick up on signs and 
behaviour which enables you to know that they need help. [for example] It might be 
something really simple: the other day I noticed that an elderly male patient had not gone to 
the t. v. room to watch his favourite programme so I knew something was up as he always 
watches it. Because I knew this about him I was able to talk to him and find out that he was 
really upset about something. I think he was able to trust me because he could see that I had 
noticed he needed help, and I only knew he needed help because I cared about him enough 
to notice little signs like that. 
Example 5 
Female, age 26, Staff Nurse (ENT ward) 
[question] What would you say is involved in caring for your patients? 
[answer] I think it's a matter of looking after them and making sure that you do your job 
properly. You make sure that they get the right drugs at the right time, get fed and watered, 
... are made comfortable, get their dressings changed ... and that sort of thing. 
[question] So, would you say that caring is about doing those duties that you're paid to do 
as a nurse? 
[answer] Yes. 
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[question] What do you think, then, about the idea that caring for patients should involve 
getting to know them at a more personal level? 
[answer] I disagree; I'm not paid to make friends with the patients, I'm there to do a job. 
My responsibilities to the patients are to look after them like I just said, I don't think I 
should have to get to "know" them personally. ... sometimes you get to like certain patients, 
but that's not part of the job, that's something else ... to be honest most of the time they 
[patients] can be a right pain in the neck and it's as much as you can do to hold back from 
having a go at them. 
[question] Would you say that you identify yourself as a nurse? 
[Answer] I'm not sure what you mean? 
[question] What I mean is; if you had to describe what sort of person you are to me or 
someone else how important is it to your sense of personal identity that you are a nurse? Or 
to put it another way, is nursing just a job to you or do you see it as a vocation? 
[Answer] Oh, definitely a job, I get sick of it when people treat me as if I'm a nurse 24 
hours a day, they think that because you're a nurse you must be a certain type of person, 
some angel..... Nursing is my work not my life, I do it to pay the bills. 
.............................................................................................. 
In all of the examples above each nurse has recognised that a duty to care is one of the 
requirements of occupying the role of a nurse. But what is equally evident is that the way in 
which the duty to care is realised in the actual professional practice of the nurses in 
examples 2,3 and 4 is radically different from the nurse in example 5. In 2,3 and 4 the 
caring involved extends far beyond the performance of formally specified tasks and duties 
150 
which in example 5 is considered to exhaust the responsibility to care. For each of these 
nurses (2,3, and 4) the caring in which they engage is fundamentally informed by the 
concrete relationship that exists between themselves and the particular patient in receipt of 
care. The patient is treated not merely as a "generalized" other but also as a "concrete" 
other. What is clear is that the nurses treat the health problems encountered by the 
particular patients not as discrete symptoms requiring discrete interventions but by placing 
those problems within the context of the unique life of the patient as a whole. It is only 
through this process of concretization that they become sensitive to, and able to respond to, 
the care needs of the patient. 
(iii. b) Caring as aNurse is Neither Personal or Impersonal 
The key aspects of the process of concretization revealed in many of the comments made in 
the interviews above (and in the other interviews and questionnaires) support the major 
claims set out at the beginning of this chapter. Most importantly the process shows how 
there can be reasons for action that are neither strictly personal nor strictly impersonal. If 
we take example 3 again (the Macmillan nurse) we can see that the nurse's understanding of 
the process of concretization is one which he describes in terms of a reciprocal response to 
each individual patient contextualized by the unique historical, psychological and 
sociological (etc. ) qualities and experiences of the individual. However, in responding 
reciprocally to the patient the nurse makes it explicitly clear that he does so through reasons 
and dispositions that constitute his understanding of the goods and requirements of his 
professional role. He does not respond to her as, say, a close friend would where it would 
be appropriate to relate to her simply as another like himself, thus his reasoning is not 
merely personal. But he also explicitly rejects the idea that he could respond appropriately 
to the patient if he were entirely detached in his relationship to her, thus he rejects the idea 
that his responses are strictly impersonal. Rather, he represents a perfect example of 
someone who has to a significant extent absorbed his professional role into the motivational 
set of his narrative self. His whole approach to caring, his understanding of what it involves 
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and the way he cares in practice is quite clearly that of a nurse, but crucially it is the caring 
of the nurse that he is. His relationship to his role as a nurse is vocational or identity- 
conferring, not instrumental, thus the dispositions from which he acts are both those which 
represent his own dispositions and dispositions which reflect a (third-personal) conception 
of what constitutes a good nurse. For example, his commitment to truth-telling, essential 
for the trust his patients must have in him as a nurse, is made concrete by his individual 
responsiveness to the particular needs of the patient cared for. Thus he recognises that the 
process of truth-telling is as important as the truth itself, that a hug at this time can be 
crucial in demonstrating genuine care for the individual whose life is affected by the truth he 
tells her. Truth-telling, for him, is not something he perceives as a duty generating from 
some formal principle which demands it, but is a key component in his care for the 
particular individual. Sara Fry captures his understanding and motivation nicely in the 
following quote: 
"Through truth-telling, the nurse assists the patient to assess the subjective as well as objective realities in 
illness and to make choices based on the unique meaning of the illness experience. Through touch, the nurse 
assists the patient in overcoming the objectness that often characterizes a patient's experience in the health care 
setting. To touch the patient is to affirm the patient as a person rather than an object and to communicate the 
value of caring as the basis for nursing actions, " 
(ST Fry "The Role of Caring in Nursing Ethics", in IiBequaert Ilolmes and LM Purdy (eds) Feminist 
Perspectives in Medical Ethics, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, p. 96)30 
It is worth stressing that the disposition to care for the patient that he manifests is quite 
distinct from the disposition to care that would be manifested by a friend. In each case the 
disposition to care personally motivates the individual to act; however, the content of the 
disposition to care is constituted differently- in the case of the nurse by considerations that 
transcend mere personal interest. Thus it is it quite clear, I would argue, that he reasons and 
responds through his identification of himself as a nurse in ways that cannot be described as 
merely personal nor impersonal. The same points hold for the other examples (1,2, and 4) 
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cited above. It is also exemplified in the following extract taken from one of the written 
reports sent in by a nurse in response to a nation-wide request advertised in nursing journals 




Female, (RGN) Occupational Health Nurse 
[This nurse wrote in describing herself as a committed "feminist and socialist" but 
nevertheless as someone who holds "moral objections to abortion", and someone who 
believes that "abortion is bad for female health, for physical, social and psychological 
reasons"] 
"I have held a number of posts as an occupational Health Nurse. One of these was in a 
luxury hotel in London, where there were many young women. On about 5 occasions, I was 
called upon to counsel women seeking abortion. This usually involved dealing with 
requests for information, about how to obtain an abortion. But I had a good rapport with my 
clients, and many of these women were seeking support in their decision, from me. 
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA 
I faced the dilemma of caring for these women and not wanting to inflict my views on them. 
At the same time I felt I was not being true to myself if I gave them abortion information 
without telling them how I really felt about it, and I felt that I would also be lying to them, if 
I neglected to tell them this. 
I further believed that abortion would probably cause them problems in various ways in the 
future, and they should be warned of the risks that are there, ... Only with all information 
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can women make personal ethical decisions and I believe that as a health professional I had 
a duty to do this to the best of my ability. 
But I did not want to hurt the women who had come to me for help and I did not feel I had 
any right to condemn them. I made many mistakes in dealing with these and other 
subsequent situations in other jobs. Eventually I made the decision to deal with any woman 
coming to see considering a termination in this way: I would give them as much 
information as I knew, including why I am against it. I also let them know that even if I 
may disapprove of their decision, I would still offer them support and could not condemn 
them. I felt this way I was being true to everyone. 
CONSEQUENCES 
Every women I ever dealt with thanked me for supporting her, even those who knew of my 
moral stance. I believe I managed to alienate nobody. ... Some women had their 
terminations. They still came back to see me for support... .1 truly believe that I behaved to 
the best of my ability as a nurse, and that I acted with the best interests of the women at 
heart at all times.... " [see appendices for full transcript] 
........................................................ 
Again one can see in this extract that the disposition to care personally motivates the 
individual to act. But perhaps even more obviously so in this case, that disposition to care 
cannot be given content in terms of purely personal interests. On the contrary her purely 
personal interests (i. e. her objection to abortion) would prescribe quite different responses to 
the ones she gives. However, she neither abandons these clients nor passes them on 
elsewhere (which is a professional option), but sees and feels that as a nurse she must 
support them. It is only because she identifies herself with her role as a nurse that she cares 
in the way that she does, and, indeed, is motivated to do so in the first place. 
.................................... 
154 
(iv) Moral Reasoning in an Identity-Conferring Role 
The picture of practical moral reasoning generated by the considerations raised in this 
chapter point conclusively to a very different conception from that founded on the principle 
of impartiality proposed by Moral Theorists. In exercising (moral) professional judgement, I 
would argue, it is clear from the examples 1,2,3, and 4 (and the overwhelming majority of 
others not here discussed) that the practical reasoning and response to patients of the nurses 
interviewed is not founded upon the application of impartial principles and rules generated 
through a process of personal detachment, but proceeds directly from dispositions to care 
that exist as a part of the motivational set of their narrative self. It is precisely this that 
enables them to care with the particularity required to respond to the needs of the specific 
patient. 
It should also be becoming clear now how this contextualist picture of the moral agent 
resolves the problem of moral agency raised by the Basic Question. What it shows is that 
the first-personal and third-personal components of the moral point of view are not two 
entirely separate perspectives but are inextricably united in the process of moral agency. 
Thus, moral reasons are neither strictly personal or strictly impersonal, neither purely partial 
or purely impartial. Moral agency is (shown to be) a process of acting from dispositions and 
for reasons that are my own through being made my own as a response to factors that arise 
"independently" of my own pre-reflective desires. However, these independent factors are 
only independent insofar as they represent reasons why I, being who I am (a nurse, a mother, 
a sister etc. ), should recognise them as such. It is the attempt to describe morality in purely 
impartialist and third-personal terms, separate from any consideration of a person's narrative 
self, that renders the Moral Theorist incapable of establishing a plausible connection to first- 
personal motivation. 
(iv. a) Objections 
Before I conclude this chapter I will deal briefly with some objections that might be raised 
against the account I have just given. 
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(iv. b) People Do Not Always Identify with a Role 
First, it might still be protested that the account of role absorption into the motivational set 
of an individual I have presented is implausible because it is clear that people neither 
identify solely nor completely with a particular role. This is of course true and nothing I 
have said would dispute this claim, nor need it. First, my account quite clearly makes room 
for the fact that people identify themselves with a whole variety of different roles, thus, for 
example, someone might identify herself as a nurse, a mother, an aunt, a wife, a mountain 
climber, a Moslem, etc., etc.. Indeed, many of the more traumatic and tragic ethical 
dilemmas professionals face occur precisely because they feel the motivation to act from 
conflicting roles that they have absorbed into their motivational see'. In fact the existence 
of these moral dilemmas only make sense if the sort of account I have provided in terms of 
role absorption is true". Secondly, my account accepts that role absorption is something 
that happens in degrees and is never something that can be regarded as completed. The 
picture of moral development and the pursuit of moral excellence that I have implicitly 
hinted at in this chapter, recognises that the concretization and dialogical activities 
(mentioned below) involved in role absorption are a continual process. The good 
professional is the professional who understands the importance of continued reflective 
practice, and that just is (in an important sense) to recognise that role absorption is never 
complete, that the content and exercise of one's professional dispositions is always subject 
to criticism and refinement. 
(iv. c) Caring is Not a Moral Concept 
A second objection might suggest that everything I have just said about caring is fine but 
that care and caring have nothing at all to do with morality and ethics, but belong solely to 
the realm of personal and private relationships . Hopefully the previous points I have made 
should already undermine such a claim, any way, this objection is clearly question begging. 
What it does, in effect, is simply define the sphere of morality as that which is identical with 
impartiality; however, precisely this identification is the question at issue. There appears to 
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be little more than theoretical prejudice lying behind the rejection of care as an ethical 
concept and value given the widespread common-sense view that it forms one of the most 
important ways in which we ethically relate to another. Lack of care in a variety of 
contexts, nurse to patient, mother to daughter etc. , is regarded as blameworthy not simply 
because it is a dereliction of duty but morally blameworthy because it shows a failure of the 
individual to respond appropriately to the needs of the other. Conversely, we hold as moral 
exemplars those who demonstrate genuine care in their relation to others. 
(iv. d) The Principle of Impartiality is Necessary for Moral Criticism 
A third objection commonly raised is that without the principle of impartiality and the 
perspective of the impartial observer we will be bereft of any means by which we can 
criticise moral conventions and attitudes. This is an important objection but is, I believe, 
misplaced. It is of course crucial that whatever philosophical conception of moral agency 
we seek to establish that it is provided with the resources for genuine critical reflection on 
current beliefs and presuppositions. Indeed, it is the fundamental importance of this 
requirement that has provided the principle of impartiality with its dominant force. This is 
because impartiality purports to provide a thoroughly neutral perspective from which truly 
unbiased criticism can be conducted. However, it is not the only picture of critical 
reflection that we have to work with nor indeed is it the most plausible. As I began to 
outline in chapter 3, an alternative conception situates critical reflection in the (everyday) 
dialogical practices of individuals who enter into genuine open conversation with others in 
which the principles, values and goods that constitute some area of life are discussed. Iris 
Young puts it thus: 
".., because there is no impartial point of view in which the subject stands detached and dispassionate to assess 
all perspectives, to arrive at an objective and complete understanding of an issue or experience, all 
perspectives and participants must contribute to its discussion. Thus dialogic reason ought to Imply reasons as 
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contextualized, where answers are the outcome ofa plurality ofperspectives that cannot be reduced to a 
unity. In discussion speakers need not abandon their particular perspective nor bracket their motives and 
feelings. As long as dialogue allows all perspectives to speak freely, and be heard and taken into account, the 
expression of need, motive and feelings will not have merely private significance, and will not bias or distort 
the conclusions because they will interact with others needs, motives and feelings. 
(IM Young "Impartiality and the Civic Public" in S Benhabib and D Cornell (eds), 1987, Feminism as a 
critique: On the Politics of Gender, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press)33 
The critical bite in this process depends upon the willingness of the participants to scrutinise 
not only the beliefs of others but also their own beliefs and presuppositions. This is a 
picture of critical thinking that goes back as far as Socrates and Plato and has many modern 
adherents such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre34. On this conception moral 
change is secured through transitions in conceptions of the goods, principles, and values, 
where the transition to the new conception is generally considered to provide a "gain" over 
the previous conception. The dialogical structure of this process is typically narrative in 
form where the particular good, principle, or value at stake is described in ways which seek 
to demonstrate that it either coheres better with the fuller picture in which it is to be situated 
or shows that the fuller picture needs to be altered. Indeed, it is just this sort of dialogical 
process that is the mark of a thriving professional community, and characterises the 
development of the nursing profession which I discussed previously (see chapter 1). 
(v) Abandoning the Principle of Impartiality 
The evidence, then, both empirical and theoretical, strongly supports the view that we must 
understand the practical moral agency of the professional in ways very different from that 
suggested by The Moral Theory Approach which makes the principle of impartiality central. 
The professional must be seen as an agent embedded within a specific context in which 
moral decisions are made through a process of concretization in which the role they occupy 
is absorbed to a significant degree into the motivational structure of the narrative self. It is 
through this process that the professional comes to reason and respond to the client in ways 
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which enable her to see and extend her understanding of the ethical. The professional 
should thus be encouraged to pursue ethical excellence through an on-going dialogue with 
other professionals (and concerned parties) where that dialogue ultimately concerns what 
sort of professional nurse (doctor, lawyer etc. ) it is good to be". This in turn suggests (as I 
argued in chapter 3), that the emphasis should not rest upon the application of abstract 
principles and rules contained within a code of conduct, but that codes of conduct should be 
seen as providing a bare framework from within which a much richer and fruitful discussion 
of the ethical can be constructed by committed professionals. The onus is thus on the 
professions and the institutions within which professionals practice to enable genuine 
dialogue to take place in order that each professional is provided with the opportunity to 
critically identify with the goods of the role they occupy and possess. The picture of 
professional moral agency I present supports the move away from reliance on the code of 
conduct as the sole or major tool for ethical reasoning, to an approach where professionals 
are actively encouraged to participate in dialogical activities such as committees, forums, 
group discussions, training, role-play etc. in order to develop their ethical dispositions and 
powers of moral reasoning, 
(v. a) The Relevance of the Concept of Impartiality 
It is important to note here that abandoning the principle of impartiality does not entail 
abandoning the idea that the concept of impartiality has relevance in professional moral 
decision making. I noted in chapter 1 (passim) that the trust clients have in professionals 
will depend in significant part on the belief that the professional dispenses her services 
without any intention to unfairly benefit herself, her profession, her organisation, or other 
clients. However, this notion of impartiality is crucially different from the principle of 
impartiality. This notion of impartiality can be satisfied by the fact that a professional 
distributes the goods of her professional role according to criteria merited by the intrinsic 
nature of the goods concerned. Thus, in examples 2-4 above it is clear that caring is 
distributed by the individual nurses in ways which respect the impartial concerns just 
mentioned (i. e. there is nothing in their approach to caring that suggests an unfair advantage 
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is being gained by any individual or group). However, this has nothing to do with adopting 
the abstract third-personal perspective demanded by the principle of impartiality. Indeed, on 
the contrary, the professional impartiality exhibited by such nurses can only be plausibly 
explained by the fact that they have come to be motivated by their identification with the 
goods (and reasons) of their professional role. It is in their efforts to be a good nurse that 
impartiality is secured, not through the application of the principle of impartiality. An 
examination of two more extracts taken from the interviews with nurses will clarify this 
point. 
Examnle 7 
Female, age 30, Health Visitor 
[question] Have you ever had to care for someone you didn't like? 
[Answer] Yes, many times. 
[question] Can you give me an example ... try to think of a case where you really took a 
dislike to the person concerned, and tell me how you dealt with them. 
[Answer] ... I can think of a time when 
I was working on an intensive care ward [prior to 
becoming a health visitor] and we had two people brought in who'd suffered severe burns. 
We couldn't do anything for the woman and she died within a short time, but the boyfriend 
wasn't so badly hurt. The Police told us that he had set fire to the woman by pouring petrol 
over her in her car and had got caught in the flames as well. Apparently he was known to be 
violent and this time went berserk. It was really difficult knowing that in one room we had 
a poor woman burnt to death and just down the corridor the person who did it, ... And we 
had to care for him like any other patient. 
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(question] How did you cope with that? It must have been very difficult. 
[answer] Yes it was very difficult. Personally I'd like to have throttled the man, but as a 
nurse you've got to care for the patient no matter who they are or what they've done. 
[question] How did that work out in practice? How did you deal with him on a day-to-day 
basis? 
[answer] Well it wasn't easy and I never grew to like him. He turned out to be just like 
you'd expect ... he was always moaning, 
just a horrible pathetic man.... However, when it 
comes down to it he deserved the same care as any other patient, you can't pick and choose 
your patients. 
[question] But how did you psyche yourself up to deal with him, as it were, how did you 
get yourself into the right mental state to deal with him? 
[answer] You just remind yourself that you're a nurse. You have to be professional. You 
can't allow personal feelings to cloud your judgement. I can't honestly say I was particularly 
nice to the patient but I do think I treated him fairly. 
Exam nie 8 
Female, age 28, Forensic Nurse (secure psychiatric ward) 
[question] How easy do you find it to care for people who you know have been violent, 
who have raped and murdered? 
[answer] It was very difficult to start with. These are people I would normally despise just 
like everyone else. I have access to their records so I know exactly how bad some of the 
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things are they've done. But as a nurse you learn to see beyond your normal reactions and 
this gets you to provide the level of care that is needed to help these people overcome their 
problems. ... I would 
be no good as a nurse if I allowed my personal feelings to get in the 
way of my professional judgement. 
[question] Do you ever feel any conflict between your personal feelings and your 
professional judgements? 
[answer] ... One of the things I have to 
do is present progress reports that will be used in 
court to decide whether the patient has progressed enough to be allowed back into the 
community. As their advocate I have to present a report which is as fair as possible and 
presents them in their best light. But when you know what they've done in the past it can be 
really hard not to let your personal feelings influence what you say. Sometimes I find 
myself asking whether I would be happy to have such a person living near me, who would? 
However, my job is ignore these feelings and make an objective assessment as their nurse. 
............ "" ................... "........... "............................... 
In both of these extracts there is a clear commitment to impartiality displayed by the nurses 
in circumstances where purely personal considerations might easily influence professional 
decision making. However, what is equally clear is that the commitment to impartiality they 
display stems from a conception of what constitutes a good nurse to be and not the 
application of the principle of impartiality. As the nurse in example 7 put it: "You keep 
reminding yourself you're a nurse" and the nurse in example 8, "... as a nurse you learn to 
see beyond your normal reactions". Their understanding of impartiality is relative to the 
goods that they pursue as professional nurses, and it is this that determines their recognition 
that all patients qua patient must be cared for irrespective of any purely personal feelings36. 
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(vi) The Non-Vocational Nurse 
Finally, then, what do I say about professionals, as in example 5 above, who do not see their 
role in a vocational or identity-conferring way, who do not undergo role absorption, or the 
concretization of their relations to clients? It certainly does not follow that they are 
necessarily unethical, that is not my point. However, it is not possible that such individuals 
would constitute moral exemplars of the professional nurse. What is clear is that they 
restrict themselves to observing the bare ethical minimum as laid down in their code of 
conduct, and these ethical requirements will always strike them as externally enforced 
obligations. It is certainly a pertinent personal question for them whether they are in the 
right job (whether they have the character and commitment to pursue nursing excellence)". 
However, the research for this thesis suggests that these individuals are not representative of 
the typical professional nurse, that most to some significant degree undergo role absorption. 
It is precisely this fact that professional ethics should focus upon, seeking to encourage the 
pursuit of ethical excellence by active and committed individuals through enabling the sort 
of open dialogue mentioned above and in chapter 3. 
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I As W Kymlicka put it: "Every moral Theory must answer two questions: what are the demands that 
morality makes of us, and why should we feel obliged to obey those demands? " (in P Singer (ed), 1993, A 
Companion to Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 186) 
21 am of course here giving a reason for adopting the principle of impartiality from within morality itself, 
However, not all Moral Theorists start within morality, for example, Kant attempted to show that impartiality 
(universality) is a necessary requirement of rationality per se, thus, in any case of practical reasoning I have 
reason - because I am rational - to adopt maxims of action that reflect impartial standards and are universally 
applicable. 
3 By referring to this concept of the self as the "narrative self' I do not wish, at the moment, to imply anything 
more than that each of us typically has a (largely pre-theoretical) conception of our own self-identity which is 
constituted in the way just mentioned; by one's desires, values, dispositions, concerns, and attachments to 
particular individuals, projects and causes etc. All of these elements focus upon what matters to the individual 
and form the main reference points or threads in an ongoing "story" that each of us plays out in living an 
intelligible or meaningful life (for a rich discussion of the notion of narrative, see: A Maclntyre 1985, After 
Virtue, London, Duckworth. And, C Taylor, 1989, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. ). The question remains, of course, whether this sort of self-conception in narrative terms stands up to 
philosophical reflection, that is, whether, or to what extent, a properly worked out theoretical conception of the 
self will incorporate or reject our pre-theoretical self-conception. About this question I have little to say here 
other that a complete rejection of this notion of self-identity, if it is plausible (which I seriously doubt), would 
transform beyond recognition our understanding of morality. Indeed, Charles Taylor, ibid, pp. 3-24 argues that 
the narrative elements I have referred to represent "inescapable frameworks" for moral agency, Bernard 
Williams, argues that "... unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, projects and interest, it is 
unclear why I should go on at all ... ", B Williams, 1981, 
Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 12. 
° The notion of an "encumbered" and "unencumbered" self I take from the work focusing on the 
liberalism/communitarian debate. In particular the communitarian responses to John Rawls's 1971, A Theory 
of Justice, Massachusettes, Harvard University Press, which accuse him of requiring for his theory a notion of 
the self which is implausibly detached (unencumbered) from the purposes and interests of the narrative self 
(see, for example Michael Walzer, 1983, Spheres of Justice, New York, Basic Books, see also, M 
Sandel"The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', Political Theory, 1984, vol. 12,1) 
s Different Moral Theorists give different accounts of how an impartial observer conducts her reasoning. For 
example, Kant, 1785, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, (translated by IIJ Paton, 1948, The 
Moral Law, London, Hutchinson), provides a picture of an autonomous agent carrying out her reasoning in 
isolation from others through applying the categorical imperative to proposed maxims of action. Discourse 
ethicists (for example: J Habermas, 1971, Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston, Beacon Press. J 
Habermas, 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (translated by C Lendhart and S Weber 
Nicholson), Boston, MIT Press. S Benhabib, 1992, Situating the Self, Cambridge, Polity Press. ) see the 
impartial observer as someone who conducts her reasoning in relation to others according to the principles 
which define a fair and open discussion. Other authors make use of the idea of a hypothetical agent who views 
the (moral) world as if from nowhere within it and is thus able to consider all options in an unbiased way, for 
example, T Nagel, 1986, The View From Nowhere, New York, Oxford University Press. 
6 This reflects another important difference between The Moral Theory Approach and Contextualism. For the 
Moral Theorist the justification of particular moral acts is something that stands separate from their narrative 
description, for the contextualist description and justification are inextricably intertwined, indeed, amount to 
the same thing. The Moral Theorist will appeal to an impartially described principle to justify an act, the 
contextualist will describe the act in terms of certain moral concepts (kindness, honesty etc. ) in an attempt to 
get others to recognise the description as justifying her behaviour. See, J Dancy, 1993, Moral Reasons, 
Oxford, Blackwell, ch. 7. 
What she has to do in effect, is ignore the fact that it is specifically her who loves Gemma and inquire from 
an impartial moral perspective whether it is permissable that anyone should be allowed to love Gemma (and all 
that doing that involves). This may of course lead to the conclusion that loving Gemma is morally permissible 
and she can get on with all the intensely personal engagement that this involves, but the crucial point to 
recognise is that the moral sanction for this is derived from an impersonal perspective (see, VI leld, "Feminist 
Moral Inquiry and the Feminist Future", in V Held (ed), 1995, Justice and Care: Essential Readings In 
Feminist Ethics, Colorado, Westview Press). Failure to see this distinction is what lies behind Rawls's 
mistaken claim that impartiality does not imply impersonality (op cit. p. 190). Rawls seeks to defend himself 
against the claim that impartiality implies impersonality by rejecting the utilitarian form of 
impartiality/impersonality which fails to recognise the distinctness of individuals, however, he does not escape 
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the Kantian version of impartiality/impersonality which while it recognises the formal distinctness of each 
individual does not allow their substantive distinctness to play any role in moral decision making (see ch. 5 
above. For support for Rawls's view see Louden R, 1992, Morality and Moral Theory, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. esp. ch. I and ch. 2). 
& Stocker M, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 1976, 
PP. 453-466. Stocker, argues that Moral Theory results in a sort of "moral schizophrenia" in alienating the 
individual from what motivates her (what I have described as splitting moral agency from the narrative self). 
9 See TDJ Chappell, 1998, Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press. 
to M Slote, 1983, Goods and Virtues, Oxford, Clarendon Press. The overridingness of the moral consists in 
the thought that no other considerations of any kind can override a moral prohibition (see p. 81). See also I Tare 
1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxrord, Oxford University Press, p. 168. 
" Susan Wolf "Moral Saints" in RB Kruschwitz and RC Roberts (ed), 1987, The Virtues, Belmont, 
Wadsworth) 
12 Indeed, Williams thinks that we should be "grateful" that we do not live in a world in which "morality" 
(construed narrowly) is universally respected (1981, p. 23 and p. 37-38). 
13 The individuals not of the Moral Theory persausion who I think also ought to be disturbed by this 
conclusion actually include all those critics of Moral Theory that I have just mentioned (Williams, Stocker, 
Wolf et al). I think that they make a mistake in accepting the distinction Moral Theorists make between the 
personal world of self-interest and the moral world of universal and impartial rules and principles. I shall 
suggest that we need not distinguish between two such realms at all, that we need not see moral ideals and 
personal ideals as being in conflict but rather see "... that a person's morality is revealed in the very enactment 
of her personal ideals. " (P Chazan, 1998, The Moral Self, London, Routledge, p. 4. ). The key, of course, is 
not to construe morality in purely narrow terms but to broaden the terrain to that of ethics as Williams 
eventually does in "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" (Op cit). See also, LA Blum, 1994, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, esp. ch2. 
14 Scheffler S, 1982, The Rejection of Consequential ism: A Philosophical Investigation of the 
Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
15 As Scheffler notes, the priority of the consequentialist view, however, means that while there will be 
occasions when it is defensible to pursue an interest from the personal perspective (via the independence 
thesis) I can never be required not to maximise the overall amount of good. For example, I might be permitted 
to serve the interests of my children before the interests of a greater number of others even where the latter 
increases the overall amount of good but I can never be morally required to put my children's interests first. 
The fact that one cannot be constrained by personal concerns in this way brings out a crucial difference 
between Moral Theorists like Scheffler and those opponents who see such personal attachments as sometimes 
requiring the adoption of non-universal and partial moral commitments. As in the case of Rawls (see note 6 
above) the moral justification of the personal is provided by impersonal considerations. 
16 Again it should be clear, as mentioned in the note above, that the ultimate justification for pursuing personal 
interests does not come from any intrinsic features of personal life but from the impartial and impersonal 
theory (consequential ism) that permits those interests to be pursued. 
17 In the discussion of reasons that are neither strictly personal or strictly impartial my comments arc Indebted 
to the work of Lawrence Blum, 1994, Moral Perception and Particularity, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
18 I should perhaps note here that the sense in which this role definition is impersonal does not automatically 
entail full-blown impartiality in its universalist sense. Clearly at this stage we only need to see the obligations 
and duties that delineate the role as applying solely to the set of individuals who occupy or who will come to 
occupy, the role concerned (see Blum L, 1994, Moral Perception and Particularity, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 103-4). Whether it does actually entail impartiality in the fullest sense will depend upon 
the nature of its relation to a universalistic and impartialistic Moral Theory, see T Nagel , 1979, Mortal 
Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press ch. 6. 
1s' It is true, of course, that at the beginning of his article Nagel recognises the wide variety of types of roles 
that actually exist, and that this complexity complicates the discussion. However, he goes on to suggest that 
there are general features that apply to all types of roles which enables him to make the universalist claims he 
wishes to support. 
20 The term "identity-conferring" I have borrowed from J Kekes, "Constancy and Purity", 1983, Mind, 92. 
And L McFall, "Integrity", in T Deigh (ed), 1992, Ethics and Personality, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press. I do not claim that I will go on to use the term in exactly the same way as suggested by these authors. 
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21 I am not suggesting that there are not occasions when the motivational unity of the narrative self and 
professional role come apart. Indeed, as I shall discuss below (p. 26) there are important moral dilemmas that 
arise precisely from such a disjunction. However, as I shall also discuss, it is only in terms of the typical 
importance of the unity of the narrative self and professional role in acting in professional life that we can 
understand the full force of the moral dilemmas caused when the two do in fact come apart and suggest 
conflicting courses of action, 
22 See for example: JR Boyer and JL Lindemann "A Comment on Fry's'The Role of Caring In a Theory of 
Nursing Ethics"', in H Bequart Holmes and LM Purdy (eds), 1992, Femminist Perspectives in Medical 
Ethics, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press. LA Blum, 1994, Moral Perception and Particularity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. ST Fry, The Ethic of Caring: Can it Survive in Nursing? ", 1988, 
Nursing Outlook, Vol. 36, No. l. ST Fry, "The Role of Caring in a Threory of Nursing Ethics" in It Bequart 
Holmes and LM Purdy (eds), 1992, Femminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics, Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press. S Gaddow, "Nurse and Patient: The Caring Relationship", in All Bishop and JR Scudder 
(eds), 1985, Caring, Curing, Coping: Nurse, Physician, Patient Relationships, Birmingham Alabama, 
University of Alabama Press. C Gilligan, 1982, In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
AP Griffin, "A Philosophical Analysis of Caring in Nursing", 1983, Journal of Advanced Nursing, Vol. 8, 
pp. 289-95. V Held (ed), 1995, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, Colorado, 
Westview Press. E Kittay and D Meyers (eds), 1987, Women and Moral Theory, Totowa, Roman and 
Littlefield. MJ Larrabee, (ed) 1993, An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New 
York, Routledge. N Noddings, 1984, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. 
Berkeley, University of California Press. JS Packard and M Ferrara, "In Search of the Moral Foundation of 
Nursing", 1988, Advances in Nursing Science, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 60-71. J Watson, 1985, Nursing: Human 
Science and Human Care, Conneticut, Appleton Century Crofts. 
23 See also, for example, V Held, 1995, op cit, pp. 153-176. 24 Quoted in P Benner, "The role of articulation In understanding practice and experience as sources of 
knowledge in clinical nursing" in J Tully (ed), 1994, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The philosophy 
of Charles Taylor in question, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 142. 
2$ P Benner, "The role of articulation in understanding practice and experience as sources of knowledge 
In clinical nursing" in J Tully (ed), 1994, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The philosophy of Charles 
Taylor in question, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Benner identifies here the naturalistic 
philosophical motivation for this sort of impartialist treatment of moral notions like caring. 
26 See, for example, P Benner, 1984, From Novice to Expert: excellence and power in clinical working 
practice, Reading Massachusettes., Addison-Wesley. Also, P Benner, 1994, op cit. And P Benner, From 
Novice to Expert: a phenomenological study of clinical nursing expertise In Intensive care units 
(forthcoming) (referred to in Benner P, 1994). 
27 LA Blum, 1994, op cit, p. 200. 
28 It is interesting to note here that the nurse described the ward as "her" ward. It proved typical throughout 
the empirical survey that nurses who percieve their role as identity-conferring use expressions such as "my 
hospital", "my unit", "my patients" etc, This is clearly indicative of the extent to which the nurse concerned 
has absorbed her role into the motivational set of the narrative self. 
29 An interesting comment made by this interviewee later when I asked him why he rather than a doctor 
provided the "bad news" to patients, was that in consultations with the doctors of the patients concerned they 
would often ask him to deliver the news as he "knew" the patient better. This suggests that the particularity of 
the nurse-patient relationship is quite explicitly recognized to be of value in caring. 
30 ST Fry "The Role of Caring in Nursing Ethics", in llBequaert I lolmes and LM Purdy (eds) Feminist 
Perspectives In Medical Ethics, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, p. 96. Fry is referring here to S 
Gaddow, "Nurse and Patient: The Caring Relationship" in, All Bishop and JR Scudder (eds), 1985, 
Caring, Curing, Coping: Nurse, Physician, Patient Relationships, Birmingham Alabama, University of 
Alabama Press. 
31 This is recognised explicitly in the nursing profession which makes provision for individuals to opt out of 
participating in certain procedures on grounds of conscience. Thus, for example, a woman who identifies 
herself as a christian and a nurse (among other things) may opt out of taking part in abortions on the grounds 
that it conflicts with her strongly held christian beliefs. 
32 It is much to Kant's credit, and an example of his integrity, that he recognised that a universalistic or 
impartialistic Moral Theory must rule out the possibility of moral dilemmas (see his , on a Supposed Right to 
Lie from Altruistic Motives" repr. in P Singer, 1994, Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
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33 IM Young "Impartiality and the Civic Public" in S Benhabib and D Cornell (eds), 1987, Feminism as a 
critique: On the Politics of Gender, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Quoted in V field (ed), 
1995, op cit, p. 163. All italics are mine. 
34 See for example, A MacIntyre, 1981, After Virtue, London, Duckworth. and, 1988, Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, London, Duckworth. C Taylor, 1989, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. and, 1991, The Ethics of Authenticity, Massachusettes, Harvard University Press. 
35 It should be clear by now, I hope, how the notions of: vocational or identity-conferring roles, role 
absorbtion, and concretization together provide a contextualist solution to the Basic Question, in that all these 
concepts contain first-personal and third-personal aspects that are inseparable. Thus they provide first- 
ersonal motivation and third-personal transcendence of the merely personal. 
36 Indeed, to allow purely personal feelings to influence judgement would be to fail to treat the individual as a 
patient and thereby fail to act as a nurse. A purely private relationship would have been wrongly introduced 
into the non-private setting of the professional health care environment. 
37 It is revealing that the nurse interviewed in example 5 did eventually leave the nursing profession and in a 
subsequent conversation actually cited the discussion we had had as confirming that she "wasn't the right sort 
of person to be a nurse". 
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CONCLUSION 
(i) Summary of the Arguments 
In chapter 1 (Professional Ethics), I attempted to identify what might be 
distinctive about professional ethics in order to focus upon what I argue to be 
central issues in the chapters that follow. I began in part I, with an attempt to 
blunt the claims of sceptical sociologists who argue that there is nothing at all 
distinctive about professions compared to other occupations save for the fact that 
professions have managed to monopolise power in certain areas of human life. 
This, I suggested, is particularly important because sceptical sociologists typically 
argue that the heightened concern with ethics that professions proclaim is nothing 
more than an instrumental device used to secure a position of monopoly and 
power. Accordingly, I sought to show that there is at least a prima facie 
plausibility in distinguishing between occupations in terms of the concept of a 
profession by embedding a traditional "traits" style definition of the concept 
within the more dynamic processes of "professionalisation". I showed how recent 
developments within nursing are clearly best described in terms of a sustained 
self-conscious process of professionalisation. I concluded, then, that the concept 
of a profession (and professionalisation) has palpable explanatory power. This 
immediately suggests, I argued, that the real source of the sceptic's anxieties 
concerns ethics in a fundamental way. Whether or not an occupation's pursuit of 
professional autonomy is to be described as, either: purely the self-interested 
pursuit of power, or, as recognition of a unique competence to provide vital 
services, will depend significantly upon the ethical basis of their claims. I 
suggested, then, that in an important way, the very validity of the concept of a 
profession rests significantly upon what sense we can make of the idea that 
professions have a distinctive concern with ethics. To recognise this, however, 
just is to recognise that there is no quick route to scepticism, and thus I hope to 
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have blunted, or at least delayed, scepticism about the professions pending the 
results of the investigation presented in this thesis. 
In part II, I attempted to delineate the general shape of the debate within which the 
arguments of the following chapters are situated. I argued in support of Bernard 
Williams' view that what gives content to the idea that professions have a 
distinctive concern with ethics is the claim that professional ethics diverges in 
some important sense from everyday or general morality. Accordingly, I claimed 
that it is in accounting for this divergence from general morality that the nature 
and validity of professional ethics is to be established. I identified two 
possibilities: first what I called the "Deductive Paradigm", and second, what I 
called the "Contextualist Conception". The Deductive Paradigm, I argued, claims 
that professional ethics is contained within general morality as an application of 
itself to the special circumstances of professional life. In short: general morality 
provides independent universal (and impartial) principles and rules which form 
the major premises in arguments which when conjoined with minor premises 
drawn from the special circumstances of professional life enable the professional 
to "deduce" moral conclusions. The Contextualist Conception, I argued, denies 
any sort of deductive relationship between professional ethics and general 
morality. It claims that while there must be coherence between general morality 
and professional ethics, professional ethics cannot in any sense be seen as an 
application of general morality. Rather, it represents a distinctive set of ethical 
concerns generated directly from within professional life that co-exist with 
everyday moral considerations. I argued that the Contextualist Conception 
represents a more radical account of the divergence of professional ethics from 
general ethics than is provided by the Deductive Paradigm, and concluded chapter 
1 by showing how these different accounts manifest themselves in actual 
professional life. I noted that the Deductive Paradigm inevitably places moral 
obligations centre stage. I argued that the universal principles and rules of general 
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morality can only be stated as obligations (in order that they are indeed universal), 
thus in deducing professional morality from general morality the distinctiveness of 
professional ethics inevitably consists in adopting a specific set of obligations only 
applicable to the professionals concerned. I argued that the Contextualist 
Conception in eschewing any deductive connection to general morality has to 
draw more directly upon the specific features of professional life. The result of 
this, I claimed, is to focus professional ethics fundamentally upon questions 
concerning the goods realised in professional practice. I encapsulated this 
difference between the two positions by arguing that an adherent to the Deductive 
Paradigm sees the basic concern with professional ethics as raising and answering 
the question about what it is right to do in some situation, where this is given 
content by determining what a professionals obligations are in that circumstance. 
The adherent to the Contextualist Conception on the other hand, I claimed, 
focuses fundamentally upon the question of what it is good to be, where this is 
given content by articulating what constitutes a good professional of the kind 
concerned. 
In chapter 2 (Ethical Theory: Moral Theory and Contextualism), part I, I attempted 
to provide a deeper understanding of the differences between the Deductive 
Paradigm and the Contextualist Conception by making explicit the fundamental 
philosophical presuppositions about ethics and ethical theory that underlie the two 
approaches. I argued that it is impossible to get a clear understanding of 
professional ethics unless one brings these central philosophical issues to the 
fore. I claimed that this is because it is the acceptance or rejection of these 
different presuppositions (explicitly or implicitly) that drives an individual into 
one camp or the other. Accordingly, I identified two styles of ethical theory; one 
corresponding to the Deductive Paradigm which I now labelled "The Moral 
Theory Approach", and the other corresponding to the Contextualist Conception 
which I now labelled "Contextualism". I claimed that both styles of ethical theory 
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involve the philosophical (meta-ethical) analysis of everyday moral intuitions, 
experiences behaviour etc. but that it is what this analysis implies about how we 
ought to conduct our practical moral reasoning that crucial differences emerge, I 
claimed that according to The Moral Theory Approach this analysis demands that 
we develop a Moral Theory which I described as a sub-theory of ethical theory 
which provides, "a set of universal principles and general axioms which justify or 
entail a systematic set of rules or duties from which particular moral judgements 
are to be deduced" (p. 51). Contextualism, I claimed, argues that philosophical 
analysis demonstrates no such requirement and in fact suggests that the 
development of a Moral Theory is impossible. Instead it replaces Moral Theory 
with an account of what constitutes a good or worthwhile life to lead with the 
result that moral reasoning is always correlative to a perception of the goods at 
stake, requiring situated practical wisdom. I then gave examples of each approach 
(Henry Sidgwick and Aristotle. ). 
At this point I noted that any successful comparison of the merits of these two 
approaches requires the identification of some fundamental common ground 
which they both recognise as demanding explanation and successful incorporation 
into the ethical theory being offered. In this respect I identified two fundamental 
features of the "moral point-of-view" which any ethical theory must account for. 
First I supported Roger Scruton's claim that, "Morality must be understood in first- 
person terms: in terms of the reasoning that leads to action", this recognises that 
moral reasoning must in some way motivate an individual to act. Secondly, I 
argued that reasoning from the moral point-of-view must also be guided by, or 
incorporate, concerns that in some important sense lie outside of one's own 
particular personal concerns and desires (that is, moral reasoning must incorporate 
a response to what lies external to the agent). As such, the moral point-of-view, I 
claimed, inextricably combines first-person and third-person aspects (which is 
what makes moral reasoning so hard). This, I argued, immediately yields what I 
171 
called the "Basic Question for Applied Ethical Theory", namely "1161P can a 
stretch ofpractical reasoning incorporate the fact that it needs to reflect 
reasoning that is specifically mine (and motivate me as such) yet at the same time 
reflect standards that transcend my own specific concerns? " I suggested that this 
provides a perfectly adequate question against which to test the rival claims of The 
Moral Theory Approach and Contextualism. 
In part II, I explained the strategy I have used throughout the remaining thesis in 
comparing the rival approaches to professional ethics. Following Alasdair 
Maclntyre (et al) I described The Moral Theory Approach as the "dominant 
conception" in applied (professional) ethics, but claimed that for both theoretical 
reasons and empirical reasons generated from the survey of nursing opinion this 
approach represents, "... a radically distorted description of our actual ethical 
practices and an implausible account of how ethical practice might be perfected or 
improved. " (pp. 64-5). In short, I claimed that it cannot answer the Basic Question 
for Applied Ethical Theory. Thus, I identified my strategy as involving a 
sustained attack upon the fundamental principles and presuppositions of The 
Moral Theory Approach, in the course of which my own positive account in 
favour of a Contextualist alternative emerge. The rest of the chapter was spent 
identifying two fundamental principles and two fundamental presuppositions that I 
claimed are central to any form of The Moral Theory Approach. These I 
identified as: the "Principle of Universalizability", The "Principle of Impartiality", 
a commitment to a rationalistic procedure in moral argument, and the 
prioritisation of conceptions of what it is right to do over conceptions of what it is 
good to be. 
In chapter 3 (Universalizability: Principles, Rules and Codes of Conduct), I 
presented my case for the rejection of the principle of universalizability. I began 
in part I, by describing three different versions of the principle (Karat's, I fare's and 
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discourse ethics) in order, primarily, to demonstrate that it is indeed a fundamental 
principle adopted by any version of The Moral Theory Approach. In describing 
these accounts I further demonstrated why the principle of universalizability 
entails a rationalistic procedure in moral argument. In part II, the arguments 
against the principle were presented by focusing upon the nature and function of 
professional codes of conduct. First, I established the link between the principle 
of universalizability and codes of conduct. This I explained in terms of the notion 
of codifiability. I argued that the principle of universalizability rests crucially 
upon the possibility of codifying principles and rules in such a way that the 
propositional content of the principle or rule alone can determine its application. 
I argued that this is required because the principle or rule (in virtue of its 
universality) is supposed to be able to guide the behaviour of anyone irrespective 
of her personal interests or situation. The whole point of universal principles is 
that they are supposed to be able to be taken around any number of contexts and 
guide the conduct of the various individuals therein, thus they must be specifiable 
separately from any particular context (it is in this sense that they provide 
premises for application in a deductive/rationalistic form of reasoning and 
argument). I claimed that a Moral Theory reading of professional codes of 
conduct represents an ideal example of an attempt to codify ethical principles and 
rules in just this way, albeit that the scope of its universality is restricted to the 
domain of the relevant professionals it covers. In this restricted case the principles 
and rules identified are supposed to guide the conduct of any professional 
irrespective of her personal interests or (professional) situation. Thus, I claimed, 
if it can be shown that it is impossible to codify the principles and rules of a code 
of conduct in the way Moral Theorists must, then a devastating blow will have 
been struck against the principle of universalizability and the Moral Theory 
Approach in general (because universalizability depends upon codifability). I 
labelled this the "Problem of Codifiability". However, before I went on to show 
this I noted another connection between codes of conduct and the principle of 
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universalizability, which links them together in a relationship of justification. 
Using examples (pp. 93-96) I showed that Moral Theorists argue that the specific 
ethical principles and rules contained within a professional code of conduct can 
only be justified if they are shown to be an application of universal principles and 
rules. I labelled this the "Problem of Justification". I noted that the two problems 
are inextricably linked as universal principles and rules can only justify the 
specific principles and rules of a code of conduct if codifiability is possible. Thus, 
I turned quickly to the problem of codifiability. 
I rejected the possibility of codifying principles and rules (in the way demanded by 
the principle of universalizability) on the Wittgensteinian grounds that no rule 
exists apart from its applications. I claimed that it follows from this that there can 
be no understanding of a rule separately from its applications, which in turn 
means that there can be no specification of a rule (or principle) such that its 
propositional content alone can fix its application. And this, of course, just is to 
reject the very possibility of codifiability. The argument I put forward in this 
respect concerned Wittgenstein's account in the "Philosophical Investigations 
(1953)" of what is involved in following a rule, and I showed how Wittgenstein 
knocks-down any sort of account of rule following upon which the Moral Theorist 
must depend. I argued that Wittgenstein showed that the ability to follow a rule is 
a practical ability which depends upon nothing more nor less than the fact that 
agents share in certain forms of life. I argued that an agent's grasp of a rule is 
demonstrated in her ability in certain social contexts to "go on" in appropriate 
ways, thus manifesting her understanding of a rule in appropriate stretches of 
behaviour. This, however, demonstrates that there is no understanding of a rule 
separately from its application. Accordingly I argued that the principle of 
universalizability cannot provide the sort of ethical principles and rules to guide 
moral reasoning that Moral Theorists require. 
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To strengthen my case for the rejection of the principle of universalizability I then 
provided an account of a contextualist form of moral reasoning, which I claimed 
provides a much more plausible picture of what is involved. This, I claimed, 
necessitates repudiation of the rationalistic myth that moral reasoning must 
proceed in the form of a deductive style of argument from provable (universal) 
first principles to particular conclusions. Indeed, I claimed that moral reasoning is 
not primarily concerned with "argument" in this sense at all, but is essentially an 
activity in which the agent seeks to make sense of what one does or proposes to 
do. Thus, in moral reasoning I typically attempt to get you to see the point (sense) 
of why I think that a particular rule demands x in the circumstances rather than y. 
I claimed further that the activity of making sense of a rule's application is 
inherently descriptive and narrative in nature and consists in: (a) identifying the 
salient features of a situation in virtue of which a rule is prima facie invoked, and 
(b) description of the various salient features of a situation such that together they 
take on a certain moral shape (expressed in narrative form). I then argued that 
critical evaluation of rules focuses centrally upon two considerations: (a) whether 
an individual's application of a rule coheres with the narrative within which it is 
embedded, and (b) whether the particular rule following demanded by a narrative 
shows the narrative to be suspect. 
These conclusions, I claimed, lead to a picture of rules in which they should be 
understood as partial specifications of the goods within a practice (narrative). I 
supported Alasdair Maclntyre's claim that when we reflect upon a rule's 
application such that we seek, for example, to extend a rule to cover new cases, or 
reformulate a rule to exclude certain behaviour, reject a rule outright, develop a 
new rule etc. it must be because "... the members of [a] particular community could 
agree in seeing some substantial good at stake in responding one way rather than 
another. " ("Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake? ", 1984, p. 506), Thus, I 
argued that the rule concerning truth-telling in the professional health care setting 
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is only properly understood as a partial specification of the good of realising 
patient autonomy. I noted further that this means that in just ding why one 
follows a rule in one way rather than another, no appeal is (or can be) made to 
abstract and neutral universal principles and rules. Rather, I argued that, 
according to contextualism, description and justification are not separate activities 
(as they are on The Moral Theory Approach) but amount to the same activity. In 
describing an act as following a specific rule an agent at the same time articulates 
her conception of the good expressed by the rule, thereby justifying her action(s) 
in the same dialogical activity. 
I then sought to compare the two different approaches to moral reasoning by 
examining how each understands the nature and functioning of codes of conduct 
in the process of moral decision making. It is at this point that I explicitly 
introduced evidence accumulated in the empirical survey of nursing opinion. I 
selected extracts from a number of interviews to show that The Moral Theory 
Approach to codes of conduct not only fails to account for the way professionals 
actually engage in ethical reasoning, but also renders codes an actual hindrance to 
moral reasoning. I claimed that the results of the empirical survey showed that 
while nurses unanimously recognise the importance of ethics typically they see the 
code of conduct produced by the UKCC as no real help in moral decision making 
(and more often than not a document that yields contradictory and confusing 
principles and rules). I argued that this is the result of them implicitly adopting 
The Moral Theory Approach to the code of conduct. This, I argued, could be seen 
in their expectation that the code of conduct should provide principles and rules 
for direct (deductive) application to particular situations in order to determine 
answers to any moral problems that might arise. I argued that this just is to make 
the assumption that principles and rules can be codified in the way Moral 
Theorists suggest. This, I claimed, leads not only to frustration among nurses 
concerning the usefulness of their code, because it cannot fulfil this function for 
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reasons already discussed, but also to the highly damaging perception that the 
sceptical sociologists I mentioned earlier are correct in thinking that the 
proclaimed concern with ethics professed by the professions serves no other 
purpose than to protect professional autonomy from general moral scrutiny 
(p. 115). 
The solution, I suggested, lies not in abandoning codes of conduct but rather in 
abandoning the interpretation of codes according to The Moral Theory Approach, 
I argued that a contextualist interpretation of codes of conduct, which treats them 
as providing common narrative frameworks from within which professionals 
articulate their ethical concerns, represents the proper useful role of a code in 
moral reasoning. I then produced an example of a nurse who successfully used the 
UKCC code of conduct in precisely this fashion. I concluded the chapter by 
arguing that the extent to which a code of conduct justifies the activities of a 
particular group of professionals will depend upon the extent to which the 
profession concerned creates genuine dialogical opportunities for its professionals 
to use its code in the narrative ways I identified. 
In chapter 4 (Impartiality: The Self, and Professional Roles), I attempted to 
undermine the principle of impartiality by showing that the Moral Theorist's bi- 
partite division of reasons into those that are personal/partial (non-moral) and 
those that are impersonal/impartial (moral) is seriously flawed. I began my 
argument by noting that the Moral Theorist's division of reasons into impartial and 
partial kinds leads inevitably to a distinction between two kinds of individual 
agency, namely, moral agency and personal agency (I labelled the latter the agency 
of the "narrative self'). I noted that this raises an enormous difficulty in 
explaining how these quite distinct perspectives are to be united in the life of one 
particular individual (the "Basic Question for Applied Ethical Theory"), 
However, rather than criticise various theoretical attempts at achieving this I 
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argued that a more fundamental criticism of The Moral Theory Approach could be 
offered by undermining the distinction in the first place. Supporting Lawrence 
Blum's arguments presented in "Moral Perception and Particularity" (1994), I 
claimed that this dichotomy fails to recognise that in at least some contexts moral 
agency and personal agency unite inextricably such that there are moral reasons 
for action that are not strictly impersonal, nor strictly personal. The context I 
identified in order to show this was the action of an individual in a professional 
role. 
I argued that individuals can occupy professional roles in two quite different ways: 
"instrumentally" or "vocationally". I claimed that in occupying a role 
instrumentally the occupant lacks any personal identity with the role and sees 
herself primarily as instrument in realising the explicitly stated obligations and 
duties that attach to it. Her motivation to act to realise those duties and 
obligations is secured by the contractual agreement that she has with her 
employers to acquire money in exchange for her labour (in short, her continued 
interest in the role is maintained solely by the prospect of realising a good 
"external" to the intrinsic nature of her tasks, i. e. money). By contrast, I claimed, 
in occupying a role vocationally the occupant does, in some important sense, 
identify personally with the role (thus I described these as "Identity-con ferring" 
roles). She sees herself not merely as an instrument in realising the duties and 
obligations of the role but also personally realises herself in performing its 
specified tasks. Her motivation to act to realise those duties and obligations is not 
secured simply by the prospect of making money but to a significant degree by the 
fact that those duties and obligations speak to her directly as things she values 
intrinsically because she identifies with the role concerned (i. e. she is (also) 
motivated by the "internal" goods of the role). I described this sort of 
identification with a role as "role absorption into the motivational set of the 
narrative self'. I claimed that it is acting in a role in this latter "identity. 
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conferring" sense that provides an agent with moral reasons to act that are neither 
strictly impersonal nor strictly personal. 
In demonstrating this claim I focused on the concept of caring in a nursing role. I 
argued that there are two possible conceptions of caring as a nurse: the "task 
oriented model" and the "patient oriented model". The task oriented model of 
caring claims that nursing care can be defined in terms of a set of discrete 
impersonally described behavioural tasks. This, I claimed, pictures the care 
relationship, as holding between the patient/client who is the bearer of 
impersonally describable symptoms and the nurse who provides impersonally 
describable treatments. There is no requirement on this model for the notion of 
role identification/role absorption, thus nursing care can be provided purely in 
terms of an instrumental approach to a role. I argued that the patient oriented 
model, by contrast, identifies the particular relationship between the particular 
nurse and particular patient as central to the idea of nursing care. On this 
conception there is always a departure from generally describable features to the 
concrete relationship in which the nurse responds to the patient as a unique and 
whole individual (what Lawrence Blum describes as "care particularity", op cit. 
pp. 108-111). I argued that this notion of caring cannot be described in impersonal 
terms. Using further extracts from the interviews conducted with nurses I 
attempted to show that typically nurses care according to the patient oriented 
model of caring. Most importantly I showed that caring in this way could not be 
described as impersonal because it always involves some significant degree of 
role-absorption, that is, the nurse cares in the way she does because of the nurse 
that she actually sees and feels herself as being. The disposition to care in these 
cases, I claim, is clearly a part of the motivational set of the narrative self, and 
thus is not purely impersonal. However, I argued that this sort of caring in the 
nursing role is not strictly personal either. I argued that the disposition to care in 
these cases is constituted differently from carings the individual might engage in 
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more personal contexts. Thus, I claimed, caring as a nurse also involves response 
to standards that arise independently of a person's pre-reflective desires. I 
concluded, then, that there are, moral reasons that are neither purely partial nor 
purely impartial. Further, I claimed that it is precisely in the use of these sort of 
reasons that (professional) moral agency is expressed. 
I argued that the advantage of locating ethical reasoning in these sort of reasons, 
and in this sort of picture of moral agency, becomes immediately apparent when 
one appreciates how it offers an answer to the Basic Question for Applied Ethical 
Theory. It becomes easy to see how reasoning that results from role absorption 
can both motivate the agent to act, and at the same time reflect standards that 
transcend the agent's specifically personally concerns. Thus, I argued, there is no 
need to adopt the deeply implausible and profoundly problematic picture of moral 
agency demanded by The Moral Theory Approach's adherence to the principle of 
impartiality. I then concluded the chapter by answering possible objections that 
might be raised by the contextualist picture of moral reasoning (agency) I have 
supported. 
................................................ 
(ii) A Final Reflection 
In reflecting upon the thesis I have presented here the thing that strikes me as most 
interesting is how much of it is taken up with the discussion of "deep" theoretical 
issues. This seems prima facie paradoxical given that the motivation for the 
research stemmed in large part from a concern that the actual ethical experiences 
of professionals has largely been ignored by philosophers in their theoretical 
musings on applied (professional) ethics. Thus, one might have expected the 
thesis to contain much more in the way of empirical material, However, if the 
thesis has at all been successful it should be apparent that theoretical concerns 
180 
have dominated precisely because of the results of the empirical survey I 
conducted. As the survey progressed it became clear that the central problem the 
thesis needed to address concerned the relationship between theory and practice. 
This problem was given a particular direction, however, by the fact that the results 
of the empirical survey showed that the dominant Moral Theory Approach to 
applied (professional) ethics quite dramatically failed to cohere with, or account 
for, the ethical experiences and practices of professionals. This meant that the 
level at which I pitched the theoretical analysis of, both, the empirical evidence 
and the academic literature needed to penetrate deeper than the standard disputes 
to be had between various kinds of utilitarians and Kantians. It required 
uncovering deeper assumptions that all these Moral Theorists shared. Thus it 
became crucial to investigate the theoretical presuppositions underlying The 
Moral Theory Approach to see whether the apparent yawning gap between theory 
and practice could be accounted for in terms of a failure in that approach, or 
whether professional practice needs to be radically reorganised to fit with its 
requirements. Either way, an answer could only be approached by tackling deep 
theoretical issues. It was precisely in this sense that I described the thesis as an 
attempt to provide a "meta-ethical foundation for professional ethics" (p. 50). I 
hope that the arguments presented throughout have demonstrated that without this 
form of meta-ethical analysis little of philosophical use can be said about the 
empirical evidence regarding the way professional's reason about ethical issues 
(actually or ideally). 
The support I have offered for a contextualist approach to ethical reasoning in 
professional contexts has in the main, then, been offered by way of a 
thoroughgoing criticism of the essential presuppositions of The Moral Theory 
Approach. In demonstrating the irresolvable flaws lying at the heart of The Moral 
Theory Approach I have at the same time attempted to show how a contextualist 
alternative fares much better in explaining and guiding ethical conduct (for 
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example, in the interpretation of the role of a code of conduct). however, I have 
attempted nothing more than to show the initial plausibility of the contextualist 
position and an account a good deal fuller than I have provided here would be 
needed to confirm its superiority. The reason I have not produced this fuller 
account should be obvious. The limitations upon length imposed on a PhD thesis 
requires careful selection of the issues to be addressed, and it remains my firm 
contention at the end of this thesis that professional ethics cannot be properly 
understood by academics or properly recognised by professionals until the deeply 
entrenched biases of The Moral Theory Approach are exposed in the way I have 
attempted here. Thus, I hope to have at least demonstrated the simple but 
profound truth in Bernard Williams' claim that: "Theory and prejudice are not the 
only possibilities for an intelligent agent, or for philosophy. " (Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy, 1985, p. 1120). 
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APPENDIX i(a) 
NURSING ETHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
[All information provided will be treated as confidential) 
INSTRUCTIONS: please tick one or more of the boxes unless 
the question states otherwise. Feel free to 
add comments where you feel they are appropriate. 
Assume the patient/client referred to in the 
questions is a normal adult. 
POSITION (including ward) ................................... 
LENGTH OF NURSING EXPERIENCE ................................ 
HOSPITAL .................................................... 
1. Which of the following describes best what you think is the 
nurses role in patient/client care? 
(A) As someone who should make decisions on behalf of the 
patient, choosing what is in their best interest. II 
(B) As a health technician providing scientific objective 
care in a non-personal manner wherever this is requested. [] 
(C) As an advocate for the patient, promoting and safeguarding 
the interests and well being of the individual. (1 
(D) Other (please specify) 
2. How much influence do you think a nurse should have in the 
choice of medical treatment for the patient. 
(A) A large influence () 
(B) A significant but not large influence (1 
(C) A small influence 1) 
(D) No influence El 
(E) Other (please specify) 
2. 
3. How much influence do you think a nurse should have in the 
choice of care provided on the ward for the patient? 
(A) A large influence. [] 
(B) A significant but not large influence. (3 
(C) A small influence. (3 
(D) No influence. (] 
(E) Other (please specify). 
4. Do you think that it is ever acceptable to override the 
wishes of the patient? 
(A) Never. [] 
(B) Only in very special circumstances. (j 
(C) Only if to do so would be beneficial to their health. (] 
(D) Whenever it is convenient to do so. () 
(E) Other (please specify). 
5. Do you think a nurse should attempt to develop personal 
contact with their patients (eg. befriend them)? 
(A) Yes. 
(B) No. 




6. Do you think it is ever acceptable to fail to tell the 
truth to a patient? 
(A) Never. 
(B) Only if to do so would benefit their health. 




(D) Whenever it is convenient. (I 
(E) Other (please specify). 
7. Do you think a nurse should always obey the orders of a 
doctor? 
(A) Yes. (] 
(B) Not if the order would involve a breach of the law. [] 
(C) Not if the order would involve a breach of contract 
or code of conduct. [] 
(D) Not if the nurse believes the order to be against the 
best interests of the patient. [] 
(E) Not if it is against the wishes of the patient. [] 
(F) Not if the nurse does not want to. [] 
(G) Other (please specify). 
B. Do you think a nurse should cover up a colleague's error? 
(A) Never. 
(B) Not if the mistake is serious. 
(C) Yes if the mistake is not very serious. 
(D) Always. 






9. Do you think it is acceptable for a nurse to expose to 
the general public information about malpractice at their 
hospital? 
(A) Never. 
(B) Not if the malpractice is not very serious. 
(C) Yes if the malpractice is serious. 
(D) Yes if the nurse has exhausted all internal methods 
of rectifying the problem without success. 
(E) Always. 






to. Rate the following duties in order of importance by putting 
the number 1 against what you consider to be the most important 
duty, 2 and 3 against the next and 4 against the least important. 
(A) The nurse's duty to his/her colleagues. 
(B) The nurse's duty to the hospital. 
(C) The nurse's duty to society. 
(D) The nurse's duty to the patient. 
11. Do you think that ethics is an important part of your working 
experience? 
(A) Very Important. 
(B) Important. 
(C) Not very important. 
(D) Unimportant. 










12. Have you read the UKCC Code of Conduct? 
(A) Yes. 
(B) No. 
(C) Other (please specify) 
13. Would you say that the UKCC Code of Conduct has helped 
you make decisions at work? 
(A) Yes. 
(B) No. 
(C) Other (please specify). 
14. Faced with an ethical problem at work how would you usually 
try to solve it? 
(A) Refer to the UKCC Code of Conduct. 
(B) Trust to your own judgement. 
(C) Consult colleagues. 
(D) Ask a senior member of staff for a decision. 
(E) Refer the matter to an ethics committee. 
(F) Other (please specify). 
15. Which of the following do you think would be the best means 
of resolving ethical issues. Put the number 1 against what 
you consider to be the best option 2 against the next best and so on. 
(A) Reference to the UKCC Code of Conduct, 
(B) Trusting your own judgement. 
(C) Consultation with colleagues. 
(D) Seek a decision from senior staff. 















(E) Seek a decision from an ethics committee. 
(F) Other (please specify). 
16. Have you received any form of training in ethics? 
(A) Yes (please specify). 
(B) No ( go to question 18) 
17. Do you think the training you received was helpful? 
(A) Yes. (go to question 19) 
(B) No. (go to question 19) 
(C) Other (please specify) (go to question 19) 
18. Do you think some form of training would be useful? 
(A) Yes. 
(B) No. 
(C) Other (please specify) 
19. Is there an ethics committee at your hospital which deals 
with nursing issues? 
(A) Yes. 
(B) No. 
(C) Other (please specify). 
20. Do you think there is adequate provision at your hospital 
to raise and discuss ethical issues? 
(A) Yes 
(B) NO. 














Please place the questionnaire in the envelope provided and 
either return it directly to me at the address below or give 
it to the nurse responsible for distributing it. 
May I thank you most sincerely for taking the trouble to 
fill in the questionnaire, your help is a very important 
part of my research into nursing ethics. 
If you feel that you would like to participate further 
in my research I would very much appreciate your help 
in two particular ways. I would be grateful for any 
written accounts of particular ethical dilemmas that 
you have personally encountered as a nurse. I shall also 
be conducting informal interviews with nurses so that I 
can discuss with them the sort of ethical issues that 
confront them. If you could help in either or both of these 
ways, either fill in your details below or write to me at 
the following address; 
ROBERT BARON 





NAME .................................. ADDRESS ............................... 
90.0.000.0... 000900004 It 0106.0.46 
09009000QQ0000000900900%606 f$ 400m 
0090.0"0000"0900"0000"0000000000 
I would be able to help with 
1. A written account of an ethical dilemma I have faced [] 
2. An informal interview (3 
(All information provided will be dealt with in strict 
confidence) 
APPENDIX I(b) 
Supplementary questions added to the questionnaire for the second survey of 
opinion among nurses, midwives and health visitors 
21. If you presently work as a nurse in the private sector, or have ever worked as a 
nurse in the private sector, has this changed your conception of what is required of 
you as a registered nurse? 
(A) Yes 
(B) No 
(C) Other (please specify) 
22. Would you say that you personally identify yourself to a significant extent 
with your professional role? 
(A) Yes 
(B) No 
(C) Other (please specify) 
APPENDIX I(c) 
WRITTEN REPORTS 
The following two examples of written reports sent in by nursing professionals have 
had all names and addresses removed to preserve the anonymity of the sender. 
8th January 1993 
Mr Robert Baron 
University of Wolverhampton 





Dear Mr Baron 
I was interested to read, in the Nursing Standard, of your research project and 
thought perhaps a problem experienced in one of our nursing homes might be of 
interest to you. 
Matron of a 60 bedded unit contacted me for advice when her Ist level registered 
nurses threatened to stop administering drugs to a particular patient. The facts 
of the case areas follows. 
T) The patient in question was a retired nursing officer who had as her G. P. a 
close family friend. 
Z) This G. P. would prescribe for any little complaint the patient had. 
3) The list of drugs this lady was receiving became longer and longer. 
4) The problem was compounded by the fact that the patient was fond of a glass 
or two of brandy in the evening. 
5) Nurses began to report that the effect of this relatively small amount of 
alcohol seemed exaggerated and that it was impossible to get the patient to 
the toilet during the night, she was slurring her speech, losing the limited 
power she had in her legs and was becoming incontinent. 
6) Requests to the patient to refrain from alcohol were ignored despite appeals 
to her 'professional knowledge'. 
7) Requests to the G. P. to act on the problem led to long tearful sessions 
between him and his patient which resulted in a token discontinuation of a 
few of the prescribed drugs. 
ß) Over the following weeks these would be reintroduced by the G. P. as ho bowed 
to pressure from the patient. 
9) Nurses felt that because of their professional accountability that they could 
no longer be responsible' for administering drugs at routine times when they 
knew the patient had partaken of alcohol. 
Contd. 
10) This may appear to have a simple solution _ no drugs if alcohol has been 
taken. However, the drugs administered in a private nursing home are the 
property of the patient and not the home. (This of course is different in 
a hospital setting. ) The patient was capable of self administration but 
our nursing home policy dictated that drugs were kept locked in our drugs 
trolley for the protection of other patients who might gain access to supplies 
kept in each bedroom. 
A solution had to be found that protected both the patient and the nurses. 
We decided to seek the advice of the pharmacist responsible for dispensing the 
drugs. This proved to be our salvation. 
He did a full analysis of all the drugs being prescribed from two angles. 
a) The effect of alcohol on each drug. 
b) The effect of each drug on the others. 
In the end he was able to write directly to the G. P. to point out that not only 
was alcohol dangerous with the drug regime prescribed but several of the drugs 
also antagonised each other. 
The G. P. was then forced to act and being aware of his relationship with the patient 
he called in the geriatric consultant who totally changed the patients regime. 
Being a retired nurse she was aware of the pecking order and accepted that her 
G. P. had been overruled. 
Unfortunately the situation has to be dealt with this way on a six monthly basis 
but the nurses are now happy that their ethical problem is solved. 
I hope this tale is of some interest to you. I wish you well with your research. 
yours sincerely 
Robert Baron 
University of Wolverhampton 




Dudley DY1 3HR 
8 January 1993 
Dear Sir, 
I am writing in response to your request in the Nursing Standard. 
I hope that my experience can be of use to you. 
please do not hesitate to contact me if you need to. 
Best wishes, 
IINTRODUCTION 
I am a Registered General Nurse with a background in Occupational 
Health, although now no longer in the profession. 
As a feminist and socialist, I nevertheless hold moral obJections 
to abortion, based on my views of inalienable rights to life for 
all humans but more importantly, on my disapproval of the infliction 
of suffering on others. I believe it is highly probable that fetuses 
are capable of suffering after a certain age of gestation, and that 
to kill a fetus is therefore morally wrong. For similiar reasons 
I am vegetarian. 
I am an atheist, although I respect the Catholic views of "sanctity 
of life" as being very courageous. 
I also believe that abortion is bad for female health, for physical, 
social and pscychological reasons, and still carry around a mental 
picture of an aborted fetus, a vision that influenced my views 
profoundly. 
BACKGROUND 
I have held a number of posts as an Occupational Health Nurse. 
One of these was in a luxury hotel in London, where there were 
many young women. On about 5 occasions, I was called upon to 
counsel women seeking abortion. This usually involved dealing 
with requests for information, about how to obtain an abortion. 
But I had a good rapport with my clients, and many of these women 
were seeking support in their decision, from me. 
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA 
I faced the dilemma of caring for these women and not wanting to 
inflict my views on them. At the same time I felt I was not being 
true to myself if I gave them abortion information without telling 
them how I really felt about it, and I felt that I would also be lying 
to them, if I neglected to tell them this. 
i further believed that abortion would probably cause them problems 
in various ways in the future, and that they should be warned of 
the risks that are there. For example, one young woman was being 
coerced by her husband to have an abortion and I felt that losing 
her baby would be very bad for her health! I also felt that if we 
should give women freedom of information, we should tell them about 
the potential suffering of the fetus. "The silent scream" may be part 
of a propaganda programme but it is still truthful, however 
unpalatable. Only with all information can women make personal 
ethical decisions and I believe that as a health professional I had a 
duty to do this to the best of my ability. 
But I did not want to hurt the women who had come to me for help 
and did not feel I had any right to condemn them. I made many 
mistakes in dealing with these and other subsequent situations in 
other jobs. Eventually Imade the decision to deal with any woman 
coming to me considering a termination in this way; 
I would give them as much information as I knew, including why 
I am against it. I also let them know that even if I may disapprove 
of their decision, I would still offer them support and could not 
condemn them. I felt this way I was being true to everyone. 
CONSEQUENCES 
Every woman I ever dealt with thanked me for supporting her, even 
those who knew of my moral stance. I believe that I managed to 
alienate nobody. 
Some women were influenced by my argument and went on to have their 
babies, with the profound and wonderful change of life that 
entailed. They were glad they had them, including a girl with cystic 
fibrosis with whom I had explored all scenarios with, including her 
own right-to-life. 
Some women had their terminations. They still came back to see me 
for support, including one woman who was experiencing post-operative 
pain etc. 
The young woman who was coerced into having her termination came 
back to me full of pain and anger at her husband. I shared in that 
as best I could, without actually saying "I told you so. " I hope 
that I was of some help to her. 
CONCLUSION 
I truly believe that I behaved to the best of my ability as a 
nurse, and that I acted with the best interests of the women at 
heart at all times. I am not a person who believes in inflicting 
her views on others but I feel these experiences taught me the 
importance of standing up to say what you believe in and being 
true to yourself, which is of course entirely different. 
I don't think any of the women resented me because I believe they 
understood the ethical dilemmas abortion poses. Maybe in other 
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